Historic Overview

In January 1976 the first Guard Force elements arrived at Chikurubi Barracks to establish the Guard Force Training Center [ GFTC ]. This was to be later re-named as  the Guard Force Regimental Depot [ GFRD ]  in 1977.  Offices, quarters and training facilities were shared in those early days, with Intaf, leading sometimes to an uneasy relationship. It should be understood that whilst Intaf were doing a tremendous role in the rural areas they had the difficult task of being ‘friend and protector’ to the local population…..when Guard Force took over the latter role it became a difficult alliance between Guard Force and Intaf in those initial stages. Time would prove however that in general, the two units did work well together for the benefit of the locals and of course to the detriment of the insurgents..

At a later stage other structures, which included Quartermaster Stores, Detention Barracks, Armoury, Motor Transport Section, Signals Section and a Sick Bay / Hospital , formed part of the GFRD. Some elements from the Quartermaster Stores and Signals Section moved at a later stage to other facilities in Salisbury.

The 9th of February 1976 saw the beginning of the first Keep Commander Course. That initial course ran until  the 2nd of April 1976. In total the unit ran in excess of some 16 KC courses during its life, turning out some 400 KCs/Dep KCs.

The first Basic Training Course started on the 14th of February. The Passing-Out Parade took place on the 18th June 1976. Inspecting Officer was the Minister of Defence ,  P K Van der Byl.  Adressing the Guard Force soldiers on parade, he stated that “ from henceforth, to you will fall the responsibility for the protection and safety of the civilian population of the villages “.

In other areas Security Forces lifted all restrictions of movement by people  living in PVs and in October 1978  PVs in the Beitbridge, Chiredzi, Chipinga, Mutasa and Mt.Darwin Areas were taken over from Guard Force by Security Force Auxiliaries [ SFA ]. By 1979 the Transitional Government acknowledged  that the opening of PVs was a mistake because people returning to their homes fell victim to terrorism because they were no longer protected.

The withdraw of Guard Force from the PVs made a large number of soldiers available for other tasks and led to the decision by political and military authorities to deploy Guard Force to protect National Vital Assets like European Farming Areas , Railway Lines and vital industrial and commercial enterprises. Before these new deployments and the establishment of new units and HQs, elements of  Guard Force operated for a few months  in a COIN role in their Group areas of responsibility. (Principally but not restricted to the Operation Hurricane area in the NE). This seemed to be the initial start of the ‘soon to be’  Infantry Battalions of Guard Force.

 Retraining and deployment of these elements within their Group areas continued into the second half of 1978 . Their operational activities and deployments can be seen as the forerunners of the newly formed Infantry Battalions. This was a testing period for the new Guard Force, and as history would dictate it worked.

An unprecedented onslaught on the land to disrupt the economy of the country and to drive commercial farmers off the land, led to an increase of attacks and terror directed against the commercial farming community, homesteads and other farming assets, the farmers themselves, their families and farm labourers and their families. The manpower of the country (principally the European effort) was stretched to breaking point and due to their experiences of the culture and of the land any farmers were being called up into BSAP (PATU). Therefore the protection of these assets fell to a very large extent upon Guard Force.

The farmer became a top soft target on the frontline of this conflict. The vital necessity, as spelled out in the Security Strategy of the country, to maintain the commercial farmer on the land required the provision of security for his family, home and labour. To achieve this objective , Guard Force took over the protection of Key Farming Areas together and  in close cooperation with BSAP /. PATU and other Security Force elements. It began with the deployment of about 500 GF soldiers during 1978. Regional and Area  Headquarters , ensuring proper Command and Control were established in the Operational Areas  HURRICANE, THRASHER, REPULSE, TANGENT and GRAPPLE covering most of the commercial farming areas. GF soldiers were deployed to individual farms, with the local control centre being based at the BSAP offices.

Their task was to assist the farmer in security related tasks, clearance patrols, escort duties and defending the farm homestead, the farmer and his family and labour against attacks by insurgents. Reaction Forces were based at the relevant HQs. Local Reaction Forces were based at BSAP Stations and worked closely with BSAP / PATU. Some Regional / Area Headquarters responsibilities included the protection of Government and Municipality installations and industrial and commercial enterprises of vital importance to the economy of the country. Protection of key installations in Salisbury led to the establishment of a Guard Force Urban Protection Group based at New Sarum / Salisbury during 1979.

In May 1979 1 Battalion Guard Force [ 1BN ] was formally  established, using the manpower from GP 5 Mrewa, GP 6 Mtoko and GP 7 Mudzi and later GP 8 Beitbridge . During the first few months of its existence, companies of the Battalion operated in an area-bound COIN Infantry role in their former Group areas . In September 1979 the Battalion was allocated the task to protect the Railway Line between Beitbridge and Gwelo. 1 BN consisted of six Companies and a HQ element which was based at Rutenga. This railway line to South Africa was the lifeline of the country and was given a high Defence priority.

Shortly thereafter 2 Battalion Guard Force [ 2 BN ] was established with the responsibility to protect the Railway Line between Bulawayo and Victoria Falls . Its HQ was situated at the Cyrene Mission near Bulawayo.

3 Battalion Guard Force [ 3 BN ] was the last established Guard Force unit with its HQ at Stamford Farm west of Salisbury . The Battalion deployed its companies as  independent operating Infantry companies  and played an important role during the period leading up to the March 1980 election.                                                                                                                          Changes in the role of Guard Force did not change the role of the individual Guard Force members who fought as soldiers from the day of the establishment of Guard Force as the fourth arm of the Rhodesian Security Forces to the final days of the Bush War.

On the day, when the deployed units in the field received the signal  from  Guard Force Headquarters to stand down was an emotional time for all.. It was a  sad moment  reading the signal which cited the words of  Rudyard Kipling, the great poet of the British Empire (and friend of the common soldier), “ ………. now, the time has come to quietly unfurl your tents and fade away ……” .

For the 206 soldiers of the Guard Force, black and white, who made the ultimate sacrifice, their final rollcall came before this painful day.

Keep Cmdr Charles Provis , the last Guard Force casualty of the War, was killed on the 15 March 1980 on active service. As a soldier he fought and as a soldier he died.

Guard Force units and HQs stood down between the 11 May and 25 June 1980.        

Each Keep was meant to have a European Keep Commander (KC) and a European Keep Deputy (KD), plus an African Keep Sergeant or Keep Corporal, three Junior Corporals and some 24 Guards. The European KCs and KDs were reservists on call up. The African personnel were regulars.

At dawn they checked the access roads for mines using prodders. During the day their job was to check everyone leaving the PV to make sure they were not carrying food for the terrorists and to ensure they were back by curfew at nightfall. During the night they patrolled the PV’s security fence to keep the guerrillas from contacting the civilian population after dark.

The logistics of sustaining PV groups from north to south of the entire country were tenuous and the increasing use of mines by the terrorists led to the issuing ofthe first MAPs – Kudus and Pumas – to group headquarters in order to supply the isolated Keeps along the easily mined and ambushed graded dirt roads of the TTLs.

Guards were initially issued with old .303 rifles, some of which had pre-1923 British South Africa Company stamps. These were gradually replaced by worn ex-army SLR rifles of dubious reliability and eventually by new German G3s. Each Keep was later also meant to have a 60mm Commando mortar.

Mine prodders.

In early/mid 1979 the Muzorewa Government handed over responsibility for security in the PVs to the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs). This allowed Guard Force to disband its PV Groups and use their manpower to form three infantry battalions (1, 2 and 3 Battalions).

Farm Protection.

The terrorists increasingly managed to infiltrate through the TTLs into white commercial farming areas, so Guard Force was also ordered to take up farm protection. A Regional Headquarters (RHQs “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” and “E”) was formed under each JOC containing white commercial farms. RHQs were essentially battalion-equivalent administrative headquarters. Beneath them were subordinate company-equivalent Area Headquarters (AHQs).

Farm protection actually entailed guarding the life of the farmer and his family in order to keep them on the land. Material damage to farms was meant to be covered by government compensation schemes. However, farmers on occasion had to be restrained from misusing the Guards they were allocated to guard their labour, crops, machinery or property.

The Guards were meant to live within the security fence of each farmhouse. Their accommodation and beds were to be provided by the farmers. Food was to be bought by the Guards from their S&T money and had to be made available by the farmer. This was usually done by giving them access to normal farm rations and could be supplemented by purchases in town while acting as vehicle guards.

The Guards were to mount an all-night guard on the farmhouse perimeter, within which they were allocated fire positions in the event of an attack. At dawn they were to conduct an early morning mine detection patrol down the drive to the nearest council-maintained road. For this purpose they were issued with mine-prodders. During the day they were to provide a bodyguard and vehicle escorts for the farmer as he worked his lands. To do this comprehensively required about eight guards, but such numbers were seldom available.

AHQs had both an administrative function maintaining the two or three Guards posted on each exposed farm and an operational function in areas where they supplemented or replaced police reserve motorised reaction units. For the latter purpose each AHQ was on the Agric Alert net and by early 1979 typically had a Puma and a Kudu 6 or Kudu Ram. Where the police reservist reaction units had been completely replaced, an AHQ often also got one or more Leopards and/or other light civilian MAPs belonging to the local farmers’ area co-ordinating committee (ACC). Follow-ups after a farm attack were primarily the preserve of the local PATU on motorbikes, but Guard Force was also employed on them. As a result AHQs also developed an infantry element and were issued with heavier weapons. For example, by mid 1979, in addition to old SLR and new G3 rifles, AHQ “F” had a 60mm Commando mortar and 12 South African-supplied .303 Bren guns.

Urban Protection.

After the attack on the Salisbury oil depot on 11 December 1978, Guard Force was given responsibility for its protection. The first Guards for urban protection were initially provided by rotating through the senior recruit course from GFRD at Chikurubi as a form of operational training. However, during 1979 the Urban Protection Group became a separate unit based at New Sarum.

Line-of-Rail Protection.

In mid 1979 1 and 2 Battalions were put on line-of-rail guard duties in the west and south of the country respectively. In addition to conventional Crocodiles and Kudus, they both manned rail-mounted Kudus and Rhinos on the rail lines themselves and patrolled on foot to mount OPs and ambushes beside the tracks. The crews of the rail MAPs were unique in Guard Force in that they received helmets for use in the vehicles.

Infantry Role.

3 Battalion, went straight into a full infantry role in the second half of 1979, initially in the Sub-JOC Mtoko area and from mid-1979 in other parts of Mashonaland. Its headquarters was essentially administrative. Subordinate to it were six independent infantry companies on active operations. They were organised and flexibly deployed in much the same way as Police Support Unit companies. Each company had four platoons, one of which was always on R&R on a six-weeks-on, two-weeks-off cycle, thereby allowing the company to remain permanently in the field. Each company was fully motorised, including at least three Crocodiles, a Puma flatback, a Kudu X and a Land Rover. Weaponry now included a full issue of MAGs, 60mm Commando mortars, 42Z rifle grenades, hand grenades etc. A76 radios.

Future Plans.

3 Battalion was the model for future Guard Force development. At the end of 1979 the majority of Guard Force was on farm protection, but a new policy was being introduced for a structured farm militia to be trained and equipped by the BSAP using farm labourers. This would then release the rest of Guard Force for the infantry role. For example, at the ceasefire AHQ “F” had been partly replaced by the new farm militia in the Mtoko-Mrewa area and was due to become the first farm protection unit fully converted to the infantry role. The plan was to create a total of eight infantry battalions by converting the five RHQs into five additional infantry battalions, but the ceasefire prevented any further move in this direction.

This would have made an all infantry Guard Force of eight battalions little distinguishable in role and equipment from the diluted RAR of eight battalions under consideration by late 1979 or the eight battalions of RR, which were largely manned by African soldiers by the same date. The logical conclusion would have been to absorb Guard Force into the Rhodesian Army.

Symbolic of this new infantry role was a sleeve badge (not mentioned in any of the Rhodesian uniform books). This was designed, approved and ordered in late 1979 and the first sample was received in early 1980. However, it was never introduced because the war ended. It was to be of the same size and shape as the Rhodesian Army “Lion and Pick” flash and worn in the same place. However, its background field was to be horizontal brown/red/brown stripes like the Guard Force stable belt, and its device was to be a vertical, yellow, Roman sword with “IV” on its hilt. The design of the sword was to be the same as on the “Bastion” cap badge. However, the crenellated tower found on the “Bastion” cap badge was no longer to be used. This was symbolic of Guard Force’s move from a defensive protective function to an offensive infantry role. At the same time a pullover of Army pattern, but in the same neutral brown colour as Intaf’s V-neck pullovers was trialled.

Anomalies and Complexities.

The above is a somewhat simplified version of a complex process drawn entirely from memory. There were numerous anomalies. For example, in my area alone there was as an eight-man horse stick with a heavy barrelled FN as support weapon (useful), an unreliable Browning HMG mounted on a pack mule (untested in action), a bicycle section (abandoned as useless) and two ACC Leopards on loan (which an American sergeant immobilised by clumsily pulling the gear levers out of both). My men were also guarding the Grey’s Scouts killer dog section and two related radio-controlled rustled-cattle detector stations (see below). For a while I was put in charge of the officer-less E Company of 1 RDR because Sub-JOC Mtoko was under BSAP command and had no army officers present for some of the second half of 1979 and early 1980.

Guard Force MAPs.

I am certain that Guard Force was issued with CMED Pumas, Puma Flatbacks, Crocodiles, Kudu 6s, Kudu Rams, Kudu Xs, Cougar 6s and mine protected Land Rovers, either because I had them myself or observed other units that did. It reportedly also had Kudu 8s before they were cut down to Kudu 6s and may also have had Kudu 4s. In addition Guard Force units were sometimes lent civilian MAPS, particularly Leopards.

However, I did not observe Guard Force units with CMED Moon Buggies, Hyaenas (PSU), Leopards (Intaf., PTC), Cougar 4s (BSAP and CMED itself), Low Profile Crocodiles (SFAs) or Jackals (PTC). (Brackets indicate agencies I observed using these vehicles.)

Observations on CMED and the Puma as issued to Guard Force.

Numbers of us in Guard Force had suggestions for modifications to CMED designs to meet our own requirements. However, we were told by our MT Section that they had no influence over CMED and that their previous suggestions had been rejected or ignored.

Probably the best vehicle available to us in the PV and Farm Protection role was the Puma. Personally, I also preferred it in the infantry role as well.

Looking at it as an infantry carrier, the Puma’s two-compartment configuration seemed an advantage over the Crocodile. If a Crocodile took an RPG hit anywhere the blast seemed likely to incapacitate both driver and crew, at least temporarily. However, if a Puma took an RPG hit in the cab, its passenger compartment could still function to return fire, while the driver could still drive out of the killing zone if the passenger compartment was hit. Furthermore, the Crocodile’s high sides were a deterrent to debussing, while the Puma’s were easily negotiated.

From a purely Guard Force point of view, as a unit with limited transport, the Puma was a much more versatile vehicle than the Crocodile or a Flatback. In my two Pumas (G-LMA 351 and G-LMA 352) one or both of the benches in the passenger compartment could be unbolted to convert it from a 16-seat APC into either to a mixed 8-seater/load carrier or a complete load carrier. It was thus almost as useful as either a Crocodile or a Flatback in their specialist roles and also capable of acting as a hybrid. This flexibility did not exist in the earlier Police Puma or later Crocodile, in which the seats were fixed.

The high sided Crocodile was also much more inclined to roll than the Puma, which was an important factor given our recently trained drivers.

Communications.

Guard Force had its own national Command Net for A & Q matters. All those attending Commander’s Conferences were on the Command Net.

The headquarters of Farm Protection units were also on the Agric Alert net used by all farmers. Sub-JOCs and local Police stations were also on this net. Where Guard Force provided the local reaction sticks responding to farm attacks, mobile Agric Alert sets could also be fitted in its vehicles.

PV units on patrol used portable A61 radios. These were fully compatible with Intaf radios, but were only partially compatible with Army A63 and A76 radios or Police A73 radios. However, farm protection units later got A63 radios and the infantry battalions had A76 radios.

Codes were known as Shackle ????. They were changed monthly.

Miscellany.

A peculiar Leopard handling characteristic.

In my area we had several small graded roads with a steep camber. In heavy rain they naturally became slippery. I found that once the Leopard’s heavier rear end had slid down the side the vehicle did not have the traction to get it back into the centre of the road. However, it was still possible to keep the lighter front wheels in the middle of the road and aligned with it. As a result it was possible for a Leopard to advance crab-like for hundreds of yards with its rear end virtually in the ditch and its front end in the centre of the road.

Flying Ants.

An unusual problem was flying ants, which fortunately only swarmed one or two nights a year. Because of the curfew and black out in farming areas it was often the case that the only exposed lights for many miles around at night were vehicle headlights. These seemed to attract every insect from one horizon to the other. On one occasion flying ants blocked my windscreen wipers several times and clogged up the radiator of my Puma so that it began to over heat.

60mm Commando Mortar.

We were told of three weaknesses in the 60mm Commando mortar. Firstly we were instructed not to fire it from a stone or concrete base because the recoil might break the base plate. Secondly we were told not to use the auxiliary charges that came with 60mm mortar bombs in order to give them extra range because the tube might not be able to withstand the extra pressure. Thirdly, we were warned that the locking arm that bound the tube to the base plate was weak. Sure enough, mine broke. That said, I still found the mortar a very useful bit of kit, being light and simple to operate.

Elida Flares.

The Elida Flare came in an olive green plastic canister 3-4 inches high and about 2 inches in diameter, the upper third of which was the top. Within the base part was the combustible material. This was lit by striking a match against a strip of striking paper (as found on the side of a match box). Both match and striking paper were attached to the top of the base. (I think there were also two protruding wires to allow for electrical detonation). The Elida Flare burned with a white light and gave off white smoke. It was apparently produced by the Black brothers at the Leopard/Leopardess/Termite Mines complex in the Midlands about 50 kilometres north of Queque. (I deduce this because I saw hundreds of empty Elida flare plastic canisters there after the war.) The Elida flare was a very cheap product issued to Guard Force and Intaf. I do not know if other agencies possessed them. I never heard of them being used on operations, but I did use them to start fires in order to burn camp rubbish. However, even in these favourable conditions I found that only about a third ignited.

The most useful part of the Elida Flare turned out to be the discarded top, which fitted snugly over standard issue plastic water bottle tops, the ends of which frequently popped off when over tightened. The Elida Flare top produced a virtually water-tight seal for damaged plastic water bottle tops. One of my trackers, Guard Mhlaba, got a R$50 award for discovering this and thereby saving the country considerable foreign currency.

Rhodesian G3 Rifle Modifications.

There was a tendency for second rate troops like Guard Force to panic and let off all four magazines on automatic within seconds and without aiming. Therefore a spot weld was put on the change lever of the G3 so that it could not engage automatic and single (hopefully aimed) shots would have to be used instead.

Imported G3 magazines were apparently meant to be disposable and were very lightly built. However, in Rhodesia they were not expendable. Unfortunately, because of our chest webbing they were easily damaged when taking up a prone position and tended to jam. As a result, Guard Force was increasingly issued with stronger, Rhodesian-made magazines. However, these rusted easily and also tended to jam easily.

It appears that, when they were imported, the G3s were not accompanied by the appropriate number of zeroing tools. As a result a local version of the zeroing tool was produced. Unfortunately, these were not very durable and wore out easily. In late 1979 I had the only two (worn) G3 zeroing tools between Nyamapanda on the Moczambican border and Salisbury. Neither Intaf. at Mudzi, Mtoko or Mrewa, nor the Auxiliaries in the same area had any at all. This probably meant over a thousand DSAs and SFAs without a zeroed G3 rifle between the lot of them!

Andre Holland.

If memory serves me correctly (and it may not), Andre Holland’s constituency included the Mtoko-Mrewa farming area. He was widely despised by the farmers there because he rarely visited their exposed area. They were not at all surprised that he developed a close interest in anti-ambush protection!

Above article kindly supplied by Asst/Cmdt Mark Axworthy

The article “ GUARD  FORCE  NEWS “  was written by the first Commander of Guard Force, MAJ GEN  G.A.D. RAWLINS, OLM  and published in the RAR publication  NHOWO  in Oct 1976.

GUARD  FORCE  NEWS

Word has it that in some quarters the Guard Force is called 4 RAR, well, it is a nice thought and probably a happy coincidence that the Deputy Commander, is also Honorary Colonel of the Regiment. Like everyone else we seem to be expanding in all directions and the capacity of the Training Centre should be increased to 500 men in about a month,s time – competing with Shaw Barracks ?

Certainly there is a strong 1 RAR flavour in the Guard Force, the following senior ranks all served in that battalion:

·       Maj Gen Rawlins, OLM, CO 1968-70.

·       Brig W.A. Godwin, DMM,OBE, CO 1964-68.

·       Force Sergeant Major Matambo, ICD, BEM, RSM.

·       WO2 Mudavanhu, E-Coy.

·       WO2 Shamu, HQ Coy.

·       WO2 Zondo, A-Coy.

·       WO2 Herod, E-Coy.

·       WO2 Alison Jubane, D-Coy.

·       WO2 Thomas Mkupe, B-Coy.

·       WO2 Tanyanyiwa, HQ Coy.

·       WO2 Masosa. HQ Coy.

·       WO” Tichareva, HQ Coy.

·       Senior Sgt Bobo, A-Coy.

·       Senior Sgt Alikomas, HQ Coy.

·       Senior Sgt Simukayi, HQ Coy.

·       Senior Sgt Adion Ngwenya, HQ Coy.

Space only permits these names but there are also a considerable number of Sergeants and junior NCOs who are ex-RAR. We could do with a great deal more and if the battalions have any chaps who are getting a little beyond really active duty, we would more than welcome interviewing them.

FSM Matambo is a tower of strength at the Training Centre and it is quite amusing to see the reaction of ex-service men arriving to enlist; these vary from pleasure to something verging upon alarm. The latter category normally do not seem to stay very long. Another tower of strength is WO2 Shamu, our senior African instructor; with his persuasive ways the raw recruits rapidly become that so dear to a Sergeant Major’s heart - a uniformed body of disciplined men.

With few exceptions, the Officers and NCOs are ex-Rhodesian Army and it was logical, therefore, that the Guard Force be modelled on Army ways and procedures. Working closely as we do with Ministry of Internal Affairs we tend to forget that they are not familiar with military jargon. At a recent meeting at which kit was discussed, a remark was made  “ Simple, really, check his 1157, do a quick 406 on his kit and, if necessary, sort it out with a P1954 “. It is hardly surprising that our friends looked a little bewildered.

Going back to the business of expansion, we are aiming at establishing a Reserve of Officers and should any readers be interested in serving part-time duty with the Guard Force, please contact us. What we are after are ex-Officers preferably with no service commitment. Provided that volunteers are fit, keen and reasonably active there is no rigid upper age limit. [ On reflection, this article seems to be assuming strong recruiting overtones so we will hurriedly stop ].

We send our comrades in the Regiment our greetings, best wishes and every success in the future.

Fabayi  zvakanaka  wakoma  wedu !

Passing-out parade Chikurubi with reviewing officer MoD 18.6.76. We are quoting some of his address to the recruits. I found the following lines quoted on the internet at the same occasion. :   And he added that “ I hope before long you will have killed your first terrorist “ . HORST.