Research

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GOVERNANCE AND STATE CAPACITY IN FRAGILE ENVIRONMENTS

"Bureaucrats at War: The Resilient State in the Congo," African Affairs, 2020.


Abstract: Rebels often use a state-like image to legitimize their rule, but little is known about their on-the-ground relations with the administrators of state power—official bureaucrats. This article fills this gap by examining bureaucratic practices in conflict zones. Drawing on fieldwork in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it argues that bureaucrats actively sustain state institutions and recruit rebel support during war. The article develops a theoretical framework to trace how bureaucrats use a strategic resource—their recognized authority to confer state legitimization and legality—to negotiate with rebels. This entails struggles on two fronts. On a first, bureaucrats use official certificates, codes, and paperwork to produce state legitimacy in conflict zones and exchange it with rebels to purchase protection. On a second, bureaucrats aim to preserve their brokerage role over this legitimacy resource. Quotidian practices of noncompliance such as evasions, parallel taxes, and sabotaged information, can prevent rebels from appropriating administrations outright. Original records from four Congolese rebel groups illustrate how bureaucrats maneuver between compliance and resistance. Real-time records demonstrate the continuity of bureaucratic practice during war, and offer glimpses into everyday governance practices. It contributes to literature on rebel governance, public authority, and failed states.

"In Search of Order: State Systems of Property Rights Enforcement and their Failings" in Sandra Joireman, Where there is No Government: Enforcing Property Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, Oxford University Press, 2011.


Abstract: Accepted wisdom regarding the geography of power in most African countries holds that power radiates outward from the center, with the strength of the state most pronounced in the capital and often barely discernable in the hinterland. With the intense urbanization in many African countries over the past decade we are increasingly seeing areas and populations that are geographically proximate to the center of power, yet as beyond state control as the geographic hinterland. Urban informal settlements are “pockets of statelessness” within capital cities that often have neither formal political representation nor basic public goods. This chapter explores the persistence of one of these “pockets of statelessness,” the Kibera slum community in urban Nairobi, and identifies why attempts to title and enforce property rights there have been bypassed. Four competing enforcement regimes (state courts, NGOs, bureaucratic entrepreneurs, and gangs) are identified within Kibera, and their effectiveness with regard to social welfare is evaluated.

UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATONAL INTERVENTION

"Peace-building as State-building? Lessons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo" in The State of Peacebuilding in Africa: Lessons Learned for Policymakers and Practitioners. Edited volume organized by the Wilson Center, forthcoming 2020.

"Militarizing the Peace: United Nations Intervention against Congo's 'Terrorist' Rebels" Lawfare Institute and the Brookings Institute, Lawfare blog, June 2019

GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY: POLITICS OF HEALTH IN CONTEXTS OF VIOLENCE

What are the effects of insecurity on containing public health crises? What governance changes occur locally?

EBOLA OUTBREAK 2018-2020:

Policy pieces

"Clichés Can Kill in Congo" Foreign Policy, April 2019


Listening to voices from residents in the outbreak area to understand resistance to the response teams:


Media appearances:



REBEL ORAGNIZATION

Violent Institutions: Rebellion, Bureaucracy and Wartime State Capture (Book manuscript)


My book manuscript examines varied patterns of rebel-state engagement during armed conflict and the processes of institutional change that they entail. Conventional wisdom portrays conflict zones as lacking institutions or pitting armed groups and states as competitors. Yet, my dissertation shows that rebels and state agents often negotiate to realize interests on both sides. Drawing on new data the Democratic Republic of Congo, my dissertation examines how state agents maintain institutions that collect revenue and monitor resource flows in rebel-held territories. Through subnational case comparison, it identifies four sets of accommodations—collusion, cooptation, entrenchment, and displacement—that differ according to rebels’ use of the state apparatus and where authority resides. I trace these interactions in the political economy of war as rebels and states co-administer taxation and cross-border trade.
During fieldwork, I negotiated unprecedented access to the internal records of four armed groups', including rebels’ financial transactions, correspondences with business partners and government agencies, as well as budgets, payrolls, and tax ledgers. These unusually comprehensive records provide data to trace the social relationships that governed resources during civil war and offer unprecedented insights into the inner workings of rebel organization.

DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS OF ARMED CONFLICT

Particular interest in the methodology and data sources of studying contemporary armed conflict

"Field Research in Dangerous Environments" In Chris Barrett, Jeffrey Cason, Erin Lentz, Overseas Research: A Practical Guide, 3rd ed. Routeledge, 2020.

Working Papers:

"Rebel Records: The Pen, Not Just the Sword, of Violent Organization "

"Knowing What we Don't: The Problem of (Mis)Attributing Civil War Violence"