Abstracts

1. How the Human Brain forms Optimistic Beliefs

Tali Sharot, University College London

We are constantly flooded with information (via the Web, advertising, colleagues, friends etc.) that helps us form predictions about the future and make decisions. One of the most salient attributes of information is valence: whether a piece of news is good or bad. Classic theories in psychology, economics and machine learning all implicitly assume that beliefs are adjusted in a similar manner in response to desirable and undesirable information. In this talk I will provide evidence challenging these assumptions. I will show that while people incorporate good news into their existing beliefs in a normative manner, they discount bad news leading to optimistically biased beliefs. The asymmetry, however, is not set in stone, but fluctuates in response to changes in the environment in a way that may be adaptive. Using a combination of fMRI, TMS and DTI we characterize the neural system supporting this asymmetry and show that variation in this circuit is related to individual differences in behaviour and mental health, with more balanced incorporation of information observed in depression and middle age.

2. We are holier than thou: Asymmetric learning about the moral behaviour of ingroups and outgroups

Ben Tappin, Royal Holloway, London

Intergroup conflict is characterized by the belief, held on both sides, that the other group is malevolent, unjust, and nefarious. In contrast, the ingroup is believed to be virtuous and morally good. In this talk I will present preliminary data from our lab that shows these beliefs may be underpinned by systematic asymmetries in belief updating for moral information about the in- vs. -outgroup. Specifically, unfavourable moral information appears to be incorporated into existing beliefs about the ingroup to a lesser extent than for an outgroup. Insofar as social group memberships constitute an important part of our identity, these data are consistent with a self-protection account of social feedback processing.

3. Is the Optimism Bias an Adaptation?

Anneli Jefferson, University of Birmingham

When individuals display cognitive biases, they are prone to developing systematically false beliefs. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that rather than being a flaw in human cognition, biases may actually be design features. In my paper, I assess the claim that the optimism bias is such a design feature. Proponents of this claim have pointed out that when individuals make decision under uncertainty, it can be advantageous to err on the side of overestimating one’s chances of success if the potential gains through success are high and the potential costs of failure are low. I assess whether such an explanation for the optimism bias is plausible by exploring whether the kind of optimistically biased thinking that people exhibit is indeed sensitive to costs and benefits of failure in the way the model would predict. I also compare this type of explanation to alternative explanations for optimistically biased thinking.

4. The Unbearable Lightness of Being Wonderful

Constantine Sedikides, University of Southampton

What do people want to know about themselves? What kind of information do they solicit from others? What sort of feedback do they remember? These questions are addressed by self-evaluation motives and, in particular, self-enhancement/self-protection, self-assessment, and self-verification. The self-enhancement and self-protection motives refer to the pursuit of positive feedback and the avoidance of negative feedback. Self-assessment motivation refers to the pursuit of accurate feedback (be it positive or negative), whereas self-verification refers to the pursuit of feedback consistent with pre-existing self-beliefs (positive or negative). Adopting a comparative-testing framework, self-enhancement and self-protection motives are pit against self-assessment and self-verification motives in information-gathering settings and feedback situations. It is concluded the self-enhancement and self-protection are the predominant self-evaluation motivations. Support from this view is obtained from a cross-cultural perspective. Individual differences in self-enhancement will be considered. The talk will conclude with a consideration of the origins—societal, individual, evolutionary—of self-enhancement and self-protection motives.

5. Consequences of Unrealistic Optimism

James Shepperd, University of Florida

Although researchers have published over 1,000 studies on unrealistic optimism, most of the studies have focused on demonstrating the phenomenon, examining boundary conditions or documenting causes. Surprisingly few studies have examined the consequences of unrealistic optimism. I review research on the consequences of unrealistic comparative optimism (the belief that one’s future will be better than the future of peers) and unrealistic absolute optimism (the belief that one’s future will be better than the future suggested objective indicators). Studies examining both types of unrealistic optimism reveal mixed findings, with some research suggesting that unrealistic optimism corresponds with favorable outcomes, other research suggesting that it corresponds with unfavorable outcomes, and still other research suggesting that unrealistic optimism is inconsequential. My talk tries to make sense of the mixed findings and provide direction for future research in the area.

6. Rational Hope

Miriam McCormick, Richmond University

The state of “holding true” is one that applies to a diversity of attitudes: beliefs, assumptions, acceptances, imaginings, and hopes are all different ways that one can regard propositions as true. It makes no sense to talk about norms or correctness conditions applying to some of these “holding true” attitudes. Such would be the case with a supposition put forth in the course of a philosophical argument to see what follows, or for what is held true in the context of imaginative play. Of course, beliefs are such that they can be assessed according to correctness conditions. There will always be something wrong with believing a false proposition; some norm has been violated. It is clear that beliefs can be evaluated and assessed as rational or not in a way that imaginings cannot. But what about hope? Are “hopings’” open to rational assessment and evaluation? I will argue that they are, but in a way that parallels rational evaluation of emotions. Just as one can be criticized for inappropriate anger, one can be criticized for inappropriate hope. The “norms” of hope include both practical and epistemic dimensions and so exploring the senses in which we can distinguish between rational and irrational hope will help to further support the idea that the cognitive and affective components of our minds are intermeshed and overlapping in a way that often gets overlooked by philosophical treatment of mental attitudes.

7. Sadder but safer: Optimistic causal illusions can affect our health

Fernando Blanco, Bilbao

The human cognitive system is fine-tuned to detect patterns in the environment, with the aim of predicting important outcomes and, eventually, to optimize behavior. Built under the logic of the least-costly mistake, this system has evolved biased to not overlook any meaningful pattern, even if this means that some false-alarms will occur, just as when we detect a causal link between two events that are actually unrelated (i.e., a causal illusion). Experimental research has proven that causal illusions are less prevalent in depressed people, who are more realistic in judging causality. Thus, causal illusions are one of the costs of being optimistic, and it has important consequences. For instance, it has been proposed that causal illusions might underlie many of today's widespread false beliefs and superstitions that are particularly worrying when they concern health-related issues, such as believing in pseudomedicine. Therefore, it is possible that optimistic people, who naturally show causal illusions, are in higher risk of developing dangerous beliefs about their health. Fortunately, further experimental studies have revealed which factors lead to the causal illusion and how to counteract them. Today, we are in the position to keep an optimistic view on life while reducing one of its dangers, the causal illusion that leads to harmful health-related beliefs.

8. Optimism and Agency

Lisa Bortolotti, University of Birmingham

We need a theoretical framework for understanding the conflicting messages coming from the empirical literature on optimism bias and positive illusions. On the one hand, the optimism bias and positive illusions seem to have a number of psychological benefits for agents: they lead to higher motivation and persistence in pursuing goals, and ultimately to achieving those goals. Positive illusions also support personal growth and a sense of control: events are seen as stressful when the agent does not get a sense that she can control them, but agents who are curious and engaged see challenges as opportunities to grow and improve. On the other hand, the optimism bias and positive illusions have been reported to have negative effects. Optimism may prevent agents from coming to terms with how things actually are and from acknowledging and preparing for likely risks and threats. Further, it has been suggested that positive illusions may interfere with success in personal relationships and with coping strategies. Finally, optimism bias and positive illusions may be associated with narcissism and aggression. What is the message we should take home then? Are the optimism bias and positive illusions something beneficial or harmful? I will argue that they are beneficial when they do support our sense of agency and they are harmful when they interfere with it. The successful agent is positive and motivated, but not blind to the constraints of her physical and social environment.