Øivind Schøyen
PH.D.
Hi there!
My name is Øivind Schøyen (I use the anglicization Evan when I am abroad).
I am an Associate Professor of Economics at the School of Business and Economics, UiT The Arctic University of Norway.
My research fields are experimental, behavioral, and, comparative economics. My research focus on how people with different notions of fairness interact with each other, how we come to think of something as fair and how states interact with peoples notions of fairness.
Current working papers:
A Theory of Moral Authority: Moral Choices Under Moral Network Externality
with Avner Greif, Stanford University
Abstract: Why do people choose to follow a demanding moral authority even in situations in which a less demanding alternative exists? Can social imitation alone sustain meaningful moral equilibrium? What factors underpin and limit the power of moral authorities? This paper addresses these questions by developing a choice-theoretic model of moral authorities, moral standards, and moral behaviour. We show that sustaining meaningful moral behaviour is possible if some actors choose to provide, and others choose to follow, a person providing moral guidance. Our theory builds on literature in cultural evolution, biology, and psychology on how guilt has become an adaptive trait.
Link to slides and video of the presentation at The Cultural Evolution Conference in Sapporo 2021 HERE. Slides available upon request.
Geostrategic competition and the balance between state and society: theory and historical evidence from the rivalry between Aragon and Genoa, 1358-1497
with Jean-Pascal Bassino, ENS Lyon
Abstract: Heightened geostrategic competition enhances the strategic value to central powers of controlling peripheral territories. How does increased strategic value affect the balance between state and society? We consider the historical case of the relationship of the Mediterranean islands of Corsica and Sardinia to Genoa and Aragon in the late medieval period. Strategic competition between Genoa and Aragon had opposing effects on the two islands; strengthening society on Corsica while strengthening the feudal state on Sardinia. We develop a novel four-player game between two competing regional powers, the local elite, and the local society. We show how an increased strategic value of controlling a territory can both strengthen or weaken its society depending on society's ability to insurrect.
Old working paper at SSRN; major revision ready April 2024, Long abstract here. Slides available upon request.
Working papers forthcoming 2024:
Accumulation, deterrence, and group identity: A rationalist explanation for war Solo theory paper.
A Two-Step Auction for A Two Price Equilibrium Markets Theory paper, with Sjur Kristoffer Dyrkolbotn, Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, and Hannu Vartiainen, University of Helsinki
Measuring the efficacy of coercion: An Empirical Test with Espen Sirnes, UIT, and Chris Andresen UIT
Published work: ORCID (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4610-3342)
Political Coercion in Cliometrics Handbookchapter in the "Handbook of Cliometrics"
Schøyen, Ø. (2024). Political Coercion and Cliometrics. In: Diebolt, C., Haupert, M. (eds) Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_82-1
Abstract: States can use various negative incentive schemes against non-state morality groups. When the strength of this pressure is sufficiently strong to be labeled malignant, these measures fall within the definition of political coercion surveyed in this chapter. The survey focuses on a selection of rational actor theories explaining the macro-level political coercion published in the last 20 years. We also refer to literature in adjacent fields aimed at creating an understanding of political coercion. Some of the theories explain outcomes that relate to the absence of political coercion, that is democracy, state-society balance, and liberty.
Suspicious Minds and Views of Fairness [Experiment & Theory paper] Theory and Decision
Citation:
Schøyen, Øivind. "Suspicious minds and views of fairness." Theory and Decision (2024): 1-22.
Poster presentation here.
Abstract: Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions? In a novel experimental design, I find that participants are significantly more likely to attribute a no redistribution vote to selfishness if they consider redistribution fair. I define this, attributing actions that do not adhere to one's own fairness view to selfishness, as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to show how suspicious attribution arises from two other findings from the experiment: the participants underestimate the number of people who have a fairness view differing from their own, and, overestimate the selfishness of participants with other fairness views.
Rejecting Non-Paternalist Motivation: An Experimental Test with Xianwen Chen [Experiment paper] ( Journal of Experimental Political Science)
Citation:
Chen, X., & Schøyen, Ø. (2021). Rejecting Non-Paternalist Motivation: An Experimental Test. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 1-7. doi:10.1017/XPS.2021.12
JEPS Blog coverage: "What motivates people to impose their view upon others?" [LINK]
Replication data available online at Havard Dataverse from this [LINK].
Suplementary material including simple decision problem: [LINK]
Working paper available at SSRN.
Abstract: Is people’s willingness to implement their fairness views on a group dependent on how many in the group share their view? We designed a new experiment to answer this question. Spectator participants were asked how many other participants they believe share their view of whether it is fair to redistribute income in a work task. They were then given the option to pay two cents to implement the distribution they found fair upon a pair of participants who had completed the work task. Although spectator participants systematically overestimate how many share their fairness view, being informed about the true number does not affect their decision to implement the distribution they found fair. The results suggest that people are motivated to implement their fairness view regardless of whether their view is at odds with that of those who are affected.
What limits the efficacy of coercion? [Theory paper] (Available as open access: Cliometrica)
Citation:
Øivind, Schøyen. "What limits the efficacy of coercion?." Cliometrica 15.2 (2021): 267-318. Doi . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-020-00207-0
Working paper version: NHH Discussion paper "What limits the powerful?" available at SSRN.
Abstract: We model a game between an authority, seeking to implement its state identity, and a parental generation, seeking to socialise a younger generation into their own identity. The authority first selects a coercion level against the non-state identity. The parental generation then chooses whether to insurrect in response to the coercion level and, if not, decides how much to invest in socialising their children into the non-state identity. In this overlapping generations model, we formalise and explore the consequences of an intrinsic negative reaction to coercion: coercion resentment. We show how coercion resentment can create an interval where coercion has negative efficacy in imposing the state identity. This causes the rational legitimacy maximising authority to restrain its use of coercion. We then show how this inefficacy of coercion can make certain levels of coercion unimplementable without causing the non-state identity to insurrect. This causes the long-run equilibrium size of the non-state identity group to be dependent on their initial size and, thus, path dependence. We consider the validity of the model by reviewing two historical episodes: Stalin’s secularisation project (1922 –1953) and the Counter-Reformation in early modern France and the Holy Roman Empire (1517 –1685).
Newspaper Opinion pieces:
- Minerva: A Nozickian argument for lowering Norwegian income taxes and introducing inheritance taxes
2. Dagens Næringsliv: A novel market mechanism for the Norwegian electricity market and the political economy reasoning behind the mechanism.
2.1 "Norge trenger markedsløsninger som skiller mellom prisen på vannkraft som benyttes innenlands og utenlands." Innlegg i Dagens Næringsliv, 30.03.22
2.2 "Et "politisk økonomi-perspektiv" kan hjelpe oss å løse flokene på strømmarkedet." Innlegg i Dagens Næringsliv, 10.04.22
Disclaimer: These two prices are explicitly not meant as economic analysis, this is written as political economy in the tradition of international political economy. Claims are made explicitly connected to political preferences and political actors playing repeated games in a setting of considerable complexity. Thus, the claims cannot be made with the same certainty as theories of international trade or theoretical economics where dynamics arise from models of rational fully informed profit-maximizing actors.
Rapports:
SIRUS Rapport med Hans Olav Melberg
English summary: Report for the Norwegian Drug and Alcohol Research Unit (SIRUS now FHI).
Norwegian municipalities can set their own bar opening hours within the national maximum allowed limit of 3:00 a.m. This study estimates the effect of bar opening hours on bar revenue by using municipal variations in bar revenue and opening hours between 2000 and 2010. Based on data from 220 firms in the industry, we find that a one-hour reduction in opening times was associated with between 9 and 12 percent reduction in revenues for pubs and bars. The results were statistically significant for bar revenue, but less so for average per capita turnover in the industry in a sample of municipalities.
If you are interested in talking to me or taking a look at my current work please email me at oivind[dot]schoyen[at]gmail[dot]com.