Øivind Evan Schøyen

Current working papers:

Proportional license games 

 with Sjur Kristoffer Dyrkolbotn, Western Norway University of Applied Sciences

Under review in Theoretical Economics

Link to working paper here.

This paper introduces proportional license games as a novel framework for rent-seeking contests. Players allocate scarce, costly effort between competing for licenses and engaging in a licensed activity that yields economic rent. Five axioms—effort requirement, equal treatment, effort permutation invariance, entry neutrality, and maximum effort efficiency—uniquely characterize the allocation rule: each player’s share of licenses equals her share of total effort, while aggregate licensed activity scales endogenously with overall effort. The resulting game is a Tullock contest with an endogenous prize that declines with total effort. In contrast to standard Tullock models, which typically exhibit the discouragement effect whereby lowerability players reduce effort, equilibrium incentives here compel all players to match maximal effort levels. The principle of insufficient reason then yields a unique strict Nash equilibrium in which asymmetrically endowed players devote equal shares of their resources to the contest. The resulting rent allocations are proportional to player’s capacities for exerting effort. Harsanyi’s Bayesian tracing procedure with a uniform prior selects this equilibrium, which converges to full rent dissipation as the number of players grows. The paper briefly discusses what this implies for trade regulations that make access to one market contingent on market shares in another, such as Warren Buffet’s proposed import certificate scheme, granting import licenses to exporters in proportion to their exports. 

A Theory of Moral Authority: Moral Choices Under Moral Network Externality 

with Avner Greif, Stanford University

Abstract:   What determines which behavior is considered morally ideal? We present a rational actor model where people's choices determine the contents of moral ideals. The model shows that if choices reflect a trade-off between cost and the feeling of guilt, social learning cannot sustain moral ideals that are privately costly. Persons with the ability to affect what others consider moral - moral authorities - are needed for moral ideals to sustain privately costly behavior. We apply the model to analyze what limits the influence of moral authorities' and what determines the enforcement costs of laws. 

Link to slides and video of  the presentation at The Cultural Evolution Conference in Sapporo 2021 HERE. Slides available upon request.

Link to current version of paper here.

Link to slides (From Coase Foundation Workshop in Perugia 2025) here.

Geostrategic competition and the balance between state and society: theory and historical evidence from the rivalry between Aragon and Genoa, 1358-1497 '

with Jean-Pascal Bassino, ENS Lyon 

Link to workingpaper

Economic history and applied theory 

 Abstract: Heightened geostrategic competition enhances the strategic value to central powers of controlling peripheral territories. How does increased strategic value affect the balance between state and society? We consider the historical case of the relationship of the Mediterranean islands of Corsica and Sardinia to Genoa and Aragon in the late medieval period. Strategic competition between Genoa and Aragon had opposing effects on the two islands; strengthening society on Corsica while strengthening the feudal state on Sardinia. We develop a novel four-player game between two competing regional powers, the local elite, and the local society. We show how an increased strategic value of controlling a territory can both strengthen or weaken its society depending on society's ability to insurrect. 

The Inefficiency of Moderate Political Coercion :  A Cross-Country Comparison of Coercion Intensity, State Legitimacy, and Regime Stability 

with Espen Sirnes, UIT, and Chris Andresen UIT

Link to workingpaper

Requested revison submitted to Public Choice  

Does coercion's effectiveness in suppressing non-state moralities to strengthen state legitimacy vary with coercive intensity? Drawing on Freedom House, V-Dem, and Polity5 indices as proxies for coercion intensity, alongside data on regime legitimacy and survival, we identify a mid-level coercion range associated with negative efficacy. Fewer regimes have coercion levels in this range, and those that persist there display reduced legitimacy and elevated risks of instability. Shifts in coercion away from this intermediate zone—toward either higher or lower levels—are significantly correlated with gains in legitimacy. Time-series analysis of coercion use in authoritarian regimes shows a pattern of gradual coercion reduction into this suboptimal range, followed by sharp increases. This suggests that coercion entails high exogenous costs—such as economic or reputation costs—and that delayed feedback on its legitimacy effects leads to dynamic overshooting. Interpreting these findings through historical cases like the USSR, we argue that moderate coercion's inefficiency stems from an intrinsic negative reaction to the use of coercion, coercion resentment.

Morals favored by previous moral choices are always safer

With Max Kanwal, Stanford University 

This theory paper develops a framework to analyze how actions are perceived to be legitimate based on previous observed behavior.  The paper has been presented at the Cultural Evolution Society Conference and the  Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture conference.

 An early version is avalible upon request. 

Published work:  

Suspicious Minds and Views of Fairness

 Theory and Decision

Citation: 

Schøyen, Øivind. "Suspicious minds and views of fairness." Theory and Decision (2024): 1-22. 

 Poster presentation here.

Abstract: Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions?  In a novel experimental design, I find that participants are significantly more likely to attribute a no redistribution vote to selfishness if they consider redistribution fair. I define this, attributing actions that do not adhere to one's own fairness view to selfishness, as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to show how suspicious attribution arises from two other findings from the experiment: the participants underestimate the number of people who have a fairness view differing from their own, and, overestimate the selfishness of participants with other fairness views.

What limits the efficacy of coercion?   

 Cliometrica 

Citation: 

Øivind, Schøyen. "What limits the efficacy of coercion?." Cliometrica 15.2 (2021): 267-318. Doi . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-020-00207-0 

Working paper version: NHH Discussion paper "What limits the powerful?" available at SSRN.

Abstract: We model a game between an authority, seeking to implement its state identity, and a parental generation, seeking to socialise a younger generation into their own identity. The authority first selects a coercion level against the non-state identity. The parental generation then chooses whether to insurrect in response to the coercion level and, if not, decides how much to invest in socialising their children into the non-state identity. In this overlapping generations model, we formalise and explore the consequences of an intrinsic negative reaction to coercion: coercion resentment. We show how coercion resentment can create an interval where coercion has negative efficacy in imposing the state identity. This causes the rational legitimacy maximising authority to restrain its use of coercion. We then show how this inefficacy of coercion can make certain levels of coercion unimplementable without causing the non-state identity to insurrect. This causes the long-run equilibrium size of the non-state identity group to be dependent on their initial size and, thus, path dependence. We consider the validity of the model by reviewing two historical episodes: Stalin’s secularisation project (1922 –1953) and the Counter-Reformation in early modern France and the Holy Roman Empire (1517 –1685). 

Political Coercion in Cliometrics 

 Handbook chapter in the "Handbook of Cliometrics"  

Citation: 

Schøyen, Ø. (2024). Political Coercion and Cliometrics. In: Diebolt, C., Haupert, M. (eds) Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_82-1 

 Abstract: States can use various negative incentive schemes against non-state morality groups. When the strength of this pressure is sufficiently strong to be labeled malignant, these measures fall within the definition of political coercion surveyed in this chapter. The survey focuses on a selection of rational actor theories explaining the macro-level political coercion published in the last 20 years. We also refer to literature in adjacent fields aimed at creating an understanding of political coercion. Some of the theories explain outcomes that relate to the absence of political coercion, that is democracy, state-society balance, and liberty. 

Rejecting Non-Paternalist Motivation: An Experimental Test

 with Xianwen Chen, NENA 

Journal of Experimental Political Science

Citation: 

Chen, X., & Schøyen, Ø. (2021). Rejecting Non-Paternalist Motivation: An Experimental Test. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 1-7. doi:10.1017/XPS.2021.12 

JEPS Blog coverage: "What motivates people to impose their view upon others?"  [LINK]

Replication data available online at Havard Dataverse from this [LINK]. 

Suplementary material including the participants choice stated as a simple decision problem: [LINK]

   Working paper available at SSRN.  

Abstract: Is people’s willingness to implement their fairness views on a group dependent on how many in the group share their view? We designed a new experiment to answer this question. Spectator participants were asked how many other participants they believe share their view of whether it is fair to redistribute income in a work task. They were then given the option to pay two cents to implement the distribution they found fair upon a pair of participants who had completed the work task. Although spectator participants systematically overestimate how many  share  their  fairness  view,  being  informed  about  the  true  number  does  not  affect  their decision  to  implement  the  distribution  they  found  fair.  The  results  suggest  that  people  are motivated to implement their fairness view regardless of whether their view is at odds with that of those who are affected.

If you are interested in talking to me or taking a look at my current work please email me at oivind[dot]schoyen[at]gmail[dot]com.