Consumers increasingly care about the environmental and social characteristics of firms' products and production processes, yet these characteristics often remain unobservable, even after consumption. We develop a simple model in which firms select either a green or a brown production technology before competing and signaling through prices. Firms observe each other's production choices, while consumers observe only prices. We show that, in the payoff-dominant equilibrium, prices signal when at least one firm produces green, avoiding Bertrand competition. Counterintuitively, raising consumers' environmental concerns or eliminating the information asymmetry may discourage green production and reduce welfare.
In online markets for differentiated products, consumers often observe prices before deciding whether to inspect individual product fits. We study an oligopoly market for inspection goods in which prices direct the order of consumers' search. We show that no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists. We characterize a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium through an integral equation and prove that the upper bound of the price support converges to marginal cost as the number of firms goes to infinity. For uniformly distributed match values, we establish existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium and derive an explicit expression for its price distribution conditional on the upper support bound, which we determine numerically. Our numerical results indicate that both a larger number of firms and higher search costs shift the price distribution downward in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Consumer surplus first rises and then falls with search costs.