Interest Rates and the Design of Financial Contracts
(with Michael Roberts)
We show that the partial response of loan rates to interest rate changes, referred to in the bank lending literature as ``stickiness,'' is a feature of perfect capital markets. No-arbitrage models of credit risk are able to replicate empirical interest rate sensitivities. However, the widespread use of interest rate floors in the low-rate environment of the last decade is a result of risk-sharing and incentive considerations arising from market imperfections. Floors reallocate cash flows across states in a way that loan spreads cannot. They insure lenders against losses if rates fall, while mitigating borrower moral hazard if rates rise.
The Effects of Transparency on OTC Market-Making
(with Ryan Lewis)
We examine the effects of post-trade transparency on intermediation in the over-the-counter corporate bond market using the staggered introduction of TRACE as a natural experiment. Post-trade transparency leads to increased trading volume and more connected dealer networks. Transparency reduces dealers' profitability but also their portfolio risk and adverse selection costs. In contrast to prior research suggesting that TRACE benefits customers at the expense of dealers, we show that the net effect on dealer welfare is ambiguous. Bond spreads are less predictive of default in a transparent market, consistent with reduced profitability of informed trade weakening incentives to produce information.
(with Ilya Strebulaev)
Systematic risk is an important determinant of corporate capital structure. A one standard deviation increase in asset beta corresponds to a decrease in leverage of 13%, controlling for total asset volatility. This evidence is consistent with recent dynamic capital structure models that relate financing decisions to macroeconomic factors and provides further impetus for exploring the impact of systematic risk on corporate decisions.