Research
Publications
Job Rotation or Specialization? A Dynamic Matching Model Analysis (with Yoshinori Kurokawa), Review of Economic Design, 2024, 28: 243-273 New!
Lower Alertness entails More Cooperation: Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma and Coordination Games (with Toshio Kokubo, Nobuhito Kon, Wakuo Saito, Natsumi Shimada, and Masashi Yanagisawa), 2023 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, 2023, 3185-3193.
How to avoid black markets for appointments with online booking systems (with Rustamdjan Hakimov, C-Philipp Heller, and Dorothea Kübler), American Economic Review, 2021, Vol. 111, No. 7: 2127-51.
Credibility, Efficiency, and Stability: A Theory of Dynamic Matching Markets, Japanese Economic Review, 2020, 71: 135-165
Strategy-proof Improvements upon Deferred Acceptance: A Maximal Domain for Possibility (with Onur Kesten), Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 117: 120-143.
Old version: On the (Im)possibility of Improving upon the Student-proposing Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (with Onur Kesten), June 2012.
College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized (with Isa Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, and Dorothea Kübler), Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 176: 886-934.
On Characterizations of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism Involving Incentive and Invariance Properties (with Onur Kesten and Utku Unver), Mathematical Social Sciences (the special issue honoring Herve Moulin), 2017, 90: 56-62
Efficient Lottery Design (with Onur Kesten and Alexander Nesterov), Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, 48: 31-57.
On the Operation of Multiple Matching Markets (with Hidekazu Anno), Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 100: 166-185.
An Experimental Study on the Incentives of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (with David Hugh-Jones and Christoph Vanberg), Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 87: 367-380.
House Allocation with Overlapping Generations. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, 6(1): 258–289.
Two Axiomatic Approaches to the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (with Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten and Utku Unver), Theoretical Economics, 2014, 9: 253-277.
This paper is partially based on Fair and Efficient Assignment via the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (with Onur Kesten and Utku Unver), May 2011.
Working Papers
Quota Adjustment Process (with Taro Kumano), November 2022, Revision requested, American Economic Review NEW!
Who makes the cut? Endogenous priority design for heterogeneous groups of agents (with Tetsutatro Hatakeyama and Onur Kesten), December 2024 NEW! This paper supersedes the following working paper.
Inter-attribute Equity in Assignment Problems: Leveling the Playing Field by Priority Design (with Tetsutaro Hatakeyama), June 2022
Dual Organ Markets: Coexistence of Living and Deceased Donors (with Hidekazu Anno), March 2018.
Miscellaneous Stuff