content of this website has been notified to MoD and the Head of the Civil
Service, in particular the 3 main reports it hosts. Much of it has been provided by MoD.
only restriction placed upon me was that, before discussing a report submitted
to a post-Board of Inquiry investigation into the Sea King ASaC Mk7 collision
of 2003, I should request it under Freedom of Information. This request was submitted; MoD denied its
existence. I therefore feel entitled to
discuss a document the Minister for the Armed Forces referred to, but his staff
say does not exist.
has also been notified to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee.
any error has been made, please contact me providing details of the correction
required. The site permits comments to
purpose of this endeavour is to present evidence that;
- MoD's systemic failure to implement mandated
airworthiness regulations dates to the mid 1980s, not 1998 as claimed by Mr Haddon-Cave QC in his Nimrod Review
(2009). (A claim he knew to be
- Senior MoD staffs and Ministers were regularly
advised of these failings in the period 1987 - 2005 (i.e. before Nimrod
XV230 crashed) yet;
a. Denied the problems existed, thus misleading Parliament
b. Refused to take corrective action
and the RAF’s Directorate of Air Staff continued to deny the problems
existed, even after the XV230 crash
- By failing to take corrective action, aircrew
and passengers' lives were lost to
- Ministers and Inquiries were systematically misled by MoD, by
omission and commission
- The failure of senior MoD staffs, Ministers
and the Nimrod Review to take action when notified of these facts not only
denied the opportunity to prevent
recurrence but wrongly, and knowingly, blamed innocent individuals while
protecting the guilty.
evidence presented herein clearly shows MoD's financial "black hole"
and systemic airworthiness failings are directly linked and came as no surprise to anyone in MoD, Ministers
or PUS (the Chief Accounting Officer)
To demonstrate this, detailed historical evidence is required. This is presented in the form of documents
submitted to both the Nimrod and Mull of Kintyre Reviews. Also, a
comprehensive report into the loss of two RN Sea Kings, prepared on behalf of
the family of a deceased airman who remain concerned at being lied to by
Any reader will quickly ask "So
why did Haddon-Cave omit this evidence?" He will not say, but
the inescapable fact is that doing so;
- Allowed him
to blame the wrong people
without contradicting himself, and,
- Served to
protect senior staffs who, demonstrably, knew of the failings since 1987 and took no corrective action
This failure to report the verifiable facts ultimately misled Ministers and Parliament and led to
the avoidable deaths of aircrew.
In presenting and commenting upon this evidence, certain basic principles are
recognised which are enshrined in, for example, the Civil Service Code, which
demands Honesty, Integrity,
Impartiality and Objectivity. The Services have equivalent rules,
for example the Air Force Act and Queen's Regulations. Similarly, Parliament has the Ministerial
Code, although there is no mechanism whereby a member of the public may
complain about MPs/Ministers misleading Parliament, or Civil Servants lying to
- A practice
is misleading by commission if it gives false information or deceives or
is likely to deceive the average person, even though the information may
- Actions or
practices may be misleading by omission, for instance by leaving out
important information, giving unclear or ambiguous information.
the requirement to exercise a Duty of Care, if a person asks a reasonable
question and is lied to, the fault lies with the liar, not the Duty
Holder. However, if the Duty Holder could be reasonably expected to
know he was being misled or had been lied to, and did not, then he is
incompetent and negligent.
- If the
Duty Holder is provided with evidence that he was misled or lied to, and
takes no action to reconcile conflicting advice, then he is negligent and
diligence" means the standard of special skill and care that one may
reasonably be expected to exercise toward (in this case) aircrew, passengers
and those whom the aircraft overflies.
The evidence presented here clearly demonstrates a systemic breakdown in
the application of Professional Diligence and Duty of Care.
The reader is
invited to read the attached short paper “It
is always wise to start at the beginning” which outlines a few basic
principles that apply in MoD. They are simple and help one understand the
root of the systemic failures described herein.