The purpose of this endeavour is to present evidence that;
- MoD's systemic failure to implement
mandated airworthiness regulations dates to the mid 1980s, not 1998 as
claimed by Mr Haddon-Cave QC in his Nimrod Review (2009). (A claim he knew to be wrong).
- Senior MoD staffs and Ministers were
regularly advised of these failings in the period 1987 - 2005 (i.e. before
Nimrod XV230 crashed) yet;
Denied the problems
existed, thus misleading Parliament
Refused to take
corrective action, thus failing in their Duty of Care
Both amounting to Misconduct in Public Office
- By failing to take corrective action,
aircrew and passengers' lives were lost to avoidable accidents.
- Ministers and Inquiries were systematically
misled by MoD, by omission and commission, thus perverting the course
of justice and in breach of the Civil Service Code.
- The failure of senior MoD staffs,
Ministers, the Nimrod Review and the Philip Review (Mull of Kintyre) to
take action when notified of these facts not only denied the
opportunity to prevent recurrence, but wrongly blamed named individuals
while protecting the guilty.
The evidence presented herein clearly shows MoD's financial "black
hole" and systemic airworthiness failings are;
- Directly linked, and,
- Came as no surprise to anyone
in MoD, Ministers or PUS (the Chief Accounting Officer)
To demonstrate this, detailed historical evidence
is required. This is presented in the
form of documents submitted to both the Nimrod and Mull of Kintyre Reviews.
The intent is not to revisit these cases but, because the evidence to the
latter, especially, is the most comprehensive body of verifiable evidence
available, it is the logical source of verifiable fact.
Any reader will quickly ask the question "So why did both Haddon-Cave
and Lord Philip omit this evidence?" They will not say, but the
inescapable facts are that doing so;
- Allowed them to blame the wrong people without contradicting
- Served to protect senior staffs who, demonstrably, knew of the
failings since 1987 and took no corrective action
ultimately, misled Ministers and Parliament and led to the avoidable deaths
In presenting and commenting upon this evidence, certain basic principles are
recognised which are enshrined in, for example, the Civil Service Code, which
demands Honesty, Integrity, Impartiality and Objectivity. The
Services have equivalent rules, for example the Air Force Act and Queen's
Regulations and, similarly, Parliament has the Ministerial Code.
- A practice is misleading by commission if it gives false
information or deceives or is likely to deceive the average person, even
though the information may be correct.
- Actions or practices may be misleading by omission, for instance by
leaving out important information, giving unclear or ambiguous
- Regarding the requirement to exercise a Duty of Care, if a person
asks a reasonable question and is lied to, the fault lies with the liar,
not the Duty Holder.
- However, if the Duty Holder could be reasonably expected to know he
was being misled or had been lied to, and did not, then he is incompetent
- If the Duty Holder is provided with evidence that he was misled or
lied to, and takes no action to reconcile conflicting advice, then he is
negligent and liable.
- "Professional diligence" means the standard of special
skill and care that one may reasonably be expected to exercise toward (in
this case) aircrew, passengers and those whom the aircraft
The evidence presented here clearly
demonstrates a systemic breakdown in the application of Professional Diligence
and Duty of Care.
The reader is invited to read the attached short paper “It is always
wise to start at the beginning” which outlines
a few basic principles that apply in MoD. They are simple and help one
understand the root of the systemic failures described herein.
An overview is
important, but to truly understand one must view the problems from different
vantage points. To this end, the author has held positions in all phases
of Military procurement, from Concept to Disposal, across multiple technology
disciplines on Air, Land and Sea projects. He has also designed, built
and fitted equipment to Military aircraft, and maintained said aircraft.
Latterly, he has given evidence to the Nimrod and Mull of Kintyre Reviews,
being the author of the primary airworthiness reports to each body (included
here). He acted as an airworthiness adviser to bereaved families during
the Nimrod XV230 and Hercules XV179 inquests, and aftermath. He is
currently preparing a report for the family of a Serviceman lost in the Sea
King ASaC Mk7 collision in 2003 over Iraq, which also reveals systemic failings.