4. A concluding reflection

In some ways Macomber's life-story, viewed from the standpoint of its narrative form, looks a lot like the life of a saint, even though what he said, the content of his narrative, often seemed rather un-saintly on the surface! I think this kind of mismatch is possible because we live within language patterns and narrative forms that are by-and-large given to us by culture. I think these patterns and forms are the elements that form the pictures that, in turn determine or shape our philosophical convictions. So it is quite possible for a person, in this case Dr. M., to hold un-saintly philosophical convictions while also adhering to a storyline such as 'the life of a saint' or 'a Christ-like life.' Jesus criticized the status quo of his day, and in some ways the most fervent critics among us today are often the most Christ-like --in terms of echoing or occupying the narrative form of critique.Arguably what happens next is this. When philosophical convictions or narrative content run counter to the framework of given narrative form (i.e., as in Macomber' case, un-saintly philosophical convictions situated within the narrative form of 'the life of a saint') but are nonetheless expressed within the form, the convictions and content are gradually pulled into congruence with the form. This would seem to be one of the implications within Rorty's assertion that "It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, that determine most of our philosophical convictions." Put bluntly, pictures or narrative forms are stronger than philosophical convictions. So, it's possible to say that Macomber's challenge to Christianity, for example, existed at the level of convictions; namely, he came to believe that ancient Greek/Indo-European culture was better than Christian/Semitic culture. But he expressed this philosophical conviction within a Christian-derived narrative form. I think the result was that by the end of his life the narrative form brought the 'errant belief' into congruence.

So, what exactly is the narrative form of 'the life of a saint'? How might we describe this form? We might take this path, and on it we would be led unerringly back to where we began. Why? Because language would take us there! It's only by changing our methodology --moving away from language-use-- that we can change pictures. My view is that Macomber's tragedy is indeed related to the loss of prayer, but I think this point needs to be generalized. His tragedy was informed by thinking about spirituality rather than doing it. This of course runs counter to what he did with Philosophy: in that domain, he did Philosophy rather than talk about it. In the spiritual domain, he talked but he did not do. Therein is the tragedy. Had he maintained a how-to, practices-based, skills-based approach to the realm of religion and spirituality he would have had a lot of interest in prayer, meditation, yoga, contemplation, etc. --just as in the realm of education he had a lot of interest in conversation.

So now that I am tugging on my hero's cape, I am reminded in a way of my later training in Philosophy. In class and out of class, we would seek to understand a given philosopher well enough so to clearly see the problems solved as well as the ones not solved, and then we would look for ways to solve the ones not solved. This is exactly what I am doing here. I have talked a lot about the problems Macomber solved, and now I am talking a bit about one that he may not have solved, and I am beginning to work up a solution. My solution to Macomber's conflict or problem is not only different but of a different order. I'm suggesting we need to make a categorical shift, not an ideological shift. I'm suggesting we have to use different methods, not just different thoughts, if we want to change anything at the level of pictures as Rorty describes it.

Joseph Campbell, too, suggests, "If you want to change the world, you have to change the metaphor.” But I'm suggesting it is not about changing metaphors at all, it's about changing methods. In other words a life of the spirit cannot be constructed using the methodologies of the life of the mind. I think it has to be constructed using spiritual methods.

Along these lines, I think there are four basic ways of knowing (WOKs) -- scientific, aesthetic, intellectual, and spiritual. And I don't tend to think that the spiritual way of knowing or WOK is an add-on to the intellectual way of knowing or life of the mind. Again it seems to me possible to include eros and emotionality in one's intellectual life, but I don't think this means that the life of the mind adds up to the life of the spirit if these elements are included. As I see it, the spiritual WOK is its own critter. I think it, too, may include close ties to emotionality and eros, but I think it has its own particular methodologies (including prayer, ritual observance, meditation, yoga and related practices, and contemplation) that are different in kind from intellectual methodologies.In my scheme of things, the common feature that all WOKS share is conversation. In this regard I guess I remain a fervent Macomberite :) I mean it remains amazing to me that Macomber's own insight into changing education by digging into and changing its methodological base (moving it towards conversation-based methods) could have been applied to revolutionizing religiosity. (The work of Karen Armstrong points this way I think.) Anyway, I do think of the spiritual way of knowing as a conversation with the divine -- with God, or with what some call the moral axis of the universe, or with what some regard as the essence of life's meaning, present within oneself as well as in the outer cosmos. But, as I see it, this conversation needs to be carried out using methods other than reading, writing, and talking, with emotion and eros or without!

With regard to the variety of ways in which different cultures converse with the divine, theologian Paul Tillich identifies three basic types of cultures and/or individuals. He refers to these as heterononous, autonomous, and theonomous. Heteronomous cultures or individuals converse with the divine via an authoritative framework (a church, a synagogue, a mosque, a temple, etc.) Autonomous cultures (as the name clearly implies) converse with the divine within a self-determined authoritative framework, referenced more to great thinkers than religious creeds, religious figures, or sacred texts. In Tillich's categorization the heteronomous and autonomous frameworks share the structural characteristic of locating the ultimate authority outside of the individual. A theonomous culture or individual instead holds that "...the superior law is also the innermost law of man himself. The guidelines of human living are not something strange to man but his own spiritual ground." (this quote is from the book Hinduism: Its Historical Development, by Troy Wilson Organ, and indeed the above description is derived from the same book's explication of Tillich's framework).

The signature methods of the spiritual way of knowing or conversing may reflect the different strands identified in his above categorization. For example, prayer and ritual observance (based on a concept of revealed truth) may be forms of conversing with the divine that line up well with the heteronomous framework. Contemplation or study (based on a intellectual concept of truth), may line up well with the autonomous framework. Meditation (based on an experiential concept of truth) may align well with the theonomous framework. The ascertainment of validity in the spiritual WOK perhaps again parallels Tillich's framework. Validity of revealed truth is often indexed to sacred texts, validity in intellectual truth is indexed to logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, and validity in experiential truth is indexed to inner/somatic states of being that, at the same time, connect the individual to the outer cosmos.

It seems possible to me that the tragic loss of prayer Macomber refers to may be avoidable within a theonomous conversation with the divine, and unavoidable within heteronomous or autono mous conversations with the divine. Interestingly, Macomber seems to have started with a heteronomous view (informed by Catholic Christianity), and then seems to have adopted an autonomous view (informed by Greek tragedy) and might have missed the third possibility of exploring a theonomous view which might have allowed him to keep prayer in his picture. But here the tragic element of life may reassert itself. Given his intensely Jesuit background, and the intensity of his need to create some breathing room for himself personallly/sexually and culturally by embracing a thoroughly Greek view, it may not have been possible for him to rework the way he pictured religion and spirituality. In other words the loss of prayer may have been what is sometimes called a "personal tragedy". I remain kind of puzzled by this because it would seem to me Macomber would take an avid interest in separating-out and exploring spiritual practices --the how-to aspect of religiosity-- from the content aspects, much in the same way that he separated-out and explored the how-to aspect of intellectual life from the content aspects. I'll have to go on thinking about this. To complete one of the circuits of Macomber's life, though, he also seemed to return to a heteronomous view of spiritual and religious matters in the years leading up to his death.

If we pay close attention to the fact that prayer is really one of the how-to or skills-based elements in Christianity it makes perfect sense that Macomber would respect it a great deal and would neither dismiss nor critique it. As noted in my Introduction, Macomber reserved his utmost respect for a how-to approach to knowledge in the Liberal Arts, so it makes perfect sense that elements of his respect for how-to knowledge would carry over into his thinking about religion and spirituality. But this seemed not to happen.

To continue with WOKs, the intellectual way of knowing can in my scheme of things be understood as a conversation with other people --either in person or via surrogates such as books, articles, online presentations, etc. These conversations very much need to begin with talking about pictures! They need to continue with talking about relevant contexts (nothing comes out of nowhere). And they need to involve our whole selves (so we don't just put other ways of knowing aside when we are acting within the intellectual way of knowing). Ultimately, it is the conversation among all of the ways of knowing that we are talking about here. None are entirely separate one from the other, although they are separable and it is useful to understand their unique features.

The key methods associated with the intellectual way of knowing are the conversational arts of thinking, talking, reading (interpreting or decoding), and writing (producing or encoding) across various media. i.e., we need to know how to 'read' images as well as texts. These are the things Liberal Artists are good at. The concept of truth in the intellectual WOK is consensual. The validity of consensual truth-statements is adjudged in reference to principles of logic, dialectic, and rhetoric --three how-to subjects that in former times used to form the foundation or core of the Liberal Arts and were referred to as the trivium. As an example of the intellectual WOKs concept of truth in action, consider that when the U.S. Supreme Court rules on an issue, the members first talk and argue various positions extensively, then they formulate and issue what they call "opinions". Yet we are justified in assuming that the court's opinion is more than 'just an opinion', because the judges are experts not only in Constitutional law but also in the skills of thinking, talking, reading, and writing. They are, along with professors, expert practitioners of the Liberal Arts, working within the intellectual WOKs consensual models of truth and validity, deeply skilled in the trivium, avoiding logical fallacies and the like.

The scientific way of knowing is, in the words of Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, "A conversation with nature." Their now-classic book is entitled Order Out of Chaos: Man's Dialogue with Nature. Interestingly these two authors insightfully explain that in the modern or 'positivist' era of science the conversation with nature was more like an interrogation :) but they are also very optimistic that developments in chaos and complexity theory are turning the conversation in a much healthier direction. For example we might say that scientists converse with nature via the medium of experimentation. Experiments can be likened to questions that scientists pose to nature, with experimental-results serving as nature's replies. Like all WOKS, the scientific WOK has its own concepts of truth and validity, and it also foregrounds a particular process by which truth and validity are adjudged. The concept of truth embedded within the scientific WOK is empirical (based on sensory data) and provisional (subject to change) with resonances of intellectual/reasoning mixed in. The methodology or process underlying the scientific WOK is none other than the scientific method which in effect sets the ground-rules for the proper use of this WOK and/or the coordination of the various strands of validity. Okay, so we're cookin' with grease in this WOK. Time to light up another burner.

Finally the aesthetic way of knowing can be seen as including elaborate stagings of conversations (i.e., in the form of plays, movies, and dances, with multiple characters, scripts, and improvisations) as well as conversations with materials (i.e., the painter and her canvas). Key methods of the aesthetic way of knowing include dancing, acting, script and play writing, designing, painting-sculpting-building, filmmaking, music making, and composing. The concept of truth in the aesthetic WOK is experiential, and validity is indexed to experiential and somatic indices (although, like the scientific WOK, intellectual/reasoning processes are also involved, for example in connoisseurship). The process underlying the aesthetic WOK and all of its methods is none other than the creative process --a process that is based in the logic and neurology of complex systems that exhibit emergence.

Using the above framework, we can begin to deepen our understanding of the DNA or roots of DMA within WOKs, within Higher Education in general, within the Liberal Arts and Fine Arts (particularly as they are interrelated and taught at UNCSA), and within Media Studies as a relative new addition to the Liberal Arts. Putting things in relevant contexts or categories is one of the key skills of expert Liberal Artists. The interest in contexts is also shared by Fine Artists, though. One of my favorite quotations of all time follows (a quote which will pop up in other locations this term :)

Always design a thing by considering it in its next largest context --a chair in a room, a room in a house, a house in an environment, an environment in a city plan." --Eliel Saarinen

Interrelating different things (personal experience, abstract concepts, etc.) is also a key skill within the liberal arts that I've tried to model here. In addition to contextualization I have also used several rhetorical strategies --primarily but not exclusively exemplification, narration, comparison and contrast, and division and classification.