Research

Working Papers 

1. M. Kirneva and M. Núñez (2023), On the Legitimacy of Collective decisions: A mechanism design approach, Rev&Resubmit.

2.  F. Echenique and M.  Núñez (2023), Price & Choose : https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.05650,  Rev&Resubmit.

3. H. Herrera, A. Macé and M.  Núñez (2023), Brinkmanship and Compromise, submitted

 4. M. Kirneva and M. Núñez (2021), Voting by simultaneous vetoes.

-Extended abstract published in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC ‘21). 

Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 677–678. 

DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3465456.3467557

Work in Progress

1.  C. Alos-Ferrer, S. Barberà, D. Coelho and M.  Núñez, (2023), Compromise in the Lab, work in progress

2. Y. Funaki, Y. Koriyama, M.  Núñez and G. Rostagno, (2023), Pricing mechanisms: theory and experiments, work in progress

Articles in Refereed Journals

Experimental Economics

3. D. Bol, J.-F. Laslier and M. Núñez  (2022), Two-person bargaining mechanisms: A Laboratory Experiment,  Group Decision & Negociation, Volume 31, pages 1145–1177.

2. P. Louis, M. Núñez and D. Xefteris (2022), Trimming extreme opinions in preference aggregation,  Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 137, Pages 116-151.

1. P. Louis, M. Núñez and D. Xefteris (2022), The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement, Economic Journal, Volume 132, Issue 641, Pages 326–360, 

Bargaining and Implementation

6. M. Núñez, C. Pimienta and D. Xefteris (2022), On the implementation of the median, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 99, 102595 .

5.J.-F. Laslier,  M. Núñez and R. Sanver (2021), A Solution to the Two-person Implementation problem , pdf,  Journal of Economic Theory, (5 articles en 5 minutes), (published version) 

4. M. Núñez and R. Sanver (2021), On the Subgame Perfect Implementability of Voting Rules, Social Choice and Welfare, 56, 421–441 (2021) (published version).

3. M. Núñez and D. Xefteris (2017), “Implementation Via Approval Mechanisms”, Journal of Economic Theory,Volume 170, Pages 169–181.  (The Conversation).

2. J.F. Laslier, M. Núñez and C. Pimienta (2017) “Reaching Consensus through Approval Bargaining”, Games and Economic Behavior,Volume 104, Pages 241–251 

1. M. Núñez and J.-F. Laslier (2015),“Bargaining through Approval”,  Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 60, Pages 63–73. (Link to published version).

Large Elections and Poisson games

7.   F. Durand, A. Macé and M. Núñez (2024), Voter Coordination in Large Elections: A Case for Approval Voting  (see here for the Python package and here for the commands for tables and figures), forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior.

6. M. Núñez and M. Pivato (2019), Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 113, January 2019, Pages 285-305, (SSRN/HAL).

5. J.-F. Laslier et M. Núñez (2017), Pivots et Elections, L' Actualité Economique, Revue d’analyse économique, vol. 93, nos 1-2, mars-juin 2017, HAL

4. M. Núñez and D. Xefteris,(2015),“Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2015, Volume 119, Issue 2, Pages 346–374, (Link to published version.)

3. M. Núñez (2014), “The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting”, Economic Theory, Volume 56, Issue 1, Pages 157-189.

2. M. Núñez and J.-F. Laslier (2014),"Preference Intensity Representation: Strategic Overstating in Large Elections" (previously circulated as "Overstating: A tale of two cities”), Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 42, Issue 2, Pages 313-340.

1. M. Núñez (2010), “Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a counter example in Large Poisson Games”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Volume 22 Issue 1, Pages 64-84.pdf       

Axiomatic Social Choice and Voting

6. S. Courtin and M. Núñez (2017), “Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 19, Pages 1047–1068.

5. M. Núñez and M. Scarsini (2016), “Competing over a finite number of Locations” , Economic Theory Bulletin, Volume 4, Pages 125-136 (Link to published version) (paper reviewed in MathScinet 2017 by Vicki Knoblauch in MathScinet see here).

4. M. Núñez and M.R. Sanver (2017), Revisiting the Connection between the No-Show Paradox and Monotonocity, Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 90 Pages 9-17. 

3. M. Núñez (2015), “Threshold Voting leads to Type-Revelation”, Economics Letters, Volume 136, Pages 211-213.

2. M. Núñez and G. Valletta (2015), “The Informational Basis of Scoring Rules”, Review of Economic Design, Volume 19, Pages 279-297.

1. M. Núñez (2007), “A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility”, Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 53, Issue 2, Pages 209-211. pdf

Chapters in Books                                                                                              

4.  M. Núñez (2018), "Towards Transparent Mechanisms",  The Future of Economic Design (Springer, Studies in Economic Design,  eds. Jean-François Laslier, Hervé Moulin, Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker).

3.  M. Núñez and M. Scarsini (2016), "Large Location Models", Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location using Game Theory, Mallozzi and Pardalos, eds. Springer.

2.  M. Núñez (2014)  “Social Choice Theory”, Encyclopedia of Political Thought, M. T. Gibbons, ed., Blackwell-Wiley.

1. M. Núñez (2010), “Approval Voting on Large Election Models ”, in Handbook on Approval Voting, J. Laslier and M.R. Sanver, eds.,Heildelberg: Springer-Verlag.