M. Kirneva and M. Núñez (2025),Strengthening Incentives for Truth-telling in Majority voting, Rev&Resubmit 2nd Round. IMP
Y. Funaki, Y. Koriyama, M. Núñez, and G. Rostagno (2025), Price and Choose: An Experiment, submitted, EBE,IMP
C. Alos-Ferrer, S. Barberà, D. Coelho and M. Núñez, (2025), Fairness vs. Simplicity in Arbitration Procedures, submitted, EBE,IMP paper, slides
O. Bos, M. Núñez, and D. Xefteris (2025), Reputational Concerns in Common Value Elections. , EBE, IMP
M. Núñez and D. Xefteris (2025), Voting when Winning is not all, work in progress. PECO
F. Echenique and M. Núñez (2025), Halve & Choose, work in progress, EBE, IMP
Implementation : IMP
Experimental and Behavioral Economics: EBE
Political Economy : PECO
Social Choice theory: SCT
25. F. Echenique and M. Núñez (2025), Price and Choose, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol.17, No. 2, (pp. 1–27), Lead article. IMP
Published version: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20230095
Working Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.05650
24. H. Herrera, A. Macé and M. Núñez (2025), Political Brinkmanship and Compromise, International Economic Review, forthcoming, PECO
2024
23. O. Cailloux, M. Núñez and R. Sanver (2024), Two principles for two-person social choice, Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming. SCT
22. F. Durand, A. Macé and M. Núñez (2024), Voter Coordination in Large Elections: A Case for Approval Voting (see here for the Python package and here for the commands for tables and figures), Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 146, Pages 1-34 PECO
21. D. Bol, J.-F. Laslier and M. Núñez (2022), Two-person bargaining mechanisms: A Laboratory Experiment, Group Decision & Negociation, Volume 31, pages 1145–1177. IMP, EBE
20. P. Louis, M. Núñez and D. Xefteris (2022), Trimming extreme opinions in preference aggregation, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 137, Pages 116-151. IMP, EBE
19. P. Louis, M. Núñez and D. Xefteris (2022), The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement, Economic Journal, Volume 132, Issue 641, Pages 326–360. IMP, EBE
18. M. Núñez, C. Pimienta and D. Xefteris (2022), On the implementation of the median, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 99, 102595 . IMP
17. J.-F. Laslier, M. Núñez and R. Sanver (2021), A Solution to the Two-person Implementation problem , pdf, Journal of Economic Theory, (5 articles en 5 minutes), (published version) IMP
16. M. Núñez and R. Sanver (2021), On the Subgame Perfect Implementability of Voting Rules, Social Choice and Welfare, 56, 421–441 (2021) (published version). IMP
15. M. Núñez and M. Pivato (2019), Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 113, January 2019, Pages 285-305, (SSRN/HAL). PECO
14. M. Núñez and D. Xefteris (2017), “Implementation Via Approval Mechanisms”, Journal of Economic Theory,Volume 170, Pages 169–181. (The Conversation). IMP
13. J.F. Laslier, M. Núñez and C. Pimienta (2017) “Reaching Consensus through Approval Bargaining”, Games and Economic Behavior,Volume 104, Pages 241–251 PECO
12. J.-F. Laslier et M. Núñez (2017), Pivots et Elections, L' Actualité Economique, Revue d’analyse économique, vol. 93, nos 1-2, mars-juin 2017, HAL PECO
11. S. Courtin and M. Núñez (2017), “Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 19, Pages 1047–1068. PECO
10. M. Núñez and M.R. Sanver (2017), Revisiting the Connection between the No-Show Paradox and Monotonocity, Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 90 Pages 9-17. SCT
9. M. Núñez and M. Scarsini (2016), “Competing over a finite number of Locations” , Economic Theory Bulletin, Volume 4, Pages 125-136 (Link to published version) (paper reviewed in MathScinet 2017 by Vicki Knoblauch in MathScinet see here). SCT
8. M. Núñez and J.-F. Laslier (2015),“Bargaining through Approval”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 60, Pages 63–73. (Link to published version). SCT
7. M. Núñez and D. Xefteris,(2015),“Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2015, Volume 119, Issue 2, Pages 346–374, (Link to published version.) PECO
6. M. Núñez (2015), “Threshold Voting leads to Type-Revelation”, Economics Letters, Volume 136, Pages 211-213. SCT
5. M. Núñez and G. Valletta (2015), “The Informational Basis of Scoring Rules”, Review of Economic Design, Volume 19, Pages 279-297. SCT
4. M. Núñez (2014), “The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting”, Economic Theory, Volume 56, Issue 1, Pages 157-189. PECO
3. M. Núñez and J.-F. Laslier (2014),"Preference Intensity Representation: Strategic Overstating in Large Elections" (previously circulated as "Overstating: A tale of two cities”), Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 42, Issue 2, Pages 313-340. PECO
2. M. Núñez (2010), “Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a counter example in Large Poisson Games”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Volume 22 Issue 1, Pages 64-84. PECO
1. M. Núñez (2007), “A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility”, Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 53, Issue 2, Pages 209-211. pdf SCT
4. M. Núñez (2018), "Towards Transparent Mechanisms", The Future of Economic Design (Springer, Studies in Economic Design, eds. Jean-François Laslier, Hervé Moulin, Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker).
3. M. Núñez and M. Scarsini (2016), "Large Location Models", Spatial Interaction Models: Facility Location using Game Theory, Mallozzi and Pardalos, eds. Springer.
2. M. Núñez (2014) “Social Choice Theory”, Encyclopedia of Political Thought, M. T. Gibbons, ed., Blackwell-Wiley.
1. M. Núñez (2010), “Approval Voting on Large Election Models ”, in Handbook on Approval Voting, J. Laslier and M.R. Sanver, eds.,Heildelberg: Springer-Verlag.