Social antagonism, identity-driven beliefs, and loss avoidance: Evidence from Guinea. With R. Tacneng. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (ELSEVIER) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102263
We use a lab-in-the-field experiment to study identity preferences, other-regarding beliefs, and conflict behavior among the Fulani and Malinke in Guinea, Sub-Saharan Africa. In a hawk-dove game, we explore the existence of out-group hostility and ingroup cooperation compared to the baseline where pairs are uninformed of each other's region of origin. We observe that ethnic identity, especially among the Malinke, encourages loss aversion in situations where negative earnings are possible. Identity-driven beliefs, i.e. expectations of others, lead to either reciprocity among homogeneous pairs or materialism in diverse pairs. Using complementary survey data, we also find that high out-group trust and less linguistic diversity are correlated with conflict avoidance.
Time vs. money metrics for contingent valuation surveys: Theory and application to rural data. ◎K. PUZON with B. KRISTROM (CERE, Sweden). Economics Bulletin, 2023, AccessEcon, vol. 43(2), pages 700-718.
https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-22-00353.html
Money remains the most commonly used metric in valuation surveys involving non-market goods, though recent evidence suggests that alternative metrics can be equally effective. This research contributes to the literature by (i) suggesting a theoretical model to explain the links between metrics, (ii) proposing a bivariate lognormal model to account for any correlation between the answers to the valuation questions, and (iii) providing new data on the value of preserving ”blue goods” in a rural area of a developing country. We study a measure of willingness to pay (WTP) for a non-market good in a time and money metric and show that the ratio between WTP in the time/money metric is equal to the wage in a competitive economy. Our model is tested using a field survey on conservation of ”blue goods” (ecosystems involving the husbandry of water resources) in rural Philippines, and the results provide further support for the use of alternative metrics in valuation studies.
Quantile regression with interval-censored data in questionnaire-based studies. ◎K. PUZON with B. Kristrom. Computational Statistics, 2024, SPRINGER. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00180-022-01308-2
Interval-censored data can arise in questionnaire-based studies when the respondent gives an answer in the form of an interval without having pre-specified ranges. Such data are called self-selected interval data. In this case, the assumption of independent censoring is not fulfilled, and therefore the ordinary methods for interval-censored data are not suitable. This paper explores a quantile regression model for self-selected interval data and suggests an estimator based on estimating equations. The consistency of the estimator is shown. Bootstrap procedures for constructing confidence intervals are considered. A simulation study indicates satisfactory performance of the proposed methods. An application to data concerning price estimates is presented.
Gender priming in solidarity games: The Philippine context. With R. Tacneng. Review of Behavioral Economics, 2021, 8 (2), 193-211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.00000137
What is the effect of gender priming on solidarity behavior? We explore a two-player solidarity game where players can insure each other against risk of losses. We test this experimentally in a developing country setting, the Philippines. We consider a treatment that involves reminding subjects their gender and associated stereotypes. We found that without priming, there are no statistically different gender differences in the solidarity game. With priming, however, there is an increased willingness in women to provide insurance.
Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty: An experiment. With M. Willinger, 2016, GAMES, Vol. 7 (1), 1-15. https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/7/1/2
Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent.
On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies, with R. Boucekkine, et al. European Economic Review, 2016, Vol. 85 (C), 188-207, ELSEVIER. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292116300356
We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite׳s redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite׳s policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.