My Homepage

Thank you for visiting my research webpage. My name is Jeremy Bertomeu and I am an associate professor of accountancy at Baruch College, at the City University of New York. Currently, I'm working on a few new projects:

A suitable voting majority in an accounting board should be about 2/3, and its rulings will tend to unravel toward full disclosure. 

Anomalous disclosure patterns in the auto industry are rationalized in a model of collusion in the product market.

How often do managers withhold information?, with I. Marinovic and P. Ma
A simple structural estimation of the Dye-Jung-Kwon voluntary disclosure model, using management forecasts.

Verifiable disclosure, with D. Cianciaruso
A methodology to solve any static persuasion game, i.e., a sender-receiver problem in which the sender's only cares about the receiver's posterior expectation. The approach extends the results of 'classic' disclosure theory even when disclosure costs or information-endowment are type-specific (plausible) and shows that, typically, a sender is made worse-off by disclosure regulation.

Work In Progress

We test whether factors that explain the  cross-section of expected returns are used as risk factors in management contracts. Yes (somewhat) for the market factor, No for size and BTM, and (surprisingly) the strongest evidence is for the momentum factor.

The Dynamics of Concealment, with I. Marinovic, S. Terry and F. Varas,
An estimation of an infinite-horizon disclosure model in which managers are forward-looking.

Efficient disclosure laws, with J. Xue and I. Vaysman
A law that requuires the disclosure of bad news reduces the cost of excessive voluntary disclosures.




Do you have a nice working or published paper, you would like me to read and advertise on this website? If so, do email me your work. Note that the paper must be accessible via SSRN so that I may post an updated link.


I also participate to several research initiatives that, jointly with several colleagues, we hope will help disseminate theoretical research in accounting.

The accounting theory e-journal is part of the SSRN network and distributes new working papers in accounting theory through a weekly newsletter with abstracts and a working paper repository. You can subscribe to the ejournal at www.ssrn.com/arn/index.html, click Subject Matter e-journal on the left-hand side and then click on "subscribe" next to accounting theory. Also, when you upload a paper on ssrn, you can choose the accounting theory e-journal.

The JATC meetings is organized one day prior to the AAA annual meeting and features five to seven papers, now going into its fourth year. The audience is diverse with a special focus on new researchers in the field and novel methodologies/ideas. This year's event is jointly organized with A. Beyer from Stanford, J. Caskey from UCLA, C. Corona from Carnegie Mellon, P. Gao from U. of Chicago and X. Meng from NYU. More information about the event can be found at www.accountingtheory.org.