Publications

Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2017, 9(2):1-24, joint with Filip Pertold

Who Actually Decides? Parental Influence on the Housing Tenure Choice of Their Children, Urban Studies, 2018, 55(2): 406-426, jointwith M. Lux, T. Samec, V. Bartoš, P. Sunega, I. Boumová, L. Kažmér

Political Representation and Public Contracting: Evidence from Municipal Legislatures, European Economic Review, 2019, 118: 411-431.

Political Salaries, Electoral Selection and the Incumbency Advantage: Evidence from a Wage Reform, Journal of Comparative Economics, 2021, 49(4): 1020-1047, joint with Filip Pertold

Do Elections Accelerate the COVID-19 Pandemic? Journal of Population Economics, 2022, 35(1): 197-240, joint with René Levínsky,  and Samuel Škoda 

Working papers / Work in progress

Corporate Minimum Tax and the Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence from Administrative Tax Records, with Jaroslav Bukovina,  Tomáš Lichard, and Branislav Žúdel (Conditionally accepted at the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy)

We examine business responses to a minimum tax that prescribed fixed floors on corporate tax liability while also permitting minimum tax credit carry-forwards. Using 2010-2020 tax-return data on all Slovak corporations, we find that a mass of companies immediately relocated from reporting zero taxable income towards bunching at the new tax floors. We infer the ETI to be between 0.33 and 2.28 across VAT and turnover categories and quantify the marginal efficiency burden of the corporation tax. Given limited extensive-margin responses, our evidence seems to suggest that the minimum tax reduced the overall efficiency burden while raising additional tax revenue.

The Elasticity of Corporate Taxable Income Across Countries, with Kat Bilicka, Elena Patel, Nathan Seegert and others, (draft coming soon)

We use administrative tax data from around the world to investigate how the corporate elasticity of taxable income differs. We use state of the art methods that use bunching in distributions to estimate behavioral responses. These extended methods allow for covariates, multiple kinks, and elasticities that depend on firm characteristics. Taken together, we investigate whether across country differences are due to differences in observable firm characteristics, such as asset size, or due to tax system differences, such as availability of tax credits. 

Persistent Individualism in the Resettled Lands: Evidence from Post-WWII Population Transfers (draft coming soon)

Political Salaries and Favoritism in Public Procurement, in progress