Research

Specialism

My research focuses on philosophical methods. In particular, I ask questions about the place of intuitions and empirical research in philosophy.

My research also touches on issues in epistemology, ethics, free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of language, metaphysics and aesthetics.

I am also a founder member of Experimental Philosophy Group UK.

I recently wrote a bit of code that will create animations like this one based on data from JSTOR's data for research showing how word frequencies in journals change over time. You can also do something similar to track word frequency across sections of longer philosophical works such as Plato's Republic.

Recent Articles

Why don't we trust moral testimony? Mind and Language

Why don't philosophers do their intuition practice? Acta Analytica

Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. (with 42 other authors)

Third Person Knowledge Ascriptions: A Crucial Experiment for Contextualism. Mind & Language. (with Jumbly Grindrod and Nat Hansen)

Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. Synthese. (with Pendaran Roberts and Kelly Schmidtke)

English Language and Philosophy, in Knight & Adolphs, English Language and Digital Humanities, Routledge (with Jonathan Tallant)

Aesthetic Testimony and Experimental Philosophy, in Réhault & Cova, Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics, Bloomsbury

Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects? 2018. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.

Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies. 2017. Philosophia.

Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? 2017. Synthese. (open access)

Intuition-talk: Virus or Virtue? 2017. Philosophia.

A partial defence of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions: a reply to Molyneux. 2017. Metaphilosophy.

Qualitative tools & experimental philosophy. 2016. Philosophical Psychology. (preprint)

Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology. 2016. Metaphilosophy. (preprint)

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions. 2016. Philosophical Psychology. (preprint)

Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan. 2016. Philosophical Psychology. (preprint)

Zebras, intransigence & semantic apocalypse: problems for dispositional metasemantics. 2016. Philosophia. (open access)

Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions. 2016. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. (preprint)

How distinctive is philosophers' intuition-talk? 2015. Metaphilosophy. (open access)

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable. 2015. Dialectica. (preprint)

How 'intuition' exploded. 2015. Metaphilosophy. (preprint)

A semantic solution to the problem with aesthetic testimony. 2014. Acta Analytica. (preprint)

Intuitions, disagreement, and referential pluralism. 2014. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. (preprint)

Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection. 2014. Erkenntnis. (preprint)

Other Academic Writing

Intuitions. 2015. Analysis. (A critical notice of Booth & Rowbottom, eds.)

Intuitions in the Face of Diversity. 2014. PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham.

Collaborators

Some of my research is collaborative. Here are some of the people I have worked with or am still working with.