Research
Here's my CV.
MONOGRAPHS
Laws of Nature. Cambridge University Press. 2023.
This book provides an opinionated introduction to the metaphysics of laws of nature. The first section distinguishes between scientific and philosophical questions about laws and describes some criteria for a philosophical account of laws. Subsequent sections explore the leading philosophical theories in detail, reviewing the most influential arguments in the literature. The final few sections assess the state of the field and suggest avenues for future research.
PAPERS
The ideology of pragmatic Humeanism (Ergo, forthcoming)
I argue that Pragmatic Humeanism smuggles modally-robust concepts into its analysis of laws, leading to a dilemma.
Inductive reasoning involving social kinds, with Barrett Emerick (Journal of the American Philosophical Association, forthcoming)
Most social policies cannot be defended without making inductive inferences. For example, consider certain arguments for racial profiling and affirmative action, respectively. They begin with statistics about crime or socioeconomic indicators. Next, there is an inductive step in which the statistic is projected from the past to the future. Finally, there is a normative step in which a policy is proposed as a response in the service of some goal—for example, to reduce crime or to correct socioeconomic imbalances. In comparison to the normative step, the inductive step of a policy defense may seem trivial. We argue that this is not so. Satisfying the demands of the inductive step is difficult, and doing so has important but underappreciated implications for the normative step. In this paper, we provide an account of induction in social contexts and explore its implications for policy. Our account helps to explain which normative principles we ought to accept, and as a result it can explain why it is acceptable to make inferences involving race in some contexts (e.g., in defense of affirmative action) but not in others (e.g., in defense of racial profiling).
The nomological argument for the existence of God, with Thomas Metcalf (Noûs, 2022)
We argue that the natural regularities that make modern science possible are best explained by an appeal to a supernatural being.
Non-Humean theories of natural necessity (Philosophy Compass, 2020)
This article provides an accessible introduction to non-Humean theories of laws of nature and natural necessity.
Individuation and explanation: a problem for dispositionalism (Philosophical Studies, 2020)
I argue that dispositionalism, the view that natural properties are individuated by their roles in causal/nomological structures, is unable to explain certain kinds of regularities because of the way in which dispositions are individuated.
Platonic laws of nature (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020)
David Armstrong accepted the following three theses: universals are immanent; laws are relations between universals; and laws govern particular matters of fact. I argue that these theses are jointly incompatible and draw some general lessons for the metaphysics of laws and properties.
Naturalness constraints on best systems accounts of laws (Ratio, 2019)
I clarify David Lewis’s naturalness constraint on best systems accounts of laws and show how the clarification undercuts van Fraassen's mismatch objection.
Scientific practice and the epistemology of governing laws (Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019)
In ''Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws'' (BJPS 2017), Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer provide an objection to governing laws of nature. I respond by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. My account helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities.
Natural properties, necessary connections, and the problem of induction (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018)
The necessitarian solution to the problem of induction involves two claims: first, that necessary connections are justified by an inference to the best explanation; second, that the best theory of necessary connections entails the timeless uniformity of nature. In this paper, I defend the second claim.
Two types of quidditism (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2016)
I argue that some natural properties are categorical. I do so by distinguishing two ways in which categorical properties can be individuated, and arguing that one of them fares better than the other with respect to extant arguments in the field.
Can bare dispositions explain categorical regularities? (Philosophical Studies, 2014)
No, and this is troubling because it suggests that bare dispositions cannot explain observed natural regularities.
Can primitive laws explain? (Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013)
No, but laws analyzed as relations between universals can.
Tooley's account of the necessary connection between law and regularity (Philosophical Studies, 2013)
I argue that Tooley’s attempt to analyze the necessary connection between governing laws and natural regularities fails.
Rational intuitions and analytic metaphysics (in Chapman et al, In Defense of Intuitions, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)
I argue that the same intuitions required to justify beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences can support a robust metaphysics when augmented by certain kinds of empirical observations.
REVIEWS
Review of Putting Properties First: A Platonic Theory of Natural Modality, Matthew Tugby (Ratio, 2023)
Review of Laws of Nature, (eds.) Ott and Patton (BJPS Review of Books, 2019)