Here's my CV.  

Non-Humean theories of natural necessity (Philosophy Compass, 2020)
This article provides an accessible introduction to non-Humean theories of laws of nature and natural necessity.

I argue that dispositionalism, the view that natural properties are individuated by their roles in causal/nomological structures, is unable to explain certain kinds of regularities because of the way in which dispositions are individuated. 

Platonic laws of nature (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020)
David Armstrong accepted the following three theses: universals are immanent; laws are relations between universals; and laws govern particular matters of fact. I argue that these theses are jointly incompatible and draw some general lessons for the metaphysics of laws and properties. 
I clarify David Lewis’s naturalness constraint on best systems accounts of laws and show how the clarification undercuts van Fraassen's mismatch objection.

Scientific practice and the epistemology of governing laws (Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019)
In ''Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws'' (BJPS 2017)Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer provide an objection to governing laws of nature. I respond by developing an epistemology for governing laws that is grounded in scientific practice. My account helps to explain our epistemic access to non-Humean theoretical entities.

Natural properties, necessary connections, and the problem of induction (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018) 
The necessitarian solution to the problem of induction involves two claims: first, that necessary connections are justified by an inference to the best explanation; second, that the best theory of necessary connections entails the timeless uniformity of nature. In this paper, I defend the second claim. 

Two types of quidditism (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2016)
I argue that some natural properties are categorical. I do so by distinguishing two ways in which categorical properties can be individuated, and arguing that one of them fares better than the other with respect to extant arguments in the field.

No, and this is troubling because it suggests that bare dispositions cannot explain observed natural regularities.

Can primitive laws explain?  (Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013)
No, but laws analyzed as relations between universals can.

I argue that Tooley’s attempt to analyze the necessary connection between governing laws and natural regularities fails.

Rational intuitions and analytic metaphysics (in Chapman et al, In Defense of Intuitions, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)
I argue that the same intuitions required to justify beliefs in logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences can support a robust metaphysics when augmented by certain kinds of empirical observations.  

Review of Laws of Nature, (eds.) Ott and Patton (BJPS Review of Books, 2019)