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BibTeX: heski-bar-isaac-publications.bib
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Monetizing Steering (with Sandro Shelegia). Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, accepted.
When to front-load persuasion, Economics Letters, 266, July 2026, 11305
Anticompetitive Effects of Acquihires: Labor and Product Markets (with Justin Johnson and Volker Nocke) CPI Antitrust Chronicle, December 2025, 8-12.
Acquihiring for Monopsony Power (with Justin Johnson and Volker Nocke). Management Science, 2025, 71(4), 3485–3496. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604
Targeted Product Design (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023, 15(2), 157-86. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200474
Search, Showrooming and Retailer Variety (with Sandro Shelegia) Marketing Science, 2023, Vol 42(2), 251-270. DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2022.1376
Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Asymmetric Information (with Clare Leaver), Economica, 2022, 89, 849–861. DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12441
Motivating Employees through Career Paths (with Raphaël Lévy) Journal of Labor Economics, Vol 40 (1), 2022, 95-131. DOI: 10.1086/713759
Adverse Selection, Efficiency, and the Structure of Information (with Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver) Economic Theory, 72, 2021, 579-614.
Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting (with Joyee Deb) Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(1), Feb 2021, 200-236. DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaa008
Blockholder voting (with Joel Shapiro) Journal of Financial Economics, June 2020, Vol 136 (3), 695-717. Final version here. DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.11.005
Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions (with John Asker) Journal of Law and Economics, February 2020, 63 (1), 111-148.
Advertising and Related Restraints, (with John Asker) CPI Antitrust Chronicle, January 2018, 43-48.
Introduction to Symposium on Market Structure, Competition and Economic Outputs, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol 64(3), September 2016, 367-374.
Special Issue: Selected Papers, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics 41st Annual Conference, Milan, Italy/29–31 August 2014, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol 43, November 2015, 136.
Brokers' Contractual Arrangements in Manhattan Rental Markets (with Alessandro Gavazza) Journal of Urban Economics, Vol 86, 2015, 73-82. DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2014.12.002
(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters (with Joyee Deb) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol 6(4), 2014, 293-325. DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.293
Long-term debt and hidden borrowing (with Vicente Cuñat) The Review of Corporate Finance Studies Vol 3 (1-2), 2014, 87-122. DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfu007
Specialized Careers (with Johannes Hörner), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol 23(4), 2014, Fall 2014, 601–627. DOI: 10.1111/jems.12065
What is a Good Reputation? Career Concerns with Heterogeneous Audiences (with Joyee Deb) International Journal of Industrial Organization (Papers and Proceedings of the EARIE Conference 2013), Volume 34, May 2014, 44-50.
Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals (with John Asker), American Economic Review, February 2014, Vol 104(2): 672-86. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.2.672 Erratum Appendix
Ratings Quality over the Business Cycle (with Joel Shapiro) (Additional materials: Technicial Appendix) Journal of Financial Economics, April 2013, 108(1), 62-78. DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.11.004
Search, Design, and Market Structure (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), American Economic Review, April 2012, 102(2): 1140–1160.
Information gathering externalities in product markets (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), Journal of Industrial Economics, March 2012, Vol. LX, No. 1, 162–185.
Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise, The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 12: Iss. 1, Article 4, 2012.
Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives (with Joel Shapiro), American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), May 2011, Volume 101:3, 120–124.
Information gathering and marketing (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 19, Number 2, Summer 2010, 375–401.
Interrogation Methods and Terror Networks (with Mariagiovanna Baccara) (2009) Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism eds N. Memon, J. D. Farley, D. L Hicks, and T. Rosenorn, Springer, 271-290.
Breadth, Depth, and Competition, Economics Letters, (May 2009), Volume 103(2), 110-112.
How to organize crime (with Mariagiovanna Baccara) Review of Economic Studies, 2008, Volume 75(4), 1039–1067.
Recruitment, training, and career concerns (with Juanjo Ganuza) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2008, Volume 17 (4). 839-864. (Additional materials: Computational Model)
Seller Reputation (with Steve Tadelis), Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2008, Volume 4:4, 273-351.
Something to prove: Reputation in teams RAND Journal of Economics, (Summer 2007), Volume 38(2), 495-511. (reprinted in The Economics of Reputation, 2017 eds J.J. McClusky and J. Winfree, Edward Elgar)
Imperfect Competition and Reputational Commitment, Economics Letters, (November 2005), Volume 89(2), 167-173.
Reputation and Survival: learning in a dynamic signalling model, Review of Economic Studies, (April 2003), Volume 70(2), 231-251. An earlier version is available as as Self-Confidence and Survival, STICERD Theoretical Economics DP 428 or in my thesis. In addition to a better title, the chief difference with respect to the published version is a finite period version of the model that allows the firm to choose equilibrium prices. The equilibrium might see the firm choose a low price (that is below the consumers willingness to pay) when its reputation is bad. The intuition here is that making life tough in bad states is worse for a bad seller than a good one and so flushes out bad sellers quickly allowing the good to capture higher value.