A haiku abstract distills what is essential. Also warms my heart.
For poetic types with short attention spans, an abstract of each of my research papers in haiku-form. (This web-page inspired by the sometimes controversial view that a paper should have a simple, communicable point, the now defunct Guardian's haiku of the week and apparently harking back to an earlier tradition of econometrics haikus and broader popularizations). And for those inspired (or curious about other forms): It’s not a zero-sum game/ More poems can bring all more fame/ An abstract haiku/ could bring some to you/ a limerick is almost the same.
Acquihiring for Monopsony Power (with Justin Johnson and Volker Nocke).
Pay A to hire B:
an efficiency defence?
Meta do better.
Monetizing Steering (with Sandro Shelegia).
Marketplace can earn
from auctions? and/or from fees
with algo steering.
Targeted Product Design (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023, 15(2), 157-86.
Circle represents
vertical-horizontal
trade-off in design.
Search, Showrooming and Retailer Variety with Sandro Shelegia. Marketing Science, 2023, Vol 42(2), 251-270.
What brings lower price?
Somewhat picky consumers
figuring out match.
Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Asymmetric Information (with Clare Leaver), Economica, 2022, 89, 849–861.
Hired a good match?
Say nothing more for low and
efficient wages.
Motivating Employees through Career Paths (with Raphaël Lévy) Journal of Labor Economics, Vol 40 (1), 2022, 95-131.
Lose it to use it?
Compete to commit and to
provide incentives.
Adverse Selection, Efficiency and the Structure of Information (with Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver) Economic Theory 72, 2021, 579-614.
Adverse selection,
but not efficiency shifts?
Best info design.
Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting (with Joyee Deb) Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(1), Feb 2021, 200-236.
Resting on laurels
is possible when none look,
and can raise welfare
Blockholder voting (with Joel Shapiro) Journal of Financial Economics, June 2020, Vol 136 (3), 695-717. Final version here.
One man, many votes?
It depends on what you know:
SEC Beware!
Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions (with John Asker) Journal of Law and Economics, February 2020, 63 (1), 111-148.
MAP and RPM
Not equally flexible
so welfare results
Reputation and Survival: learning in a dynamic signalling model, Review of Economic Studies, (April 2003), Volume 70(2), 231-251.
Skill or luck matters?
Knowing your type drives results.
At last, truth will out.
Information gathering externalities in product markets (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), Journal of Industrial Economics, March 2012, Vol. LX, No. 1, 162–185.
Much too much to learn.
We can’t rely on others
when we act the same.
How to organize crime (with Mariagiovanna Baccara) Review of Economic Studies, 2008, Volume 75(4), 1039–1067.
Criminal trade-off.
Get more cooperation,
more vulnerable.
Search, Design, and Market Structure (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), American Economic Review, April 2012, 102(2): 1140–1160.
Consumers will search.
Accordingly, firms cater:
Second best results.
Breadth, Depth, and Competition, Economics Letters, (May 2009), Volume 103(2), 110-112.
Choose to be broad? Deep?
Competition leads both ways.
more ambiguity.
Recruitment, training, and career concerns (with Juanjo Ganuza) Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2008, Volume 17 (4). 839-864.
Raise the average?
Career concerns suggest how:
teaching to the top.
Information gathering and marketing (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 19, Number 2, Summer 2010, 375–401.
Make learning easy?
Integrated Marketing,
Commitment issues.
Seller Reputation (with Steve Tadelis), Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2008, Volume 4:4, 273-351.
Most of what we know,
more than you might want to know.
On reputation.
Something to prove: Reputation in teams RAND Journal of Economics, (Summer 2007), Volume 38(2), 495-511.
Ability known?
Hiring can induce effort.
Care for firm’s repute.
Imperfect Competition and Reputational Commitment, Economics Letters, (November 2005), Volume 89(2), 167-173.
Competition helps?
Dynamic effects unclear.
Strategic import.
Long-term debt and hidden borrowing (with Vicente Cuñat) The Review of Corporate Finance Studies accepted.
Hidden borrowing:
simpler contractual form.
Cost? efficiency.
Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 12: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 4, 2012.
More reputation:
both expertise and effort.
More ambiguity.
Ratings Quality over the Business Cycle (with Joel Shapiro), Journal of Financial Economics, April 2013, 108(1), 62-78.
To milk or maintain?
CRA incentives change
like economies.
Specialized Careers (with Johannes Hörner), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol 23(4), 2014, Fall 2014, 601–627.
Sharp career concerns
with all eggs in one basket.
But too much idle time?
Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals (with John Asker), American Economic Review, February 2014, Vol 104(2): 672-86.
Foreclose an entrant?
Retail price maintenance helps
pay off downstream firms.
Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives (with Joel Shapiro), American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), May 2011, Volume 101:3, 120–124.
Bank or CRA?
incentives for analysts
change accuracy.
Information and Human Capital Management (with Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver)
Firms control info:
inequality, turnover,
wages, and jobs result.
(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters (with Joyee Deb) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol 6(4), 2014, 293-325.
What two masters see
will change reputation
from better to worse.
Brokers' Contractual Arrangements in Manhattan Rental Markets (with Alessandro Gavazza) Journal of Urban Economics, Vol 86, 2015, 73-82.
Unusual flats
tend to be more exclusive.
But who pays the fee?
Campaigns with Coarse Cognition
Attention constraints
affect campaign dynamics:
race pause race again.
A few syllables
Capture something, not enough.
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