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For poetic types with short attention spans, an abstract of each of my research papers in haiku-form. (This web-page inspired by the sometimes controversial view that a paper should have a simple, communicable point, the now defunct Guardian's haiku of the week and apparently harking back to an earlier tradition of econometrics haikus).

Adverse Selection, Efficiency and the Structure of Information (with Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver)

Adverse selection,
not efficiency shifts?
Information structures ...

Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting (with Joyee Deb)

Resting on laurels
is possible when none look
and can raise welfare

Blockholder voting (with Joel Shapiro)

Many votes with many shares?
It depends on what you know:
SEC Beware!

Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions  (with John Asker)

Not equally flexible
so welfare results

Reputation and Survival: learning in a dynamic signalling model, Review of Economic Studies, (April 2003), Volume 70(2), 231-251.
Skill or luck matters?
Knowing your type drives results. 
At last, truth will out.

Information gathering externalities in product markets (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), Journal of Industrial EconomicsMarch 2012, Vol. LX, No. 1, 162–185.
Much too much to learn. 
We can’t rely on others 
when we act the same.

How to organize crime (with Mariagiovanna BaccaraReview of Economic Studies, 2008, Volume 75(4), 1039–1067.
Criminal trade-off. 
Get more cooperation, 
more vulnerable.

Search, Design, and Market Structure (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), American Economic Review, April 2012, 102(2): 1140–1160.
Consumers will search. 
Accordingly firms cater:
Second best results.

Breadth, Depth, and CompetitionEconomics Letters, (May 2009), Volume 103(2), 110-112.
Choose to be broad? Deep? 
Competition leads both ways. 
more ambiguity.

Recruitment, training, and career concerns (with Juanjo GanuzaJournal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2008, Volume 17 (4). 839-864.
Raise the average? 
Career concerns suggest how: 
teaching to the top.

Information gathering and marketing (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 19, Number 2, Summer 2010, 375–401.
Make learning easy? 
Integrated Marketing, 
Commitment issues.

Seller Reputation (with Steve Tadelis), Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2008, Volume 4:4, 273-351.
Most of what we know, 
more than you might want to know.
On reputation.

Something to prove: Reputation in teams RAND Journal of Economics, (Summer 2007), Volume 38(2), 495-511.
Ability known? 
Hiring can induce effort.
Care for firm’s repute.

Imperfect Competition and Reputational CommitmentEconomics Letters, (November 2005), Volume 89(2), 167-173.
Competition helps? 
Dynamic effects unclear. 
Strategic import.

Long-term debt and hidden borrowing (with Vicente CuñatThe Review of Corporate Finance Studies accepted.
Hidden borrowing: 
simpler contractual form. 
Cost? efficiency.

Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring ExpertiseThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 12: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 4, 2012.
More reputation: 
both expertise and effort.
More ambiguity.

Ratings Quality over the Business Cycle (with Joel Shapiro), Journal of Financial Economics, April 2013, 108(1), 62-78.
To milk or maintain?
CRA incentives change
like economies.

Specialized Careers (with Johannes Hörner), Journal of Economics and Management StrategyVol 23(4), 2014, Fall 2014, 601–627.
Sharp career concerns
with all eggs in one basket. 
But too much idle time?

Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals (with John Asker), American Economic Review, February 2014, Vol 104(2): 672-86.
Foreclose an entrant?
Retail price maintenance helps
pay off downstream firms.

Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives (with Joel Shapiro), American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), May 2011, Volume 101:3, 120–124.
Bank or CRA?
incentives for analysts
change accuracy.

Information and Human Capital Management (with Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver)
Firms control info:
inequality, turnover, 
wages, and jobs result.

(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters (with Joyee DebAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol 6(4), 2014, 293-325.
What two masters see
will change reputation
from better to worse.

Brokers' Contractual Arrangements in Manhattan Rental Markets (with Alessandro Gavazza) Journal of Urban Economics, Vol 86, 2015, 73-82.
Unusual flats
tend to be more exclusive. 
But who pays the fee?

Campaigns with Coarse Cognition

Attention constraints
affect campaign dynamics:
race pause race again.

A few syllables
Capture something, not enough.
Explore further! Here