Micro-Theory and Experiments
“Memory and Markets,” with S. Kovbasjuk, forthcoming in the Review of Economic Studies.
“Frequency of Interaction, Communication and Collusion: an Experiment,” with M. Bigoni and J. Potters, in Economic Theory, 2019, 68, 827-844.
“Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time,” with M. Bigoni, M. Casari and A. Skrzypacz, in Econometrica, March 2015, 83(2), 587-616.
“Trust, Leniency and Deterrence”, with M. Bigoni, C. Le Coq and S. Fridolfsson, in the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, November 2015, 31 (4): 663-689.
“Prisoner’s Other Dilemma”, with M. Blonski, in The International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44, 61-81.
“Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust”, with M. Bigoni, C. Le Coq and S. Fridolfsson, 2012, RAND Journal of Economics, 43(2), 368-390.
“Networks of Relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication”, Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72(1), 202-217.
“Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence”, with M. Blonski and P. Ockenfels, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2011, 3(3), 2011: 164–92.
“On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 89/1, 1999, 127-139.
“Social Relations and Cooperation in Organizations,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 38/1 (lead article) 1999, 1-26.
“Internet Peering as a Network of Relations”, with S. Lippert, Telecommunications Policy, 2008, 32, 33-49.
“Incentives and Development: the Role of Teams, Peer Monitoring, and Social Norms,” Economia, Societa’ e Istituzioni 9/I-II (May 1997), 1-29.
2012, “Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale for Rewarding A while Aiming for B”, with E. Iossa, CEIS-Tor Vergata Research Paper 147.
2009, “Relational Contracts and Competitive Screeining”, with G. Calzolari, CEPR Dp. 7434, presented at the 2005 ESSET-Gerzensee, the ESWC, London 2005, EARIE 2005 and EEA 2008, and NBER Workshop Nov. 2009. UNDER REVISION
2002 “Globalization and Cooperative Relations,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3522 (available from http://www.cepr.org/), invited paper at the second CEPR Workshop on Globalization and Contracts in Paris, April 2005.
2001 “Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2778 (available from http://ww w.cepr.org/), revised version of Spagnolo (1996), first dynamic analysis on Issue Linkage and Policy Cooperation.