EHR
Below you can find the necessary material for the EHR course. Slides, cases and quizzes.
Lecture 1: Talent - The market for talent (Feb. 5)
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapter 2*
2. Akerlof, George (1970). “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 488- 500
3. Lazear, Edward (1992). “The Job as a Concept.” In Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, William Bruns, ed. Boston: Harvard Business School Press
Application: Software Raises Bar for Hiring
Lecture 2: Talent - Investing in skills (Feb. 6)
Case Study 1: Non Compete Agreement
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapter 3*
2. Becker, Gary (1975). "Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, With Special Reference to Education". New York: Columbia University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research
3. Lazear, Edward (2006). “Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach” Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research
4. Mincer, Jacob (1974). Schooling, Experience & Earnings. New York: Columbia University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research
Application: MBA’s
Lecture 3: Incentives - Pay for Performance (Feb. 12)
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapters 9 and 10*
2. David Besanko, David Dranove, Mark Shanley and Scott Schaefer (2004), Economics of Strategy, Third Edition, Wiley, Chapter 14*
3. Gibbons, Robert, Lectures Notes on Agency Theory, MIT course
4. Lazear, Edward (2000). “Performance Pay and Productivity” American Economic Review 90(5): 1346-1361
Application: Franchises
Lecture 4: Incentives - Risks and incentives (Feb. 13)
Case Study 2: Safelite
Materials:
1. David Besanko, David Dranove, Mark Shanley and Scott Schaefer (2004), Economics of Strategy, Third Edition, Wiley, Chapter 14*
2. PE2008, Chapters 10*
3. Baker, G. (1992), "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement", Journal of Political Economy, 100: 598-614
4. Baker, George. 2002. “Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts” Journal of Human Resources 37: 728-51
5. Prendergast, Canice, . The Tenuous Trade-Off between Risks and Incentives.
Application: Wall Street Pay Becomes a Target (NYTimes, September 23, 2008)
Lecture 5: Incentives - Getting what you paid for: multitasking and incentives (Feb. 19)
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapters 10*
2. David Besanko, David Dranove, Mark Shanley and Scott Schaefer (2004), Economics of Strategy, Third Edition, Wiley, Chapter 14*
3. Baker, G., Gibbons B. and Murphy K. (1994), "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentives Contracts", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, n.4
4. Kerr, S. (1975), "On the Folly of Rewarding A While Hoping for B", Academy of Management Journal 18: 769-783
5. Holmström and Milgrom (1991), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52
6. Levitt S. D. and Dubner S. J (2005), "What Do School teachers and Sumo Wrestlers Have in Common?", Freakonomics, Chapter 1
7. Prendergast C. (2001). “Selection and Oversight in the Public Sector, with the Los Angeles Police Department as an Example”, NBER working paper 8664
Class discussion: Incentives and the global financial crisis
Lecture 6: Incentives - Career-based Incentives (Feb. 20)
Case study 3: Tournaments in Law Firms
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapter 11*
2. David Besanko, David Dranove, Mark Shanley and Scott Schaefer (2004), Economics of Strategy, Third Edition, Wiley, Chapter 15*
3. Chevalier and Ellison (1999), “Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 2. (May, 1999), pp. 389-432
4. Lazear and Rosen (1981), “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 5. (Oct., 1981), pp. 841-864
5. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), "Herd Behavior and Investment”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 3. (Jun., 1990), pp. 465-479
Lecture 7: continuing career based incentives (Feb. 26)
Lecture 8: Incentives - employee stock options & executive pay – part 1 (Feb. 27)
Case study 4: CEO pay regulation (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/executive_pay/index.html)
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapter 12*
2. Hall B. (2000), “What you Need to Know About Stock Options”, Harvard Business Review”, March 2001
3. Jensen M. C. and Murphy K. J. (2004), "Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got to here, what are the problems, and how to fix them”, ECGI working paper 44-2004*
4. "A Closer Look at Compensation", Corporate Board Member, 2006 Special Supplement, Towers Perrin
Application
1. Brian Hall about stock options
3. Google Transferable Stock Options
Recent evidence: Kaplan (2012), Murphy (2012)
Lecture 9: intrinsic motivation (March 5 - part 1)
Materials
Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel (2011), When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior, Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 25, Number 4—Fall 2011—Pages 191–210
Other readings
COLIN CAMERER, LINDA BABCOCK, GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, RICHARD THALER (1997), LABOR SUPPLY OF NEW YORK CITY CABDRIVERS:ONE DAY AT A TIME, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 112, 407-441.
STEFANO DELLAVIGNA AND ULRIKE MALMENDIER (2006), Paying not to go to the gym, American Economic Review, VOL. 96 NO. 3, 694-719.
URI GNEEZY and ALDO RUSTICHINI (2000), A fine is a price, Journal of Legal Studies, 29, 1-17.
Lecture 9: teams (March 5 - part 2)
Materials:
1. PE2008 Chapter 8*
2. Bandiera O., Barankay I. and Rasul I. (2009), “Social Connections and Incentives inthe Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data", Econometrica, 77, 1047–1094.
3. Holmström (1982), "Moral hazard in teams", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 324-340
4. Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), “Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation”, Journal of Political Economy, 2003, vol. 111, no. 3
5. Ichniowski, Shaw and Gant (2003), “Connective Capital: Building Problem-Solving Networks Within Firms”, mimeo, Stanford GSB
6. Mas A. and Moretti E. (2006), "Peers at Work", NBER working paper #12508
Lecture 10: continuing teams (March 6, part 1)
Materials:
Owan, H. (2014), How should teams be formed and managed?
Lecture 10: Special topic, incentives, selection & gender – a behavioral approach (guest speaker) (March 6, part 2)
Case: Affirmative action in Norway
Materials:
* Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009), Gender Differences in Preferences, Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (2), 1-27
Extra readings:
1. Bengtsson C., M. Persson and P. Willenhag (2005), Gender and Overconfidence, Economics Letters, Volume 86, Issue 2, February 2005, 199-203
2. Eckel C. and Grossman P. (2008), Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence, Handbook of Results in Experimental Economics, Volume 1, 2008, 1061-1073
3. Gneezy, U., Niederle M. and Rustichini A. (2003), Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII, 1049 1074
4. Niederle, M. and Vesterlund L. (2007), Do Women Shy away from Competition? Do Men Compete too Much?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 122(3), 1067-1101
Lecture 11: job design (March 10)
Study Questions
Case Study 5: Sun Hydraulics
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapter 7* and 8*
2. Ichniowski C., Shaw K. and Prennushi G. (1997), "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines", American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Jun., 1997), pp. 291-313
3. Michael Gibbs, Alec Levenson & Cindy Zoghi (2007). “Why Are Jobs Designed the Way They Are?” Working paper, University of Chicago
Lecture 12: Entrepreneurship (March 11, part 1)
Study Questions
Materials:
1. PE2008, Chapter 14*
2. Lazear, E. Entrepreneurship - paper
3. Ramana Nanda and Jesper B. Sørensen, Peer Effects and Entrepreneurship
4. Gompers et al., Skill vs. Luck
Lecture 12: recap, Q&A, preparing the exam (March 11, part 2)