Master in Economics (ENSAE, HEC Paris and IP Paris), Master in Optimization (University Paris-Saclay and IP Paris), HEC PhD program.
This course studies game-theoretic models of information design and strategic communication. We analyze how information provision influences agents' beliefs and behavior in strategic environments and study the incentives of privately informed agents to disclose information to other agents, with and without a mediator.
1. Basic Bayesian Persuasion
Bayesian persuasion: the single-decision-maker case
Motivation and canonical examples
Statistical experiments
Splitting lemma / Bayes plausibility
Value function and concavification
Applications and examples
Public persuasion in games
Public signals and equilibrium selection
Concavification with equilibrium payoff correspondences
Application: persuading a committee
Application: persuading voters
2. Persuasion with Belief-Dependent Preferences
Psychological (belief-dependent) preferences
Temptation and self-control
Giving advice to a psychological agent
Obedient recommendation policy
3. Communication, Correlation, and Delegation in Complete-Information Games
Contracts and individually rational correlated profiles
Correlated equilibrium, canonical representation
Coarse correlated equilibrium
Robust predictions to communication and delegation
Enforcement games and contests
4. Bayes-Correlated Equilibrium and Private Persuasion
Back to the prosecutor and judge example
Private persuasion of a committee
Traffic information system in routing games
5. Cheap Talk and Communication Equilibria
Sender-receiver model and examples
Geometric characterization of equilibrium payoffs
Transparent motives and connections to Bayesian persuasion
Mediated communication equilibrium
2026-2027 Schedule: Thursday morning, 9:00 - 12:15, room ????.
1, 8, 15, 22 Oct, 12, 19, 26 Nov, 03 Dec
M1, M2 & EXCHANGE, HEC Paris.
This course examines strategic behavior in interactive decision-making environments by combining standard game-theoretic analysis with insights from behavioral game theory and experimental economics. Using both theory and empirical evidence, students will study systematic gaps between benchmark predictions and observed behavior. Topics include backward induction, bargaining, beauty-contest games, coordination, cooperation, focal points, iterative reasoning, reciprocity, other-regarding preferences, social dilemmas, the tragedy of the commons, trust, stochastic choice, and the role of psychological factors in strategic decision-making.
Six weekly sessions of three hours, over one bimester. The course will cover the following topics:
• Dominance, rationality, and social dilemmas
• Iterated dominance and limited depth of reasoning
• Coordination, focal points, and the risk-efficiency trade-off
• Mixed strategies, unpredictability, and strategic mistakes
• Ultimatum bargaining, trust, and other-regarding preferences
• Backward reasoning and dynamic strategic interactions
• Cooperation, punishment, and long-run incentives
L3, HEC Paris.
Ce cours introduit les outils clés permettant d’analyser le comportement des consommateurs et des entreprises, et examine comment leurs décisions influencent l’allocation des ressources dans différentes structures de marché. À travers un mélange de cours magistraux, d’exercices et de discussions de cas concrets, les étudiants exploreront les interactions marchandes et sociales, et comprendront comment les forces économiques influencent les prix, la production et les stratégies d’entreprise. Ces concepts seront appliqués, entre autres, à la tarification, à la politique climatique, aux droits de douane et à la collusion. Le cours explore également le rôle des politiques publiques (politique environnementale, fiscalité, réglementation, politique de la concurrence) dans la correction des défaillances de marché.