Research Interests
Game theory, information disclosure, strategic communication, information design, bounded rationality
Working Papers
A belief-based approach to signaling (with Marie Laclau and Tristan Tomala), July 2025.
Abstract. We provide a geometric characterization of the set of interim equilibrium payoffs in the general class of costly signaling games. Our characterization offers a unified, belief-based framework to study both cheap talk and costly signaling, with or without transparent motives. The key ingredient is the analysis of Bayes-plausible belief distributions and signal-contingent interim values that are incentive-compatible for the sender. Geometrically, this leads to a constrained convexification of the graphs of the interim value correspondences. We apply and illustrate the results in a class of intimidation games. We also derive the sender’s best equilibrium payoff under transparent motives. Finally, we compare the equilibrium outcomes to those arising when the sender can commit to a signaling strategy.
Sources of Consumer Information (with Regis Renault), July 2025.
Abstract: A buyer can learn about a product, either through search or through the information disclosed by the seller. We analyze how this buyer-seller relationship is affected by lower search costs or an improvement in the seller's ability to fine-tune her disclosure of product information. Whereas a drop in search costs improves consumer surplus and decreases profit when the seller can resort to an optimal disclosure strategy, its impact is ambiguous if the seller is unable to provide information. When it is unlikely that the buyer's valuation is below marginal cost, the buyer does not benefit from optimal information disclosure by the seller if search costs are high. With such high search costs and no disclosure both parties can be better off than with lower search costs and optimal information disclosure. The seller then adopts a mass market strategy where she posts a low enough price so the buyer always purchases the product without search. By contrast, if it is sufficiently likely that the buyer's valuation is below marginal cost, then the buyer can benefit from sophisticated information disclosure for relatively low search costs. The corresponding outcome is better for both parties than an environment with higher search costs and no information disclosure. The optimal seller strategy targets a niche of high-valuation buyers and prevents wasteful search by buyers with low valuations.
Informed Communication Equilibrium (with Vasiliki Skreta), June 2025.
Abstract: We consider a privately informed sender selecting a mediated communication device to influence players' actions. In contrast to standard information design, there is no ex-ante commitment, and the communication device relies on information elicited from the informed parties. We define an informed communication equilibrium (ICE) as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the informed mediated communication game. We show that the set of ICE is the subset of communication equilibria (CE) that yield sender payoff vectors bounded below by an equilibrium payoff vector of the silent game, under some consistent interim beliefs. The principal's ex-ante optimal CE may not be an ICE. In sender-receiver games, the set of CE payoff vectors lies in the convex hull of the set of payoff vectors above silence. Hence, if the latter set is convex, as is the case when the sender has transparent motives, the sets of CE and ICE coincide.
Full Implementation via Information Design in Nonatomic Games (with Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala), February 2025.
Abstract. This paper studies the implementation of Bayes correlated equilibria in symmetric Bayesian nonatomic games, using direct information structures and obedient strategies. The main results demonstrate full implementation in a class of games with positive cost externalities. Specifically, if the game admits a strictly convex potential in every state, then for every Bayes correlated equilibrium outcome with finite support and rational action distributions, there exists a direct information structure that implements this outcome under all equilibria. When the potential is only weakly convex, we show that all equilibria implement the same expected social cost. Additionally, all Bayes correlated equilibria, including those with infinite support or irrational action distributions, are approximately implemented.
Publications
Feedback Design in Games with Ambiguity Averse Players (with Marieke Pahlke), Journal of Economic Theory, 2025, 225, p. 105987.
Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games (with Marco Scarsini and Tristan Tomala), Mathematics of Operations Research, forthcoming.
Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems (with Francoise Forges and Andres Salamanca), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, 114, p. 103023..
A belief-based approach to signaling (with Marie Laclau and Tristan Tomala), 2024, 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24).
Splitting games over finite sets (with Marie Laclau, Jerome Renault and Tristan Tomala), Mathematical Programming, 2024, 203, 477–498. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-022-01806-7.
Informed Information Design (with Vasiliki Skreta), Journal of Political Economy, 2023, 131(11), 3186-3232.
Selective Memory of a Psychological Agent (with Jeanne Hagenbach), European Economic Review, 2022, 142, 104012.
Long Information Design (with Marie Laclau, Jerome Renault and Tristan Tomala), Theoretical Economics, 2022, 17(2), 883-927.
Interactive Information Design (with Marie Laclau and Tristan Tomala), Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022, 47(1), 153-175.
Cheap Talk with Coarse Understanding (with Jeanne Hagenbach), Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, 124, 105-121.
Evidence Reading Mechanisms (with Eduardo Perez-Richet), Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, 53(3) : 375-397.
Selling with Evidence (with Vasiliki Skreta), Theoretical Economics, 2019, 14(2) : 345-371.
The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication (with Jeanne Hagenbach), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, 143 : 1-8.
Simple versus Rich Language in Disclosure Games (with Jeanne Hagenbach), Review of Economic Design, 2017, 21(3) : 163-175
Truthtelling in Matching Markets (with Jeanne Hagenbach and Thomas Tregouet), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2017, 119(4) : 882-909.
Hard Evidence and Ambiguity Aversion (with Mehdi Ayouni), Theory and Decision, 2017, 82, 327-339.
Informed Seller with Taste Heterogeneity (with Vasiliki Skreta), Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 165, 456-471.
Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations (with Jeanne Hagenbach), Economics Letters, 2016, 138, 5-7.
Extortion and Political Risk Insurance (with Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky), Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 120, 144-156.
Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure (with Jeanne Hagenbach and Eduardo Perez-Richet), Econometrica, 2014, 83(3), 1093-1131. Online appendix
Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (with Nicolas Jacquemet), Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, 78, 103-120.
Committing to Transparency to Resist Corruption (with Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky), Journal of Development Economics, 2013, 100(1), 117-126.
When does a firm disclose product information? (with Regis Renault), Rand Journal of Economics, 2012, 43(4), 630-649.
Information Aggregation and Beliefs in Experimental Parimutuel Betting Markets (with Charles Noussair and Anthony Ziegelmeyer), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, 83(2), 195-208.
Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions (with David Martimort), Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, 147(5), 1850-1881.
Fragility of Information Cascades: An Experimental Study Using Elicited Beliefs (with Juergen Bracht, Eyal Winter and Anthony Ziegelmeyer), Experimental Economics, 2010, 13, 121-145.
Strategic Communication Networks (with Jeanne Hagenbach), Review of Economic Studies, 2010, 77(3), 1072-1099.
Long Persuasion Games (with Françoise Forges), Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143(1), 1-35.
Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable Types (with Françoise Forges), International Game Theory Review, 2008, 10(2), 145-164.
Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (with Françoise Forges), Annales d'Économie et de Statistiques, 2008, 89, 3-61.
Road Traffic Congestion and Public Information: An Experimental Investigation (with Kene Boun My, Laurent Denant-Boemont, and Anthony Ziegelmeyer), Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2008, 42(1), 43-82.
Parimutuel Betting under Asymmetric Information (with Charles Noussair and Anthony Ziegelmeyer), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, 733-744.
Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs. Private Certification, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, 55(3), 305-314.
Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations (with Philippe Jehiel), Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 62(2), 533-557.
Coordination stratégique et connaissance commune dans les réseaux de communication (with Jeanne Hagenbach), Revue d'Economie Industrielle, 2006, 114, 185-204.
Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types (with Françoise Forges), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, 41 (7), 793-811.
Biais en faveur de l'outsider et nature des mises sur un marché expérimental de parimutuel (with Marie-Hélène Broihanne and Anthony Ziegelmeyer), Revue Economique, 2005, 56 (5), 1065-1087.
Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48 (2), 292-320.
Sequential Parimutuel Betting in the Laboratory (with M-H. Broihanne and A. Ziegelmeyer), Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2004, 28(2), 165-186.
Coordination des politiques budgétaires et monétaires dans l'UEM en présence de chocs et d'informations asymétriques (with S. Duchassaing), Revue Economique, 2004, 55(1), 5-20.
The Favorite-Longshot Bias in Sequential Parimutuel Betting with Non-Expected Utility Players (with M.-H. Broihanne and A. Ziegelmeyer), Theory and Decision, 2003, 54(3),231-248.
Persuasion Games with Higher-Order Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 110(2), 393-399.
Common Knowledge and Consensus with Noisy Communication, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2001, 42(2), 139-159.
Common Knowledge and Interactive Behaviors: A Survey, European Journal of Economic and Social Systems, 2000, 14(3), 271-308.