Recent articles

Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, Annals of Economics and Statistics 137, 3-30, 2020.

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval (+ Jérôme RENAULT), International Journal of Game Theory 50, 475-502, 2021.

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case (+ Stéphan SEMIRAT), Games and Economic Behavior 134, 242-263, 2022.

Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm (+ Jozsef SAKOVICS), International Journal of Game Theory 51, 589-605, 2022.

Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information Revue Economique 74,  529-539, 2023.

Interactive mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agents problems (+ Frédéric KOESSLER and Andrés SALAMANCA), Journal of Mathematical Economics 114, article 103023, 2024.

"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies": Back to the roots (+ Indrajit RAY), Journal of Mathematical Economics 114, article 103044, 2024.

Converging better response dynamics in sender-receiver games (+ Stéphan SEMIRAT), Mathematics of Operations Research 51, 1995 - 2016, 2026.