Presentations

Communication in Bayesian games: overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory, workshop "Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing and Cryptography", Princeton, June 2010.

Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games, PET 12, Taipei, June 2012.

Bayesian repeated games and reputation (+ Antoine SALOMON), ESEM, Göteborg, 2013.

Cheap talk and commitment in Bayesian games (+ Ulrich HORST and Antoine SALOMON), French Symposium on Games 2015.

Strategic information with sender's approval (+ Jérôme Renault), workshops "Frontiers in design", London, and "Information design and splitting games", Paris, June 2019.

Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion: Lecture at Econometric Society Summer School, Sapporo, August 6-10, 2019.

Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion: Laffont lecture, ESEM, Manchester, August 28, 2019. Updated version, University of Macau conference "Contemporary issues in macro- and micro-economics", July 27, 2021.

Strategic information with sender's approval: the single-crossing case (+ Stéphan Sémirat), EWET 2021.

Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information, colloquium in honor of Robert Aumann, Paris, October 2021.

Identifying the game: some examples from classical and behavioral game theory, Workshop "What is the game?", London, April 2022.

56 years of cheap talk, PET (Marseilles, June 2022) and conference in honor of Peter Hammond (Warwick, December 2022).

Neologisms in cheap talk games (+ Stéphan Sémirat), Behavior and Strategies in Information Design and Communication (HEC, Paris, May 2023); Paris Workshop on Games, Decisions and Language (June 2023); Information Transmission and Incentives (Brescia, June 2023).