Recent articles

Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques, Revue d'Economie Politique 127, 467-493, 2017.

Sender-receiver games with cooperation (+ Ulrich HORST), Journal of Mathematical Economics 76, 52-61, 2018.

Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, Annals of Economics and Statistics 137, 3-30, 2020.

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval (+ Jérôme RENAULT), International Journal of Game Theory 50, 475-502, 2021.

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case (+ Stéphan SEMIRAT), Games and Economic Behavior 134, 242-263, 2022.

Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm (+ Jozsef SAKOVICS), International Journal of Game Theory 51, 589-605, 2022.

Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information, Revue Economique 74,  529-539, 2023.

Converging better response dynamics in sender-receiver games (+ Stéphan SEMIRAT), 2024. Revised version of: Forward-neologism-proof equilibrium and better response dynamics (2023).

Interactive mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agents problems (+ Frédéric KOESSLER and Andrés SALAMANCA), 2024, forthcoming in Journal of Mathematical Economics.

"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies": Back to the roots (+ Indrajit Ray), 2024.