Summary: http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/ussupct.honig.doe.htm
Ruling: http://wind.uwyo.edu/edec5250/assignments/Honig.pdf
Summary
In the case of John Doe, the student was emotionally disturbed and often dealt with his frustration through aggression. Doe attended Louise Lombard School, a developmental center for disabled children, and was evaluated in April 1980 for an IEP. Doe was identified as being socially and physically awkward with incredible difficulty controlling his anger and impulses. Doe faced many difficulties with his peers and on November 6, 1980, he responded to a student’s taunts by choking the student with enough force that abrasions were left on the child’s neck. On his way to the principal’s office afterwards, Doe kicked out a school window. Doe was suspended for five days and the SPC recommended that Doe be expelled. Doe’s suspension was extended by the SPC until the expulsion proceedings were completed.
Doe brought the suit against the local school officials and superintendent. Doe was granted temporary home tutoring, and the District Judge finally directed the defendants to return Doe to his educational placement at Louise Lombard School. Doe did not return back to Louise Lombard until December 15, 5 ½ weeks after his initial suspension.
Student/Family Perspective
The family fought against actions, claiming that the suspension and expulsion violated the Education Handicapped Act (EHA) that requires States to ensure a “free appropriate public education” for all disabled children within their jurisdiction. The Act establishes safeguards to ensure that parents will participate in all decisions regarding the disabled child’s education. It also ensures administrative and judicial review of any decisions with which parents disagree. One of the safeguards is known as the “stay-put” provision, which states that the disabled child will stay in his or her current educational placement during the process of any pending review proceedings. In the case of John Doe, the suspension and expulsion were in direct violation of the EHA and “stay-put” provision. The disabled child was taken out of his educational environment, due to a situation resulting from his emotional disability, without agreement of Doe’s family. Doe was not provided with the “free appropriate public education” promised to him.
School Perspective
The school’s decision to suspend and then eventually expel Jon Doe from Louise Lombard School was based on the safety of the school’s students. The school felt that Doe was a danger to the other students, as well as to himself, and that another placement was best for everyone. Among the Education Handicapped Act is the “stay-put” provision, which the school believed they followed until Doe became dangerous. In Honig vs Doe, a petitioner asked the court to read the "dangerousness" exception into the stay-put provision on two assumptions: first, that Congress thought the residual authority of school officials to exclude dangerous students from the classroom too obvious for comment; or second, that Congress inadvertently failed to provide such authority and this Court must therefore remedy the oversight. However, the court could not accept either assumption. Congress passed the EHA after finding that school systems across the country had excluded one out of every eight disabled children from classes.
The Department of Education has stated that while a child’s placement may not be changed during a complaint proceeding, that doesn’t mean the administration cannot follow their standard procedures for dealing with children who are endangering themselves or others. Such procedures may include time-outs, detention, or the restriction of privileges. More drastically, where a student poses an immediate threat to the safety of others, officials may temporarily suspend him or her for up to 10 school days. This authority, not only ensures that school administrators can protect the safety of others by promptly removing the most dangerous of students, it also provides a "cooling down" period during which officials can initiate IEP review and seek to persuade the child's parents to agree to an interim placement. And in those cases in which the parents of a truly dangerous child adamantly refuse to permit any change in placement, the 10-day suspension gives school the administration an opportunity to go to the judicial system, which empowers courts to grant any appropriate solution.
Why did the Court decide as it did?
The majority opinion (how the court has decided) is written by Chief Justice Brennan. As the case was heard and decided in 1988, the law applied to this case is the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) of 1974 not IDEA 2004. EHA guarantees a "free appropriate public education" , ensures parental particpation in IEP (individualized education plan) meetings, provides administrative and judicial review of any decion with which parents disagree and keeps schools from prematurely expelling disabled students. According to EHA a school system can only remove a child from a school environment pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies otherwise agree. In Honig v. Doe, the disabled student known as "Doe" was suspended and subsequently expelled from his school following a violent outburst. EHA allows for temporary suspetions to accomdate for students with emotional and behavioral disorders but due process still applies. Doe's IEP goals included "improvement in ablility to relate to peers, and cope with frustrating situations without resorting to aggressive acts." His IEP reflected continuing difficulties with peers and therefore his lack of social skills were clearly demonstrated as part of his disability. Jack Smith was a co-respondent in the case. Smith was involved in the case as a result of his grandparent's struggle to represent their grandson's interests in IEP hearings. Smith was excluded from school (because of his aggressive behavior) and denied due process in his IEP hearings. Smith's involvment in the case makes the case justiciable because he is still in school otherwise the case would be moot as Doe is out of school. In the majority opinion Justice Brennan says "Given Smith's continued eligibility for educational services under the EHA, 6 the nature of his disability, and petitioner's [484 U.S. 305, 319] insistence that all local school districts retain residual authority to exclude disabled children for dangerous conduct, we have little difficulty concluding that there is a "reasonable [484 U.S. 305, 320] expectation," ibid., that Smith would once again be subjected to a unilateral "change in placement" for conduct growing out of his disabilities were it not for the statewide injunctive relief issued below. " Therefore the Court had to find in Smith/Doe's favor as EHA still ensures Smith's educational rights. EHA protect's Smith's right to remain in school until his grandparent's have had the opportunity to participate fully in his IEP hearings.
Concurring Opinion
The “mootness doctrine” states an actual controversy must exist at all stages of appellate review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. In other words, if the circumstances causing a grievance are resolved, the Court had typically chosen not to hear the case as there was no longer an issue (hence a moot point). Rehnquist agrees with the dissenting opinion, but suggests that an exemption to the standard exists when a case presents a controversy "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Rehnquist asserts than if a case becomes moot but presents a controversy "capable of repetition, yet evading review," then the Court has the authority and jurisdiction to rule on the case. Rehnquist further adds that "capable of repetition, yet evading review rule" should only apply if the Court: 1) has already granted a writ of certiorari (a decision to hear an appeal from a lower court) or 2) indicated that it has probable jurisdiction to review a matter.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the dissent and felt that the case was moot. He considered Doe the primary respondent and because Doe was no longer of school age and Smith was not attending public schools, the case had no merit. Scalia also disagreed with the majority, that there was a "resonable expectation" that Smith would endure the same pattern of expulsion and denial of due process rights. He also felt that there was a lack of "demonstrated probablity" , that Smith's rights would be denied. Justice Scalia writes "The conclusion that the case is moot is reinforced, moreover, when one considers that, even if Smith does return to public school, the controversy will still not recur unless he is again placed in an educational setting that is unable to tolerate his behavior." Succinctly, Scalia does not forsee the same pattern reoccuring in Smith's case, should he return to school and therefore the case should have never been grated certiori.