Working Papers
Cultural Remittances and Modern Fertility (with H. Rapoport, E. Spolaore & R. Wacziarg). New version (August 2026), NBER WP #32990, CEPR WP #DP19510, CESifo WP #113557. Submitted
Abstract: We argue that migrants played a significant role in the diffusion of the demographic transition from France to the rest of Europe in the late 19th century. Employing novel data on French immigration from other European regions from 1850 to 1930, we find that higher immigration to France translated into lower fertility in the region of origin after a few decades - both in cross-region regressions for various periods, and in a panel setting with region fixed-effects. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, and across multiple specifications. We also find that immigrants who themselves became French citizens achieved lower fertility, particularly those who moved to French regions with the lowest fertility levels. We interpret these findings in terms of cultural remittances, consistent with insights from a theoretical framework where migrants act as vectors of cultural diffusion, spreading new information, social norms and preferences pertaining to modern fertility to their regions of origin.
When Democratization Turns into an "Empty Promise." Evidence from the Birth of the Welfare State. (with P. Maarek). New version (July 2026)
Abstract: The emergence of welfare programs in late 19th-century Europe transformed the role of modern states and coincided with an unprecedented wave of democratization. Yet expanding voting rights in new democracies did not always lead to redistribution through welfare-state construction. We argue that this was because emerging political parties needed time to stabilize. Party stability lengthened politicians’ time horizons and strengthened their capacity to coordinate around divisive, long-term social reforms. We first document a robust historical regularity across Western Europe: mass franchise fostered social insurance development only where party systems were sufficiently stable. We then investigate the mechanisms during the formative decades of the French Third Republic, one of Europe’s earliest mass democracies but a notable laggard in welfare-state development. Using novel historical data, we examine how MPs’ stability within partisan groups shaped their behavior throughout the legislative process, from the introduction of initiatives to roll-call votes on a landmark welfare bill debated repeatedly over fifteen years. MPs with longer group tenure were more likely to place social issues on the parliamentary agenda, participate in procedural coalitions to bring bill-related proposals to a roll-call vote, and ultimately vote for the bill. The evidence suggests that stable political organizations lengthened politicians’ time horizons and strengthened their capacity to coordinate around divisive, long-term social reforms. Stable parties were the missing link between democratization and redistribution.
Selected Publications
Voter Turnout and Intergenerational Redistribution. Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 49 (2), June 2021, pp. 603-626 (with M. Klien & A. Pickering).
Polarization and Corruption in America. European Economic Review, vol. 124, May 2020 (with A. Pickering)
Blog/Media Coverage: Marginal Revolution, Le Point
Labor Costs and the Size of Government. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics vol. 79 (2), April 2017, pp. 251–275 (with F. Facchini and A. Pickering).
Blog/Media coverage: Economic Logic, Stumbling and Mumbling
Other Publications in Peer-Reviewed Journals
Economic Shocks and Democratic Consolidation: Historical Evidence from Party-Level Electoral Volatility in France. Electoral Studies, 2023 (with F. Facchini)
Ideological Polarization and Government Debt. International Tax and Public Finance, 29(4), 2022, 811-833. Lead Article (with A. Pickering)
Egalitarianism and the Democratic Deconsolidation: Is Democracy Compatible with Socialism? Public Choice, vol. 186(3), March 2021, pp. 447-465 (with F. Facchini)
Blog/Media coverage: Le Point
New Evidence on the Historical Growth of Government in Europe: The Role of Labor Costs. European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 59, Sept. 2019, pp. 445-460 (with A. Pickering)
The Democratic Crisis and the Knowledge Problem. Politics & Policy, vol. 47, Oct. 2019, pp. 1022-1038 (with F. Facchini)
Media-Driven Polarization. Evidence from the US. Economic E-Journal, vol. 13, 2019-34, June 2019 (with P. Sekeris)
Ideological Polarization and the Media. Economics Letters, vol. 125 (1), Oct. 2014, pp. 36-39 (with A. Pickering)
Political Ideology and Economic Growth: Evidence from the French Democracy. Economic Inquiry, vol. 52 (4) 4, Oct. 2014, pp. 1408–1426 (with F. Facchini)
Efficient Government Size: France in the 20th Century. European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, Sept. 2013, pp. 1–14 (with F. Facchini).
Blog/Media coverage: Punditokraterne, National Affairs, Federal Government Failure
Book
Choix publics. Analyse économique des décisions publiques. Edited by De Boeck, Dec. 2010 (with D. Mueller, F. Facchini, M. Foucault, A. François and R. Magni-Berton). French adaptation of the book Public Choice III, 2009, by D.C. Mueller.
Works in Progress
Cultural Diversity and the Long-Term Reversal of Inequality (with A. Pickering). Project Award: Marie Curie Actions Seal of Excellence
Who are the New Nationalists? (with A. Riboni)
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