Research

This paper provides the first experimental evidence on the impact of an online job fair.

The fair generated a considerable number of job offers.  However, over 90% of them were rejected. No effect on employment probability or type was detected for the entire sample of jobseekers.  

Jobseekers lowered reservation wages, kept their jobs longer, and ended up in worse skill-matched jobs.  

Jobseekers initially had overoptimistic expectations, but learned about market conditions, corrected their expectations, and became discouraged from job search.  

Asymmetric information on job applicants' preference—i.e., how interested they are in the jobs they apply for—may cause inefficiency in job matching. 

We provide the first experimental evidence on the impacts of a signaling mechanism. 

The mechanism we study is basically identical to the one launched in the economist job market by the Americal Economic Association. It allows jobseekers to express their interest to few employers. 

We adopt a novel, fair randomization design that can estimate the application-, jobseeker-, job-, and employer-level effects of preference signals.

Because of female-specific barriers such as social norms and risks of harassment, certain job characteristics may matter particularly to women. 

"Female-friendly" job characteristics—the characteristics that may matter particularly to women— may be hard to observe. As a result, women may not apply for the jobs they should apply. 

We conduct a field experiment in which employers publicize female-friendly job characteristics in their job ads.

We estimate whether publicizing female friendliness leads women to apply for and get well-matched jobs and whether it also helps employers hire well-matched workers.