Back Cover Blurb
Our actions are the means by which we pursue our ends. It is through them that we attempt to bend the world to our will. Consequently, morality has two important roles to play. First, it must tell us which ends we should adopt. Second, it must tell us the best means to our pursuing them. According to the theory defended in this book (namely, Kantsequentialism), the ends that we should adopt are determined by both our will and what’s valuable. The value of things along with any special relations that we bear to these valuable things determine which ends are permissible, prohibited, and obligatory. And then we choose, via acts of our will, which of the permissible but non-obligatory ends to adopt. These obligatory and discretionary ends constitute our legitimate ends, which determine our reasons for preferring the prospects of some of our options to those of others. And this, in turn, determines which of our options we should take. Kantsequentialism is, therefore, a morality of ends.
As its name suggests, Kantsequentialism is a hybrid of utilitarianism and Kantianism that combines their opposite strengths. From utilitarianism, Kantsequentialism takes its act-consequentialism—the idea that whether an agent ought to perform an act just depends on whether they ought to prefer the way it would make the world go to all the ways that the alternatives would make it go. This allows Kantsequentialism to accommodate our commonsense views about action and reasons for action. From Kantianism, Kantsequentialism takes its commitment to what W. D. Ross called “the highly personal character of duty” (1930, 22). This allows Kantsequentialism to accommodate our commonsense views about morality, including the idea that, besides the relation of benefactor to beneficiary, there are several other morally relevant relations, including that of agent to patient, promiser to promisee, parent to child, etc. These others are morally relevant despite being relevant only from one’s own personal perspective.
Full Manuscript - July 24, 2025, Version (check below for possible updates)
Cover Design -- Cover design by Genís Carreras (www.studiocarreras.com).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
0. INTRODUCTION
The Distinction between a Moral Theory and a Complete Account of Morality
The Best Explanation
Fitting the Data as Opposed to the Facts
Epistemic Justification and Phenomenal Conservatism
Neither Overfitting nor Underfitting the Data
Trusting Our Moral Intuitions
II. CHAPTER TWO: Kantianism versus Utilitarianism
Kantianism and Utilitarianism
Moral Rationalism
The Teleological Conception of Action and Reasons for Action
Deontic Inheritance
Deep Value Pluralism and Attitude Inclusivism
Agent-Centered Restrictions, the Separateness of Persons, and the Directedness of Some Moral Obligations
Agent-Centered Options, the Duty to Rescue, the Self-Other Asymmetry, and the Ubiquitous but Sometimes Overridden Duty of Beneficence
III. CHAPTER THREE: Kantsequentialism: A New Moral Theory
Maximalist Act-Consequentialism
A Rationalist Account of Options
Dual Rankism
Telic Preferentialism
Kantian Telicism
Kantsequentialism
IV. CHAPTER FOUR: Kantian Telicism: Our Legitimate Ends and their Moral Significance
The Nature of Ends and Our Duties to Adopt Them
Kantian Respect: Not Manifesting a Lack of Recognition Respect for a Person
Impersonal Beneficence: Promoting the Impersonal Good
Relationship Partiality: Being Partial Concerning Certain Special Relationships
Risk Aversion: Avoiding the Risk of Any Personal or Impersonal Disaster
Discretionary Ends
A Morality of Ends
V. CHAPTER FIVE: Kantsequentialism and Agent-Centered Restrictions
Two Alternative Approaches to Accommodating Agent-Centered Restrictions
Why We Should Favor the Teleological Approach over the Side-Constraint Approach
Why We Should Favor an Act-Consequentialist Approach over a Non-Consequentialist, Teleological Approach
Why We Should Favor a Kantsequentialist Approach over Other Act-Consequentialist Approaches
Conclusion
VI. CHAPTER SIX: Kantsequentialism and Agent-Centered Options
Four Implausible Views Regarding Beneficence
A Better View: The Will-Have-Done-Enough View
The Best View: The Kantsequentialist Version of the Kantian View
A Multitude of Optimal Maximal Options
Conclusion
VII. CHAPTER SEVEN: Kantsequentialism's Other Practical Applications
Promoting the Impersonal Good: Population and Procreation
The Duty to Rescue: Do the Numbers Count?
Love and Solidarity: Affective Partiality versus Agential Partiality
Overdetermined Collective Harms: Who Are the Culprits and What Are They Culpable for?
Index
SOME RELEVANT PRESENTATIONS
THE THEORY
Kantsequentialism (short for Kantian Consequentialism): This is the view that accepts the following five core tenets:
Maximalist Act-Consequentialism: The fundamental right-making feature of a maximal option is having a prospect that is not evaluatively outranked by that of any alternative maximal option. And the fundamental right-making feature of a non-maximal option is being entailed by a permissible maximal option. (To say that one option entails another is to say that the subject in question lacks the option of performing the one without performing the other. A maximal option is an option that is entailed by only evaluatively equivalent options, and a non-maximal option is an option that is not a maximal option.)
Rationalism about Options: For any φ, a subject has, as of time t, the option of φ-ing at some later time tʹ if and only if they have, as of t, rational control over whether they’ll φ at tʹ, where rational control is the sort of control that we exert directly over our reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., our beliefs, desires, and intentions) and indirectly over that which we control via such attitudes (e.g., our intentional actions).
Ranking Dualism: The prospect of one option evaluatively outranks that of another if and only if the agent in question has both more morally requiring reason and more reason, all things considered, to prefer the one to the other. (A morally requiring reason is a reason that has some morally requiring force and that, consequently, generates a moral requirement when that force is undefeated.)
Telic Preferentialism: A subject’s legitimate ends determine what reasons, if any, they have for preferring one prospect to another. Specifically, a subject has more morally requiring reason to prefer one prospect to another if and only if their obligatory ends favor the one over the other. And a subject has more reason, all things considered, to prefer one prospect to another if and only if all their legitimate ends (including all their obligatory and discretionary ends) favor the one over the other.
Kantian Telicism: A subject’s will along with the value of things determine their legitimate ends, which include all their discretionary ends (say, mastering kung fu or traveling the world) as well as the following four obligatory ends: (a) not manifesting a lack of recognition respect for a person, (b) promoting the impersonal good, (c) being partial concerning certain special relationships, and (d) avoiding the risk of any personal or impersonal disaster.
If we’re willing to ignore certain complications concerning what determines an agent’s options and which of those options inherit their deontic statuses from other options, we can summarize this theory as follows: (1) An agent’s will along with the value of things determine their legitimate ends. (2) Their legitimate ends determine the prospects they should prefer. And (3) the prospects that they should prefer determine the options that they should take. That, in a nutshell, is Kantsequentialism.