Publications

Monographs:

• Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction (Broadview Press, 2009)

• Responsibility from the Margins (Oxford University Press, 2015)

• Wisecracks: Humor and Morality in Everyday Life (University of Chicago Press, 2024)

• The Architecture of Blame and Praise: An Interdisciplinary Investigation (in press, Oxford University Press)

Textbook:

• Knowledge, Nature, and Norms (co-authored and -edited with Mark Timmons), 2nd edition (Cengage 2014)

Edited Volumes:

• Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1 (OUP, 2013)

• Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (50th Anniversary of "Freedom and Resentment"), Vol. 2, co-edited with Neal Tognazzini (OUP 2014)

• Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 3 (OUP 2015)

• Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 4 (OUP 2017)

• Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 6 (OUP 2019)

• (See also Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 5, on themes in the work of Gary Watson, edited by Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini, published 2019)

• Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 7, (OUP 2021).

• Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 8, on the theme of Non-Ideal Agency, co-edited with Santiago Amaya and Manuel Vargas (OUP 2024)

Journal Papers:

• "Threatening Quality of Will," The Journal of Moral Philosophy (2023)

• "Empathic Control?" Humana.Mente, special issue edited by Oisin Deery (2022).

• "Now it's Personal: From Me to Mine to Property Rights," co-authored with Bas Van Der Vossen, Law and Philosophy (2022).

• “Response-Dependent Theories of Responsibility,” in Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom, eds., Oxford Handbook on Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).

• "The Trials and Tribulations of Tom Brady: Self-Blame, Self-Talk, Self-Flagellation" in Andreas Brekke Carlsson, ed., Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), pp. 28-47.

• "Disordered, Disregarded, Disabled, Dismissed: Exemptions and Morality" in Matt King and Josh May, eds., Agency in Mental Disorder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 33-62.

• "Personal Identity," co-authored with Kevin Tobia, in John Doris and Manuel Vargas, eds., Oxford Handbook on Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 543-63.

• "Moral Torch Fishing: A Signaling Theory of Blame," co-authored with Manuel Vargas, Nous 55 (2021): 581-602.

• “The Forgiven,” in Michael McKenna, Dana Nelkin, and Brandon Warmke, eds., Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 29-56.

• “Empathic Self-Control,” in Alfred Mele, ed., Surrounding Self-Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 384-399.

• "Responsibility: The State of the Question—Fault Lines in the Foundations" Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2020): 205-237.

• "Blameworthy but Unblamable: A Paradox of Corporate Responsibility," Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 17 (2019): 897-918.

• "Hurt Feelings,"  The Journal of Philosophy 116 (2019): 125-148.

• "Response to Bennett and Sommers" (author-meets-critics), Criminal Law & Philosophy (2019)

• “Cruel Jokes and Normative Competence,” Social Philosophy & Policy 35 (2018): 173-195.

• “Précis of Responsibility from the Margins” and “Response to Watson, Talbert, and McKenna,” Philosophical Studies, published on-line Feb. 2018.

• “You Oughta Know! Defending Angry Blame,” in Myisha Cherry and Owen Flanagan, eds., The Moral Psychology of Anger (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

• “Response-Dependent Responsibility; Or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame,” The Philosophical Review 126 (2017): 481-527.

• “Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, and the Presumption of Goodness,” co-authored with David Faraci, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, published on-line 10/17.

•  “Me and Mine,” co-authored with Peter Jaworski, Philosophical Studies, 2017.

• “Empathy and Moral Responsibility,” in Heidi Maibom, ed., The Routledge Companion to Empathy (NY: Routledge, 2017), pp. 242-52.

• “Marginal Agents and Responsibility Pluralism,” in Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy, and Kevin Timpe, eds., The Routledge Companion to Free Will (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 656-68.

•  “The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism,” in Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon, eds., Essays on Animalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 303-327.

•  “Ecumenical Attributability,” in Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela Smith, eds., The Nature of Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 115-140.

•  “Emotional Lobbying,” The Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 12 (2014): 505-519.

•  “Huck vs. JoJo: The Moral Ignorance (A)symmetry,” co-authored with David Faraci, in Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe, and Tania Lambrozo, eds., Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, v. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 7-27.

• “Remnants of Character,” in Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, eds., Moral Psychology and Human Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 84-107.

• “McKenna’s Quality of Will,” Criminal Law and Philosophy, published online July 2014, DOI: 10.1007/s11572-014-9322-5.

• “The Selves of Social Animals: Comments on Gruen,” Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Supplement) 52 (2014): 66-74.

• “Qualities of Will,” Social Philosophy & Policy 30 (2013): 95-120.

•  “On Criminal and Moral Responsibility,” in Mark Timmons, ed., Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 154-178.

• “Offense” (invited, refereed entry), Wiley-Blackwell’s International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. by Hugh LaFollette.

• “Personhood, Criteria of” (invited, refereed entry), Wiley-Blackwell’s International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. by Hugh LaFollette.

•  “Blame and Punishment,” in D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini, eds., Blame: Its Nature and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

•  “Responsibility Without Identity,” Harvard Review of Philosophy XVIII (2012): 109-132.

• “Personal Identity and Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005, r. 2008, r. 2012, r. 2016), Edward N. Zalta, ed.  

• “Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, Spindel Supplement (2011): 99-124.  Reprinted in Thomas Schramme, ed., Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).

•  “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 121 (2011): 602-632.  (Two discussion pieces were published about this paper in Ethics 122 (2012): Matt Talbert, “Accountability, Aliens, and Psychopaths: A Reply to Shoemaker (562-574); and Angela M. Smith, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account (575-589). Both lost.)

• “Moral Responsibility and the Self,” Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. by Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

• “Personal Identity and Bioethics: The State of the Art,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (2010): 249-257.

•  “Insanity, Responsibility, and the Deep Self: The Case of JoJo,” co-authored with David Faraci, in a special issue of the Review of Philosophy & Psychology 1 (2010): 319-332.

• “The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics,” Bioethics 24 (2010): 481-489.

• “Self-Exposure and Exposure of the Self: Informational Privacy and the Presentation of Identity,” Ethics and Information Technology 12 (2010): 3-15.

• “Responsibility and Disability,” Metaphilosophy 40 (July 2009): 438-461.  Reprinted as “Responsibility, Agency, and Cognitive Disability,” in Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson, eds. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

• “What’s Identity Got to Do With It?” The APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine 8:1 (Fall 2008).

•  “Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of the Moral Community,” Ethics 118 (October 2007): 70-108.

•  “Personal Identity and Practical Concerns,” Mind 116 (April 2007): 317-357.

• “Egoisms,” in Mark Timmons, ed., Conduct & Character, 5th edition (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2006) pp. 18-34.

• "Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension,” Social Theory & Practice 31:1 (January 2005): 51-75.

• “Caring, Identification, and Agency,” Ethics 114 (October 2003): 88-118 (nominated for the 2004 American Philosophical Association Article Prize).

•  “The Incoherence/Irrelevance of Non-Reductivism About Personal Identity,” Philo v. 5, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2002): 143-160.

•  “Why We Can't All Just Get Along: Human Variety and Game Theory in Hobbes’s State of Nature,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy v. XL, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 345-374 (co-authored with Graham G. Dodds).

•   “Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles,” Ratio v. XV, no. 1 (March 2002): 58-79.

• “Justifying Justification: Identity, Community, and Moral Motivation,” The Proceedings and Addresses of the IX International Kant Congress, Fall 2001.

•  “Reductionist Contractualism: Moral Motivation and the Expanding Self,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy v. 30, no. 3(September 2000): 343-370 (nominated for the 2002 American Philosophical Association Article Prize).

•  “‘Dirty Words’ and the Offense Principle,” Law and Philosophy 19 (September 2000): 545-584.

•  “Selves and Moral Units,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly v. 80, no. 4 (December 1999): 391-419.

•  “Utilitarianism and Personal Identity,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (June 1999): 183-199.

• “Theoretical Persons & Practical Agents,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 25:4 (Fall 1996): 318-332. 

Book Reviews:

• Talking to Our Selves, by John Doris, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (November 2015):  

•  In Praise of Desire, by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, Analysis (2015).

• Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, by Derk Pereboom, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September 2014), URL: 

• Neuroethics, by Neil Levy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 184-187.

•  In Praise of Blame, by George Sher, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85:1 (March 2007): 163-166.

•  Satisficing and Maximizing, edited by Michael Byron, Mind 115:457 (January 2006): 129-135.

•  Reasonable Self-Esteem, by Richard Keshen, Mind 109:436 (October 2000): 944-947.