Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Fall 2017)

When: Sundays, 10:15-12:00.

Where: Ziskind 1.

Instructor: Shahar Dobzinski (dobzin@gmail.com)

Please register to the Google group of the course.

Textbook

The course will not follow a specific textbook but "Algorithmic Game Theory" might serve as a useful reference sometimes.

Exercises

• 1. Exercise 1. Due date: 3/12. Some typos fixed 26/12.

  2. Exercise 2. Due date: 24/12. Updated Q2(b) 11/12.

  3. Exercise 3. Due date: 14/1.

  4. Exercise 4. Due date: 1/2.

  5. Take Home Exam. Due date 25/2. Updated Q3 18/2.

Tentative Topics

1. Mechanism design without money

   1. Single item auctions.

   2. The VCG mechanism.

2. Walrasian equilibrium.

3. Single parameter domains.

4. Communication complexity of auctions.

5. Computation vs. incentives.

6. Bayesian mechanisms.

7. Auctions in practice.