Papers

Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions
Keren Cohavi and Shahar Dobzinski.

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium
Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and Omri Weinstein.

On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, and Bobby Kleinberg.
In SODA'15.

Reallocation Mechanisms
Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski.
In EC'14.

Economic Efficiency Requires Interaction     (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Sigal Oren.
In STOC'14.

Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
Shahar Dobzinski and Renato Paes Leme.
In ICALP'14. Preliminary version was presented in AdAuctions'13.

Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes
Shahar Dobzinski and Amir Ronen.
In SAGT'14.

On the Hardness of Welfare Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
Shahar Dobzinski and Jan Vondrak.
In SODA'13.

The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions
Shahar Dobzinski and Jan Vondrak.
In EC'12. Top 10% paper award.
On Bitcoin and Red Balloons
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, and Aviv Zohar.
In EC'12. A non technical summary of the paper. See also: Slashdot, The Register.

Optimization with Demand Oracles
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, and Sigal Oren.
In EC'12.

From Query Complexity to Computational Complexity
Shahar Dobzinski and Jan Vondrak.
In STOC'12.

Sketching Valuation Functions
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden.
In SODA'12.

Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts      (JET version)    (Slides)
Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan.
In EC'11.
This blog post contains a video about the paper.

Mechanisms for Complement-Free Procurement
Shahar Dobzinski, Christos Papadimitriou, and Yaron Singer.
In EC'11.

An Impossibility Result for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations      (Slides)
Shahar Dobzinski.
In STOC'11.

Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy      (Slides)
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg.
In STOC'11.

On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design     (Slides)
Shahar Dobzinski and Shaddin Dughmi.
FOCS'09. Invited to special issue of SIAM Journal on Computing for FOCS'09.

A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan
SAGT'09.

An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms    (slides)
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, and Ron Lavi.
EC'09. This paper won the Outstanding Paper Award.

Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, and Tim Roughgarden.

FOCS'08. Appeared in a
special issue of SIAM Journal on Computing for FOCS'08 (invited).
Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget Limits    (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, and Noam Nisan
FOCS'08. Extended version in Games and Economic Behavior.

On Characterizations of Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Scheduling
Shahar Dobzinski and Mukund Sundararajan.
EC'08. See also an addendum.
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions    (slides)
Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, and Lisa Fleischer.
SAGT'08.

Is Shapley Cost-Sharing Optimal?
Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, and Mukund Sundararajan.
SAGT'08.
Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions    (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski.
APPROX'07.

Limitations of VCG-Based Mechanisms    (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan.
Early version in STOC'07. To appear in Combinatorica.

Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions    (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan.
Early version of EC'07. Appeared in Journal of Artificial Intelligence.

Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions    (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira.
Early version in STOC'06. Appeared in a special issue of
Journal of Computer and System Sciences (invited).

Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games    (slides)
Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski.
EC'06. Appeared in
IEEE JSAC special issue on Non-Cooperative Behavior in Networking (invited).
In Improved Approximation Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders    (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski and Michael Schapira.
SODA'06.

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders    (slides)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira.
STOC'05.
A merged version of this paper and the SODA'06 paper appeared in Mathematics of Operations Research.

Thesis

On the Power of Approximations in Mechanism Design.
Shahar Dobzinski, 2009.   Advisor: Noam Nisan.
Winner of the Schlomiuk prize for outstanding PhD thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Some Other Technical Writeups

On the Greedy Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions with a Random Order
Shahar Dobzinski and Ami Mor.

Truthfulness via Proxies
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg.

A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms
Shahar Dobzinski.

Better Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions via Maximal-in-Range Algorithms?
Shahar Dobzinski.
A survey in SIGecom Exchanges.

Optimal Upper and Lower Approximation Bounds for k-Duplicates Combinatorial Auctions
Shahar Dobzinski and Michael Schapira, 2005.