Publications by topic

The aim of belief

• "Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity". European Journal of Philosophy, 25 (4), 1084-1106, 2017. (Link to a penultimate longer version. Journal link).

• "A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism". Philosophical Papers, 45 (3), 343-364. 2016. (http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/sBf6ycjNS8BrQ28b2eW9/full)

• “The Aim of Belief”. in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015.  

•  "Il fine della credenza", in Aphex, 9, 2014.

• “Truth and the Aim of Belief”, in Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Ed. Duncan Pritchard. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

•   “Belief, Correctness and Normativity”, in Logique et Analyse, 54 (216), 2011, pp. 471-486. (Draft of the paper available here). 

Norms of belief and epistemic normativity

• “Justification and Gradability” (co-authored with Arturs Logins), Philosophical Studies 180: 2051–2077. 2023. Link to the journal version. 

• "Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief". Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 59(3): 497-525. 2020. Link to the online version. Link to a penultimate version. 

• "Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence" (co-authored with Jie Gao), Theoria 86(4): 500-527. 2020. Link to a penultimate version. Link to the journal article.

• "On the generality argument for the knowledge norm". Synthese 197, 3459-3480. 2020. Link to a penultimate version. Link to a full-text only view version of the article. Journal Link.

• “Les raisons épistémiques et la perspective du sujet : quelques réflexions sur la notion de raison épistémique dans l’oeuvre de Skorupski”. In Raisons. La question méta-éthique : autour de l'œuvre de John Skorupski. B. Langlet et J.-M. Monnoyer (eds.), PUAM. 2020.

• "Sur la correction doxastique comme idéal de la raison" (in French; English title: "On doxastic correctness as an ideal of reason"). Klesis 45 - La philosophie de Pascal Engel (Ed. J.H.Vollet), 2020. Link to the final version (in French). Link to an early, pre-review draft in English. 

• "Are Epistemic Reasons Perspective-Dependent?". Philosophical Studies 176(12): 3253-3283. 2019. Link to the online first version. Link to a full-text view-only version.

• "Passing the Epistemic Buck" (with Anne Meylan). in C.McHugh, J.Way and D.Whiting (Eds.). Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain, Oxford, OUP). Forthcoming. 

• "Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards" in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig. Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. Pages 165-184. DeGruyter. 2016. Link.

Shifty epistemology and Skeptical Invariantism

• "In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism". Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge Series in Epistemology. C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge (Eds.). 2021. pp.129-153. Link to a penultimate version.

• "Moderate Skeptical Invariantism". Erkenntnis 85, 841-870. 2020. Link to a penultimate version. Link to the Journal article.

• “Revisionary Epistemology” (with R. McKenna), in Inquiry. Special issue Philosophical Methodology and Metaphilosophy. Ed. Herman Cappelen. 2015.

• “Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right”, Logos & Episteme 6 (3): 265-289, 2015.

Knowledge, assertion, action, and decision

• "Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?" (co-authored with Jie Gao). Synthese 199: 7031–7059. 2021. Link to a penultimate version. Link to the journal version.

• "Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?". Philosophical Studies, 174 (9), 2137-2166. 2017. 

• "Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards" in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig. Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. Pages 165-184. DeGruyter. 2016. Link.

• "La connaissance et la fonction e l'assertion" in J. Chevalier and B. Gaultier, La connaissance et ses raisons, 2016 (invited contribution). Link to a penultimate version in English.

The Perspectivism-Objectivism debate / epistemic constraints on normative reasons

• “Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox” (co-authored with Massimiliano Carrara), The Philosophical Quarterly. Forthcoming.

• "What the Doctor Should Do: Perspectivist Duties for Objectivists about Ought", Philosophical Studies 179: 1523–1544. 2022. Link to a penultimate version.  Link to the journal version. Link to a read-only version.

• "Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration" Ethics 131(2): 183-206. 2021. Link to a penultimate version. Link to the journal. 

• "Are Epistemic Reasons Perspective-Dependent?". Philosophical Studies 176(12): 3253-3283. 2019. Link to the online first version. Link to a full-text view-only version.

• "On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have". Ratio, 32 (1), 63-73. 2019. Link to a penultimate version. Link to the Online version.

The Knowability Paradox

• “Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox” (co-authored with Massimiliano Carrara), The Philosophical Quarterly. Forthcoming.

• “The Knowability Paradox”. In K. Sylvan, M. Steup, E. Sosa & J. Dancy (eds.). Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (3rd Edition). Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming. Link to a penultimate version.

• Il paradosso della conoscibilità  (Eng: The Knowability Paradox). Padova University Press. Link. 

• “Il Paradosso della Conoscibilità”, in Aphex, 7, 2013.

•  “Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in Theoria, Vol. 77 (2), 2011, pp. 180-193.

•   “Perfected Science and the Knowability Paradox” (with M. Carrara), in M. D'Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani and C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, London: College Publications, 2010.

•   “Logically Unknowable Propositions: a criticism to Tennant’s three-partition of Anti-Cartesian propositions” (with M. Carrara), in P. Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 3. Atiner 2009: 181-194.

The nature of normativity

• “Taking Norm-Regulation Seriously”, in Dutant, J., Fassio D. and Meylan A. (eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, University of Geneva, pp. 760-777, 2014.

• “How to Distinguish Norms from Values”, in Phenomenology and  Mind 5, The Place of Values in a world of Norms. pp. 148-158. Ed. Francesca Forlè and Sarah Songhorian. Pavia: IUSS Press, 2013.

Philosophy of Mind

• “Croyance”. L’Encyclopédie Philosophique, 2022. Link.

• "A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief", in Acta Analytica, Vol. 29 (1), 2014, pp. 71-81. (A draft of the paper is available here)

Revisionary Epistemology

• “Revisionary Epistemology” (with R. McKenna), in Inquiry. Special issue Philosophical Methodology and Metaphilosophy. Ed. Herman Cappelen. 2015.

Cross-cultural and cross-linguistic studies in epistemology

• “Cross-linguistic Studies in Epistemology” (co-authored with Jie Gao). In K. Sylvan, M. Steup, E. Sosa & J. Dancy (eds.). Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (3rd Edition). Wiley-Blackwell. Forthcoming. Link to a penultimate version.