Colaço, D. (2025). On consistently assessing alleged mnemonic systems (Or, why isn’t immune memory “really” memory?). Review of Philosophy and Psychology. (Open Access)
Abstract: How should we assess systems whose mnemonic status is contested? There are, for instance, debates over whether immune memory is “really” memory, or akin to memory as ordinarily attributed to human cognition. In this paper, I challenge two arguments often given by detractors in this debate. The first is that the system does not exhibit errors exemplified in human memory. The second is that it can be described and explained in causal terms alone. I argue that our limited knowledge of the causal basis of immunological phenomena and human memory undercuts our ability to conclude that one is merely causal while the other is not. By consequence, it is unclear why we should reject that the immune system exhibits these errors. With my challenges, I question whether we are consistent in assessing alleged mnemonic systems. Though we have schematic causal accounts of both systems, we have differing expectations of what we can conclude about them. Yet, it is unclear what might warrant appeals to these expectations.
Colaço, D. (2024). When remediating one artifact results in another: Control, confounders, and correction. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, (46)5. (Open Access)
Abstract: Scientists aim to remediate artifacts in their experimental datasets. However, the remediation of one artifact can result in another. Why might this happen, and what does this consequence tell us about how we should account for artifacts and their control? In this paper, I explore a case in functional neuroimaging where remediation appears to have caused this problem. I argue that remediation amounts to a change to an experimental arrangement. These changes need not be surgical, and the arrangement need not satisfy the criterion of causal modularity. Thus, remediation can affect more than just the factor responsible for the artifact. However, if researchers can determine the consequences of their remediation, they can make adjustments that control for the present artifact as well as for previously controlled ones. Current philosophical accounts of artifacts and the factors responsible for them cannot adequately address this issue, as they do not account for what is needed for artifact remediation (and specifically correction). I support my argument by paralleling it with ongoing concerns regarding the transparency of complex computational systems, as near future remediation across the experimental life sciences will likely make greater use of AI tools to correct for artifacts.
Colaço, D. & Najenson, J. (2024). Where memory resides: Is there a rivalry between molecular and synaptic models of memory? Philosophy of Science 91, 1382-1392. (Open Access)
Abstract: Recent proposals that the substrate of memory is molecular raise questions about where this molecular model stands in relation to the dominant synaptic model of memory. In this article, we address the perceived rivalry between these models and ask whether they can be integrated. We argue that addressing rivalry or integration requires delineating the explananda of synaptic and molecular models, as well as revisiting assumptions about how these models account for their explananda. The perceived rivalry between these models exemplifies epistemic costs that arise when we try to pit explanatory models as rivals or integrate them.
Colaço, D. (2023). Connecting unconventional cognition to humans: Unification and generativity. JoLMA 4(2), 1-16. (Open Access)
Abstract: The idea of applying cognitive kind terms and concepts to ‘unconventional’ systems has gained steam. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this idea also has been met with skepticism. There is an implicit worry amongst skeptics that the idea of applying cognitive kind terms and concepts to non-humans, or at least to non-humans that are anatomically quite unlike humans, amounts to a Mere Honorific Conclusion: to say that a system is cognitive is to say it is merely worthy of investigation. In this paper, I use this conclusion as a framing device for exploring how we ought to approach the idea of cognition in unconventional systems, and I explore two avenues for blocking it: unification and generativity.
Colaço, D. & Robins, S. (2023). Why have "revolutionary" tools found purchase in memory science? Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4. (Open Access)
Abstract: The study of the neural basis of memory has advanced over the past decade. A key contributor to this memory “renaissance” has been new tools. On its face, this matches what might be described as a neuroscientific revolution stemming from the development of tools, where this revolution is largely independent of theory. In this paper, we challenge this tool revolution account by focusing on a problem that arises in applying it to this “renaissance”: it is centered around memory, but the tools were not developed for solving problems in memory science. To resolve this problem, we introduce an account that distinguishes tool development and tool uptake, and we argue that while theoretical considerations may not inform development, they do inform uptake. Acknowledging the distance between these stages of tool use draws our attention to the questions of why and how tool uptake occurs in the domains that it does.
Colaço, D. (2022). Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive. Synthese, 200(453). (Open Access)
Abstract: Philosophers and scientists propose the idea that plants are cognitive, which has been met with criticisms. These criticisms focus on the fact that plants do not possess the properties traditionally associated with cognition. By contrast, several proponents introduce novel ways to conceptualize cognition. How should we make sense of this debate? In this paper, I argue that the plant cognition debate is not about whether plants meet a set of well-delineated and agreed-upon criteria according to which they count as cognitive. Rather, many proponents are hypothesizing about cognition. They construe COGNITION not as an expression of what cognition is, but rather as a conjecture about what cognition might be. These conjectures orient research that can uncover novel similarities amongst the phenomena to which these concepts extend. In defending this view, I argue that investigating plant cognition is valuable, even if the results of these investigations lead us to reject the claim that plants are cognitive.
Colaço, D., Bickle, J., & Walters, B. (2022). When should researchers cite study differences in response to a failure to replicate? Biology & Philosophy 39(37). (Open Access)
Abstract: Scientists often respond to failures to replicate by citing differences between the experimental components of an original study and those of its attempted replication. In this paper, we investigate these purported mismatch explanations. We assess a body of failures to replicate in neuroscience studies on spinal cord injury. We argue that a defensible mismatch explanation is one where (1) a mismatch of components is a difference maker for a mismatch of outcomes, and (2) the components are relevantly different in the follow-up study, given the scope of the original study. With this account, we argue that not all differences between studies are meaningful, even if they are difference makers. As our examples show, focusing only on these differences results in disregarding the representativeness of the original experiment’s components and the scope of its outcomes, undercutting other epistemic aims, such as translation, in the process.
Colaço, D. (2022). What counts as a memory? Definitions, hypotheses, and "kinding in progress." Philosophy of Science 89(1), 89-106.
Abstract: This paper accounts for broad definitions of memory, which extend to paradigmatic memory phenomena, like episodic memory in humans, and phenomena in worms and sea snails. These definitions may seem too broad, suggesting that they extend to phenomena that don’t count as memory or illustrate that memory is not a natural kind. However, these responses fail to consider a definition as a hypothesis. As opposed to construing definitions as expressing memory’s properties, a definition as a hypothesis is the basis to test inferences about phenomena. A definition as a hypothesis is valuable when the “kinding” of phenomena is ongoing.
Colaço, D. (2021). How do tools obstruct (and facilitate) integration in neuroscience? In The Tools of Neuroscience Experiments: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, edited by Bickle, Craver, & Barwich.
Abstract: While many neuroscientists and philosophers share an interest in integrating neuroscience, both camps suggest that this integration is challenging. Why is this the case? In this paper, I account for why tools, or the materials and technologies that researchers use to study brain structure and activity, are obstructions to integrating neuroscience. The constraints of tools and their productivity create neuroscience practices that can be in tension with methodological, data, and explanatory integration. My account explains why integration in neuroscience likely will not occur unless new tools are developed. At the same time, my account explains why new tools can facilitate local integration between neuroscience subfields for the same reasons why they can obstruct it.
Jarbo, K., Colaço, D., & Verstynen, T. (2020). Contextual framing of loss impacts harm avoidance during risky spatial decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 33(5), 657-670.
Abstract: Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision-making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior.
Preprint Available at PsyArXiv.
Colaço, D. (2020). Recharacterizing Scientific Phenomena. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10, 14.
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate how researchers evaluate their characterizations of scientific phenomena. Characterizing phenomena is an important – albeit often overlooked – aspect of scientific research, as phenomena are targets of explanation and theorization. As a result, there is a lacuna in the literature regarding how researchers determine whether their characterization of a target phenomenon is appropriate for their aims. This issue has become apparent for accounts of scientific explanation that take phenomena to be explananda. In particular, philosophers who endorse mechanistic explanation suggest that the discovery of the mechanisms that explain a phenomenon can lead to its recharacterization. However, they fail to make clear how these explanations provide warrant for recharacterizing their explananda phenomena. Drawing from cases of neurobiological research on potentiation phenomena, I argue that attempting to explain a phenomenon may provide reason to suspend judgment about its characterization, but this cannot provide warrant to recharacterize it if researchers cannot infer a phenomenon’s characteristics from this explanation. To explicate this, I go beyond explanation – mechanistic or otherwise – to analyze why and how researchers change their epistemic commitments in light of new evidence.
Preprint Available at PhilSci-Archive.
Stuart, M., Colaço, D., & Machery, E. (2019). P-curving X-phi: Does experimental philosophy have evidential value? Analysis 79(4), 669-684.
Abstract: In this article, we analyse the evidential value of the corpus of experimental philosophy (x-phi). While experimental philosophers claim that their studies provide insight into philosophical problems, some philosophers and psychologists have expressed concerns that the findings from these studies lack evidential value. Barriers to evidential value include selection bias (i.e., the selective publication of significant results) and p-hacking (practices that increase the odds of obtaining a p-value below the significance level). To find out whether the significant findings in x-phi papers result from selection bias or p-hacking, we applied a p-curve analysis to a corpus of 365 x-phi chapters and articles. Our results suggest that this corpus has evidential value, although there are hints of p-hacking in a few parts of the x-phi corpus.
Dataset Available at OSF.
Picked in "Our best philosophy articles in 2019" by Oxford University Press.
Colaço, D. (2018). Rip it up and start again: On the rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 72, 32-40.
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the nature of empirical findings that provide evidence for the characterization of a scientific phenomenon, and the defeasible nature of this evidence. To do so, I explore an exemplary instance of the rejection of a characterization of a scientific phenomenon: memory transfer. I examine the reason why the characterization of memory transfer was rejected, and analyze how this rejection tied to researchers’ failures to resolve experimental issues relating to replication and confounds. I criticize the presentation of the case by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who claim that no sufficient reason was provided to abandon research on memory transfer. I argue that skeptics about memory transfer adopted what I call a defeater strategy, in which researchers exploit the defeasibility of the evidence for a characterization of a phenomenon.
Preprint Available at PhilSci-Archive
Click here for the Appendix to this paper.
Colaço, D. (2018). Rethinking the role of theory in exploratory experimentation. Biology and Philosophy 33(5-6), 38.
Abstract: To explain their role in discovery and contrast them with theory-driven research, philosophers of science have characterized exploratory experiments in terms of what they lack: namely, that they lack direction from what have been called “local theories” of the target system or object under investigation. I argue that this is incorrect: it’s not whether or not there is direction from a local theory that matters, but instead how such a theory is used to direct an experiment that matters. Appealing to contemporary exploratory experiments that involve the use of experimental techniques—specifically, examples where scientists explore the interaction of neural activity and human behavior by magnetically stimulating brains—I argue that local theories of a target system can inform auxiliary hypotheses in exploratory experiments, which direct these experiments. These examples illustrate how local theories can direct the exploration of target systems where researchers do not aim to evaluate these theories.
Preprint Available at PhilSci-Archive.
Colaço, D., & Machery, E. (2017). The intuitive is a red herring. Inquiry, 60(4), 403-419.
Abstract: In this article, we discuss critically some of the key themes in Max Deutsch’s excellent book, The Myth of the Intuitive. We focus in particular on the shortcomings of his historical analysis – a missed opportunity by our lights, on the claim that philosophers present arguments in support of the judgments elicited by thought experiments, and on the claim that experimental philosophy is only relevant for the methodology of philosophy if thought experiments elicit intuitions.
Colaço, D., Buckwalter, W., Stich, S., & Machery, E. (2014). Epistemic intuitions in fake-barn thought experiments. Episteme, 11(02), 199-212.
Abstract: In epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether members of the general public share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake-barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with age; older participants are less likely than younger participants to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases. We also found that increasing the number of defeaters (fakes) does not decrease the inclination to attribute knowledge.