Submitted:
September 2023: Non-stationary Search and Assortative Matching - joint with Nicolas Bonneton
This paper studies assortative matching in a non-stationary search-and-matching model with non-transferable payoffs. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of agents searching evolve endogenously over time. Assortative matching can fail in non-stationary environments under conditions for which Morgan (1994) and Smith (2006) show that it occurs in the steady state. This is due to the risk of worsening match prospects inherent to non-stationary environments. The main contribution of this paper is to derive the weakest sufficient conditions on payoffs for which matching is assortative. In addition to known steady state conditions, more desirable individuals must be less risk-averse in the sense of Arrow-Pratt.
May 2023: Existence of a Non-Stationary Equilibrium in Search-and-Matching Models: TU and NTU - joint with Nicolas Bonneton (builds on my JMP and chapter 2 of my dissertation; here is the September 2022 version)
This paper proves the existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in the canonical search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of unmatched agents evolve endogenously over time. An equilibrium exists under minimal regularity conditions and for both paradigms considered in the literature: transferable and non-transferable utility. We suggest that our proof strategy applies more broadly to a class of continuous-time, infinite-horizon models with a continuum of heterogeneous agents, also referred to as mean-field games, that evolve deterministically over time.
November 2023: When are Sparse Menus Profit-Maximizing? (builds on my manuscript "Price Discrimination of Non-rival Goods" and chapter 1 of my dissertation; for previous versions see here, here and here ) :
This paper re-evaluates the optimal pricing strategy for a seller offering a menu of contracts (Mussa and Rosen (1978)). We demonstrate that higher price elasticity among low-valuation buyers, conferring greater market power at the top, makes excluding lower-quality options more profitable than offering a complete product line. We establish general conditions for sparse product lines under both private and common (interdependent) values and deduce normative and positive implications in applications revolving around common values in corporate finance (government funding of R&D) and market microstructure (persistence of OTC trading).
March 2024: Market Structure and Adverse Selection - joint with Dakang Huang (Dakang's JMP)
This paper presents a unified perspective on multi-contracting in markets afflicted by adverse selection. We subsume the polar cases of exclusive and nonexclusive competition by introducing the concept of a market structure: a trading rule that specifies the subset of sellers with whom buyers can jointly trade. Normative results single out the “1+1” market structure, where buyers trade with one seller from each of two subgroups. If adverse selection is severe, adopting the “1+1” market structure Pareto-improves upon the exclusive equilibrium allocation. When, in addition, purchases must include a contract exceeding a minimum quantity, the equilibrium allocation is second-best efficient.
In progress:
February 2022: Competitive Nonlinear Pricing: a random search model (new - draft for conferences available upon request)
September 2021: Recursive Information Design (first version July 2020, to be reworked)
February 2021: Probabilistic Assortative Matching under Nash Bargaining - joint with Nicolas Bonneton (Nicolas' JMP)
November 2019: Non-stationary Search and Assortative Matching - joint with Nicolas Bonneton (my JMP—subsumed by the more recent paper of the same title and "Existence of a Non-Stationary Equilibrium in Search-and-Matching Models:TU and NTU".)
January 2020 Price Discrimination of Non-rival Goods (mostly subsumed by "When are Single-Contract Menus Profit-Maximizing")