We develop and defend an account of morphemes as multiply spatiotemporally located entities, coincident with various 'manifestations' (orthographic or phonographic strings, gestures, patterns of bumps, representations of dots and dashes, semaphore codes, strings of representations of 1 and 0, etc.,) and describe their relationship to the folk-linguistic category words. We compare our account with some recent proposals and show how our account can supplant the (in our view, fraught) distinction between type and token.

Fictional realism is the view that creatures of fiction exist. Mythical realism is the view that creatures of myth and mistaken theories exist. Call the combined view “Ecumenical Realism.” We critically evaluate three arguments for Ecumenical Realism and argue they are unsound because fictional storytelling differs from mistaken theorizing in important ways. We think these considerations support a more conservative view, “Sectarian Realism,” which results from subtracting “creatures of mistaken theorizing” from Ecumenical Realism. We close by considering an important challenge to Sectarian Realism involving immigrants in fiction.

We develop and defend a vaguely Aristotelian view of propositions by employing vaguely Spinozistic resources. We think this view, or something very much like it, is the best bet for "Russellian" propositions.

In Korman (2014) and Korman (2015), Daniel Z. Korman advances a novel response to a debunking argument for the conclusion that we aren’t justified in believing the deliverances of our experiences when it comes to ordinary object beliefs. This paper critically assesses Korman’s preferred solution and offers an alternative.

If some "repeatable" artworks can be multiply wholly located, then it's possible for something to have its origin contingently.

Kit Fine and Gideon Rosen propose to define constitutive essence in terms of ground-theoretic notions and some form of consequential essence. But we think that the Fine–Rosen proposal is a mistake. On the Fine–Rosen proposal, constitutive essence ends up including properties that, on the central notion of essence (what Fine calls ‘the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity’), are necessary but not essential. This is because consequential essence is (roughly) closed under logical consequence, and the ability of logical consequence to add properties to an object’s consequential essence outstrips the ability of ground-theoretic notions, as used in the Fine–Rosen proposal, to take those properties out. The necessary-but-not-essential properties that, on the Fine–Rosen proposal, end up in constitutive essence include the sorts of necessary-but-not-essential properties that, others have noted, end up in consequential essence.

Some essence facts have metaphysical explanations. And sometimes the essential is explained by the inessential.

In some serial fictions, some things were true (in those fictions) that are not true now (in those fictions). Here I argue that this is due to a fundamentally metaphysical, rather than linguistic, phenomenon.

In recent work, Peter Hanks and Scott Soames argue that propositions are types whose tokens are acts, states, or events. Let’s call this view the type view. Hanks and Soames think that one of the virtues of the type view is that it allows them to explain why propositions have semantic properties. But, in this paper, we argue that their explanations aren’t satisfactory. In Section 2, we present the type view. In Section 3, we present one explanation—due to Hanks (2007, 2011) and Soames (2010)—of why propositions have semantic properties. We criticize this first explanation in Section 4. In Section 5, we present another explanation—due to Soames (2104)—of why propositions have semantic properties. We criticize this second explanation in Section 6.

Jeffrey King argues against his set-theoretic rivals and in favour of his own view on propositions on two fronts. First, he maintains that his set-theoretic rivals face a Benacerraf problem. (Why are some sets, and not others, propositions?) Second, he maintains they face a truth-conditional problem. (Why do they, and not their cousins, have truth-conditions at all, nevertheless the truth-conditions they actually have?) He develops a view that he believes overcomes the Benacerraf and truth-conditional problems. And he claims that overcoming these problems is the main motivation for his view. We argue that he does not overcome either problem.

King responds here.

It is plausible that the universe exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured proposition exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. It is also plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. All of these plausible claims cannot be correct. We canvass some costs of denying each claim and tentatively conclude that parthood is not a partial ordering. Provided that the relevant entities exist, parthood is not anti-symmetric and proper parthood is neither asymmetric nor transitive.

Kripke's discussion in Naming and Necessity strongly suggests that semantic stipulation allows us to have new de re thoughts and make new de re claims. For example, it seems we could name the winning ticket in the next lottery 'Tickie' and thereby come to have singular thoughts about Tickie as opposed to merely general thoughts about the winning ticket (whichever one that is). This, in turn, seems to put us into a position to know that Tickie is the winning ticket. If so, it seems we now know which ticket will win the lottery. So it seems semantic stipulation puts us in a position to have all sorts of knowledge that, intuitively, we don't have. We argue that semantic stipulation does put you in a position to have new singular thoughts, though those thoughts will usually be informationally isolated. We think you also typically know these singular propositions, but it is misleading for you to say that you do since you typically cannot act on your knowledge in the expected way. On the other hand, since you can't act on the information in the right way, perhaps your knowledge is thwarted. If so, you don't know Tickie will win since you can't act on that information in order to (e.g.) buy Tickie and no other ticket. We develop both views and argue that they are preferable to the alternatives.

At first pass, internalism about justification holds that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Content externalism holds that there are content differences without internal differences. Many find both plausible but they are in tension. What to do?

Some hold that musical works fuse or coincide with their performances. But if performances contain wrong notes, won't works inherit that property? We say no.

Very roughly, Musical Materialism is the view that musical works (and other "repeatable" artworks) have more in common, metaphysically speaking, with cats and tables than with numbers and Platonic properties. This view is typically dismissed on three grounds: concrete manifestations of a work are many, while the work is one; works are particularly good and concrete manifestations are particularly bad at surviving the destruction of concrete manifestations; and works differ in important modal ways from their concrete manifestations. I argue that the Musical Materialist has good replies to all of these arguments. Additionally, works bear some hallmarks of the concrete. So we should accept Musical Materialism in place of the view that works are Platonica or special purpose abstracta.

In Parts of Classes and "Mathematics is Megethology" David Lewis shows how the ideology of set membership can be dispensed with in favor of parthood and plural quantification. Lewis's theory has it that singletons are mereologically simple and leaves the relationship between a thing and its singleton unexplained. We show how, by exploiting Kit Fine's mereology, we can resolve Lewis's mysteries about the singleton relation and vindicate the claim that a thing is a part of its singleton.

Some Millians are occasionally inclined to hold that problems for Millians are best solved without appeal to propositional guises or ways of believing propositions. I argue that this inclination should be resisted: propositional guises or ways of believing are vital elements of any complete solution to the problems Millians face.