Journal Articles
"Financial Fragility and the Fiscal Multiplier" (2025), with Sweder van Wijnbergen, forthcoming at the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
"Old-Keynesianism in the New Keynesian model" (2024), De Economist, 172, pp. 167-232.
"Unintended Consequences of Central Bank Lending in Financial Crises", (2023), The Economic Journal, 134, pp. 728 - 765.
"Some Unconventional Properties of New Keynesian DSGE Models" (2023), with Ben Heijdra, De Economist, 171, pp. 139-183.
"The long-run effects of risk: an equilibrium approach" (2023), with Joao Madeira and Nuno Palma, European Economic Review, 153, April 2023, 104375.
"Sovereign Debt and Bank Fragility in Spain" (2017), with Sweder van Wijnbergen, Review of World Economics, 153, pp. 511-543.
"Financial fragility, sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs" (2014), with Sweder van Wijnbergen, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 43, pp. 218-240.
"Utilizing redox-chemistry to elucidate the nature of exciton transitions in supramolecular dye nanotubes" (2012), with D.M. Eisele, C.W. Cone, E.A. Bloemsma, S.M. Vlaming, R.J. Silbey, M.G. Bawendi, J. Knoester, J.P. Rabe and D.A. Vanden Bout, Nature Chemistry 4, pp. 655-662
Working Papers
August 2025: "Monetary financing produces neither high inflation nor miraculous fiscal multipliers" (2025).
Abstract: I investigate the macroeconomic impact of money-financed fiscal stimuli when the central bank pays interest on reserves. I do so in New Keynesian models where government bonds and reserves are imperfect substitutes. Despite reducing funding costs for the consolidated government, I analytically show for several models that there is zero impact from money-financed fiscal stimuli on inflation and the real economy (relative to debt-financed stimuli). Afterwards, I relax the conditions behind this `irrelevance result', and show that money-financed fiscal stimuli barely increase inflation and output.
May 2021: "To Bail-in or to Bailout: that's the (Macro) Question" (2021), with Matthijs Katz, under revision.
Abstract: In this paper we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with limited liability banks to compare financial stability and macroeconomic outcomes under a regime in which banks are bailed out by the government with outcomes under a regime in which bank creditors are bailed in. We find that long-run investment, capital, output, and consumption are higher under the bailout regime. Bailouts also mitigate the impact of financial crises with respect to the bail-in regime, as lower funding costs increase banks' profitability. Bailouts, however, introduce moral hazard, which substantially increases the fraction of banks that need to be recapitalized from 0.24% per quarter under the bail-in regime to 3.12% per quarter under the bailout regime. The frequency of financial crises, however, hardly increases. Finally, we find that welfare is highest under the bailout regime.
Working Papers (old)
"The Macroeconomic Consequences of Higher Capital Requirements" (2018), with Sweder van Wijnbergen.
Publications (non peer-reviewed):
"Eurozone-begrotingsunie zou duur uitpakken voor Nederland" (2022), with Lex Hoogduin, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 107 (4815), pp. 498-501.
"De eurozone werkt slechter dan de dollarzone door de Noord-Zuid-verschillen" (2022), with Levi Kuiper, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 107 (4812), pp. 350-353.
"Alleen giften lossen de fundamentele eurozone-problemen niet op" (2020), Economisch Statistische Berichten, 105 (4788), pp. 379.
"Nederland moet kiezen tussen eurobonds of euro-exit" (2018), Economisch Statistische Berichten, 103 (4764), pp. 344-347.
"Herkapitalisatie banken schept ruimte voor stimulering" (2013), with Timotej Homar and Sweder van Wijnbergen, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 98 (4664), pp. 422-425.