SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
CHANCERY DIV. MERCER COUNTY
DOCKET NO. C-6-11
FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN )
CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER )
of New Jersey State Supreme Court )
(In his official capacity) )
CHAIRMAN JOHN DOE #1 ) VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Committee on Character of New Jersey State Supreme Court )
(In his official capacity) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 42 USC Sec. 1983
AND OR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM
Comes now the plaintiff FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN appearing pro se and makes the following complaint solely for prospective injunctive relief and not for damages under 42 USC Sec.1983 and or alternatively the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States to enjoin the defendants CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER and Committee on Character CHAIRMAN JOHN DOE #1 from denying the plaintiff’s proposed attorney Bret D. Landrith an evidentiary hearing on character and fitness for admission to the State of New Jersey bar, a prerequisite to representing the plaintiff before the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
The plaintiff FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN seeks this relief because she is unable to obtain representation by a New Jersey admitted attorney willing to represent her in continuing and impending violations of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1985 (3), and the plaintiff’s civil rights to Due Process and Equal Protection Under the Law secured by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and enforceable against New Jersey State officials under the Fourteenth Amendment to deprive the plaintiff of property and due course of justice in violation of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1985 (3) and 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 which resulted in the procurement of the termination of the plaintiff’s parental rights as a biological mother of her daughter Nabeela Pathan through extrinsic fraud.
Previously, the plaintiff was represented by counsel from the Office of the State of New Jersey Public Defenders,
responsible for providing counsel to indigent natural parents in parental rights termination cases, and her counsel inadequately represented the plaintiff and failed to protect the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights and the federal constitutional rights of Nabeela Pathan in trial court and upon appeal. The plaintiff’s religion of Islam and the plaintiff’s ethnic and cultural origins as a United States citizen of Indian/Pakistanian/Afghan descent, along with her religious dress in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 figured prominently in both the violation of laws to terminate the plaintiff’s parental rights and in the inadequate legal representation of the plaintiff by the State of New Jersey.
At the time this injunction is being sought, and after the termination of the plaintiff’s parental rights, the plaintiff is still suffering from violations of her fundamental liberty interests by State of New Jersey officials and despite the plaintiff’s professional reputation as an emergency room registered nurse and membership in the bar association of the State of New Jersey as a paralegal and forensic nurse, the plaintiff is unable to obtain representation by New Jersey licensed attorneys due to the seriousness of the violations of federal rights the plaintiff is still be subjected to.
1. The plaintiff makes the following averments of fact regarding the parties in this action:
2. FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN, plaintiff pro se is a citizen of the State of New Jersey and of the United States of America and resides in Princeton, New Jersey with the mailing address of PO BOX 8328, Princeton, New Jersey 08540.
3. The plaintiff FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN is a Case/Risk Manager and Registered Nurse for twenty years and for 10 years as a Legal Nurse Consultant/Paralegal on the New Jersey State Bar Association.
4. CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER, defendant in his private and individual capacity is a citizen of the State of New Jersey and of the United States of America and works in Mercer County at the State of New Jersey Supreme Court, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market Street, Trenton, NJ 08625-0970.
5. CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER is responsible for the ministerial conduct of choosing a Chairman for the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Character under New Jersey Supreme Court Rule 1:25 including choosing the persons to be considered for the position and for convening the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee when and if it is constituted.
6. CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER in his position as Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court has the ministerial duty to maintain the personnel records of employees of the New Jersey Judicial Branch including the
records of Ms. Yvonne Smith Segars who was director of Office Of The Public Defenders and responsible for providing counsel to indigent natural parents in parental rights termination cases, children's rights, and appellate cases.
7. CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER in his position as Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court has the ministerial duty to oversee the collection of payment for indigent legal representation provided by the State of New Jersey including that of counsel provided for the Plaintiff and the proper billing for over $50,000.00 of legal services stating the hours and legal work performed for which by State of New Jersey licensed legal and medical professionals.
8. CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER prior to serving in the office of Chief Justice of the State of New Jersey Supreme Court held the office of Attorney General of the State of New Jersey where CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER was the chief policy making authority for State of New Jersey law enforcement officers, child protective service investigative authorities, and was responsible for overseeing the exercise of discretion by county prosecutors in the charging of persons for the crimes of kidnapping and failure to support children, and in the involuntary confinement of persons for mental health reasons.
9. CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER has actual, imputed, and constructive knowledge of the ongoing racial and class based animus by State of New Jersey Officials and their agents depriving the plaintiff and her daughter of their federally guaranteed civil rights and equal protections while he was Attorney General of New Jersey from September 26, 2006 to June 21, 2007.
10. CHAIRMAN JOHN DOE #1, defendant in his or her private and individual capacity is believed to be a citizen of the State of New Jersey and of the United States of America and is believed to perform his or her duties as Chairman of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Character in Mercer County at the State of New Jersey Supreme Court, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market Street, Trenton, NJ 08625-0970.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
11. The plaintiff and her daughter are members of a racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious based protected class as American citizens of Indian/Pakistanian/Afghan descent and culture who are Muslim.
12. As Muslims of a foreign race, dress and culture in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 the plaintiff and her daughter were subjected to racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious based animus by officials of the State of New Jersey and licensed legal and medical professionals working under contracts with the State of New Jersey.
13. The plaintiff became a target for racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious based animus by officials of the State of New Jersey when she sought child, medical, and spousal support enforcement of court awarded obligations against her divorced husband a successful Pakistani American Anesthesiologist whom early in their marriage she had financially supported, assisted him in obtaining American certifications to practice medicine, and obtained for him employment as a doctor.
14. The plaintiff became a target for racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious based animus by officials of the State of New Jersey when she sought to report abuse of her daughter and herself.
15. The local police departments responsible refused to take reports from the plaintiff concerning the physical, sexual, domestic, violence parental and legal alienation against her and her daughter.
16. State of New Jersey licensed legal and medical professionals were negligent in their duty to the plaintiff and State of New Jersey in fulfillment of their responsibilities to the court due to the racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination terrorism based animus against the plaintiff and her daughter.
17. The State of New Jersey licensed legal professionals including State of New Jersey licensed attorneys appointed as indigent counsel and employed to supervise attorneys appointed to parental rights work were both negligent and intentionally ineffective in their duty to the plaintiff and State of New Jersey in fulfillment of their responsibilities to the court due to the racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious based animus against the plaintiff and her daughter.
18. The plaintiff had her parental rights over her handicapped special needs daughter terminated and given to her teacher Jennifer and Eric Schollenberger of a different faith and culture and in a professional and ethical conflict of interest.
19. Jennifer Schollenberger the teacher was with the plaintiff’s special needs daughter Nabeela Pathan twenty four hours a day, seven days a week in a state licensed educational facility and had a special opportunity to be protected against in alienating the biological mother now plaintiff FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN.
20. In October 2005 the biological father and plaintiff’s ex-husband Dr. Jaseem Ahmed surrendered his rights to Jennifer and Eric Schollenberger.
21. Dr Jaseem Ahmed gave talaq (Islamic Divorce not recognized under New Jersey or United States law) in Feb 1998, once he got his US Citizenship and completed his Anesthesia Residency in 2000.
22. The plaintiff did not help or support Dr Jaseem Ahmed attempt to exercise talaq without honoring his responsibilities for his child and wife under US law and the laws of New Jersey and New York.
23. The State of New Jersey Judicial Branch has recognized its parental rights staff engaged in misconduct over the representation of the plaintiff in failing to provide adequate legal counsel to defend the parental rights of the plaintiff and the interest of the plaintiff’s daughter in being raised by her natural mother and maternal Grandmother Sabera Pathan whom she had formed an extensive relationship with and in enjoying her extended natural family, its culture and participating in her religion of Islam.
24. The State of New Jersey has recognized the failure of its law enforcement officials to recognize the rights of the plaintiff and to respond to the crimes she reported but they refused to act on or even write down due to their negligence in training and an acquiescence in a policy and practice condoned by New Jersey state agency officials under ministerial opinions and rules established by and failed to be established by CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER in his earlier office of New Jersey Attorney General.
25. On information and belief of the plaintiff, the State of New Jersey and CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER have recognized the failure of the Director of Office of the State of New Jersey Public Defenders, Ms. Yvonne Smith Segars in exercising her responsibilities for providing counsel to indigent natural parents in parental rights termination cases, and in her office’s representation of the plaintiff to protect the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights and the federal constitutional rights of Nabeela Pathan in trial court and upon appeal.
26. The plaintiff relied on an appeal of the termination of her parental rights where a reviewing court was the sole practical remedy for judicial misconduct of the trial court judge that resulted in the unlawful termination of parental rights as the biological mother of Nabeela Pathan.
27. The plaintiff was represented in the appeal by counsel from the Office of the State of New Jersey Public Defenders that never met in person or conferred with the plaintiff.
28. Prior to and subsequent to the unsuccessful appeal, the plaintiff has been injured by New Jersey state officials including deputy attorney generals, county district attorneys, court services officials, child protective services authorities, municipal chiefs of police, and their city councils acting under policies with the effect of encouraging racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination based animus against members of the plaintiff’s class, the plaintiff’s daughter, and the plaintiff's grandmother Sabera Pathan.
29. When local police would not take her reports including the plaintiff’s attempts to report the kidnapping of her daughter Nabeela Pathan, the plaintiff went repeatedly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation eight times to report the crimes being committed against her and her child.
30. The F.B.I. agents in the period following the events of September 11, 2001 were negligently and inadequately trained to identify white collar crime including 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, et seq. racketeering utilizing state courts to terminate parental rights as a device to maximize false claims of federal funds in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq., through bad faith state child protective services actions violating 42 U.S.C. § 671.
31. The F.B.I. agents in the period following the events of September 11, 2001 were negligently and inadequately trained to recognize their duty to treat U.S. citizens who are Muslim and of Indian/Pakistan/Afghan national origin equally and not to ignore their reporting of federal crimes because of mode of dress or cultural practices.
32. The federal civil rights laws provide remedies and relief for the violations of rights guaranteed by federal law and the Constitution of the United States but stating a claim and pleading conspiracy and documenting the religious, ethnic and racial animus and also the extrinsic fraud that resulted that resulted in the plaintiff’s parental rights over her handicapped daughter Nabeela Pathan being unlawfully terminated is extraordinarily difficult for a layman pro se litigant and impossible for the plaintiff growing up as a woman in a traditional Islamic culture.
33. Controlling federal precedent in Limone v. U.S., 497 F.Supp.2d 143 at pgs. 231-243 (D. Mass., 2007) provides a remedy under federal law against the Director of the F.B.I. Robert S. Mueller III for negligence in protecting citizens from foreseeable violation of their federally guaranteed civil rights.
34. The US District Court for the District of New Jersey is in a special relationship with the State of New Jersey Supreme Court and under local rules has a requirement not shared by some other district courts that to be admitted as an attorney to practice in federal court, counsel must be admitted to practice by the State of New Jersey.
35. The plaintiff has asked over twenty five New Jersey attorneys for representation who have declined to represent her because of the politically controversial nature of her as a victim of misconduct by State of New Jersey officials. See exhibit 1, List of Attorneys.
36. Local rules for pro hac vice admission to federal court both require local counsel (which the plaintiff has not been able to obtain) and the absence of disciplinary actions regardless of whether such action in another state was a lawful exercise of state attorney discipline authority.
37. The plaintiff did however, attempt to find an attorney licensed in another state to represent her hoping that such an attorney may find local counsel and be able to represent her in the State of New Jersey courts and in the the US District Court for the State of New Jersey.
38. The plaintiff encountered the same unwillingness of even attorneys in foreign states to address the injustice they could see befell her in New Jersey.
39. One attorney approached by the plaintiff, Brandon Mayfield a Washburn School of Law graduate practicing in Oregon, had experience with the retribution against attorneys representing natural parents of Islamic faith from termination of parental rights by state officials because of the politically controversial nature of Muslims asserting rights and relief from the ethnic and religious discriminatory animus.
40. Brandon Mayfield came to the defense of the parental rights of a Muslim man that appeared to have his liberty interest in his family relationships in jeopardy following the events of 9/11. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandon_Mayfield
41. The US Attorney for the District of Oregon used false fingerprint evidence to attempt to frame Brandon Mayfield for a terrorist bombing of a train that killed over a hundred people in Spain, a country where Mayfield had never been and where the Spanish authorities knew and reported that Brandon Mayfield was not involved in the plot by elite Spanish security forces to politically retain a conservative Prime Minister supporting the deployment of Spanish troops to the war in Iraq.
42. The plaintiff received no response from letters and calls sent to Brandon Mayfield.
43. On September 16, 2010 the State of New Jersey provided the plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence on these violations by police law enforcement officials in victim’s crime compensation hearings.
44. Despite a letter promising compensation of $125.00 for each hour of representation the plaintiff was unable to find a New Jersey licensed attorney willing to represent her in even the non-adversarial nature of presenting evidence to determine compensation.
45. The plaintiff was instructed by the victim’s crime compensation tribunal and the current Attorney General of the State of New Jersey to return to the City of Hackensack and file a criminal complaint so proper police action could be initiated against wrongdoers for the kidnapping of the plaintiff’s daughter prior to the court’s termination of the plaintiff’s parental rights based on extrinsic fraud out of racial, national, ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination based animus against members of the plaintiff’s class, the plaintiff’s daughter, the plaintiff’s grandmother and the plaintiff herself and inadequate legal representation and a denial of Due Process.
46. The plaintiff without the advice of a licensed New Jersey attorney is even unable to determine when claims for negligence against State of New Jersey licensed medical officials that contributed to or resulted in the plaintiff’s termination of parental rights over her special needs daughter are in danger of expiring due to statutes of limitations.
47. The plaintiff without the representation of a licensed New Jersey attorney is unable to stop the continuing violations of her federally guaranteed civil rights that are occurring subsequent to the termination of parental rights and appear to be the result of bad faith reporting to State of New Jersey agencies that the plaintiff is a terrorist or a danger to others or herself that in actuality is the intended discriminatory conduct of persons with a religious and ethnic animus against the plaintiff that seek to deprive her of the resources and opportunity to vindicate her rights as the natural parent of her daughter.
48. The plaintiff without the representation of a licensed New Jersey attorney is unable to investigate, research and prepare her federal civil rights claims, on November 11, 2009 the Hackensack School and the Access center the Mental Health Professionals refused to give the plaintiff access to her daughter’s school records.
49. In response to the plaintiff’s lawful and peaceful investigation of her federal civil right’s claims, on November 17, 2009 the Princeton Police came to the plaintiff’s home at 2am in the morning with the psych screeners without any warrants 2 times in a week.
50. On November 20, 2009 the plaintiff was involuntarily committed at the Capital Health in the Crisis Center by Dr Bari, and the Director of Psychiatry Dr Gary Brown, 24 hours against the plaintiff will, the detention terrorized and threatened the plaintiff for the exercise of her constitutional and civil rights.
51. On December 8, 2009 the plaintiff was forced to attend Greater Behavioral health intensive outpatient therapy.
52. On December 14, 2009 an ex parte restraining order was issued by Morris County Family Court Judge Thomas Critchly.
53. On September 16, 2010 I the plaintiff had an appeal hearing for Victims of Crime Compensation Board in which the plaintiff was denied benefits because the plaintiff had no police reports.
54. The plaintiff went to Bergen County Prosecutor’s office to file a complaint and instead the plaintiff was told to go to Hackensack Police dept and file domestic violence complaints against DYFS, Jennifer and Eric Schollenberger and the plaintiff’s immediate family and relatives involved in a form of domestic violence that can include “honor killing” in the plaintiff’s Muslim culture.
55. The plaintiff went to Hackensack police and filed a complaint against Sgt Clause, Sgt Lopez took the complaint few days later the plaintiff received a call Wednesday from the Lieutenant regarding the complaint .
56. The plaintiff was told to come in person to report the domestic violence complaints.
57. The plaintiff on Friday went to Hackensack Police around 830-900 am the plaintiff was in the police station.
58. Police Officer Kiselow started to take the complaint and said the plaintiff was crazy and the plaintiff needed to be on medication he went in and out numerous times and called the helpline for a psych evaluation.
59 The plaintiff was detained until the screener came around 1130am.
60. The plaintiff kept asking to leave and return to Princeton where the plaintiff had forgotten her cell phone at home. 61. The police kept asking for friends and relatives so the plaintiff gave them Imam Chebli and they couldn't reach him.
62. Police Officer Kiselow searched the plaintiff’s purse and s for weapons.
63. The plaintiff was taken for psych evaluation to Bergen Regional Medical Center involuntarily.
64. The plaintiff suggested she go to Hackensack medical center where the plaintiff’s doctors were and the plaintiff had lived there.
65. The plaintiff was told no, that the confinement was involuntary and the plaintiff was been taken to BRMC for psych eval.
66. On October 6, 2010 Mountain Lakes police restraining order by Jennifer and Eric Schollenberger.
67. On October 6, 2010 another final Restraining order from Morris County Judge Thomas Critchley.
68. On October 16, 2010 , a warrantless search of the plaintiff’s Princeton house was made by Princeton Borough Police.
69. On October 22, 2010 NYS State troopers served a Restraining order for Zarin and Athar Khan the plaintiff’s niece and nephew.
70. On October 17, 2010 Princeton Borough Police again came to the plaintiff’s home to serve her with another restraining order
71. The plaintiff found another Washburn Law School graduate, Bret D. Landrith with experience in state government official misconduct in the termination of parental rights and an understanding of the extraordinary professional retaliation including fraudulent disbarment that can be used by to deny their victims legal representation and fair opportunity to obtain redress in court.
72. A United States Court of Appeals dicta in a decision obtained by Bret D. Landrith describes federal relief for civil rights violations following termination of a natural parent’s rights that does not violate the preclusion effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
“Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal-court claims that would be identical even had there been no state-court judgment; that is, claims that do not rest on any allegation concerning the state-court proceedings or judgment. A suit on such claims could not be characterized as an "appeal" of the state-court judgment, which is the core concern of Rooker-Feldman. To illustrate, say a father was deprived of custody of his child by a state-court judgment. If he files suit in federal court, seeking to invalidate`the state-court judgment on the ground that the state-court proceedings deprived him of due process or that the judgment was otherwise contrary to federal law, his suit would be barred by Rooker-Feldman; the suit usurps the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction because it seeks to set aside the judgment based on a review of the prior proceedings. If, however, the father simply brought suit in federal court seeking custody of his child, without raising any complaint about the state-court proceedings, Rooker-Feldman cannot be invoked; his federal claim would have been the same even in the absence of the state-court judgment. A myriad of doctrines, including res judicata, would almost certainly bar the suit. But because he is not seeking to overturn the state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable, regardless of whether a favorable judgment in federal court would be inconsistent with that judgment and would "den[y] a legal conclusion that [the] state court has reached." Exxon Mobil, 125 St. Ct. at 1527 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the allegations underlying Mr. Bolden's federal claim would be identical if there had been no state-court proceeding. He is not seeking "to undo the [state-court] judgment." Id.”[Emphasis added]
Bolden v. City of Topeka. 441 F.3d 1129 at ¶63 (10th Cir. 2006).
73. Bret D. Landrith was disbarred by the State of Kansas for taking the African American James Bolden’s claims against the Kansas State agency the City of Topeka to federal court.
74. Bret D. Landrith was also disbarred by the State of Kansas for representing James Bolden’s material witness David M. Price of American Indian descent in an appeal of the termination of parental rights for Landrith having briefed the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act to depriving the State of Kansas court of the jurisdiction to place Price’s infant son (determined by the trial court to be American Indian) in a private for profit adoption in another state prior to terminating the parental rights of the natural father.
75. Bret D. Landrith has agreed to represent the plaintiff for one dollar if the State of New Jersey admits him for the practice of law.
76. The plaintiff has filed this action against the defendants in advance of an application by Bret D. Landrith to obtain an evidentiary hearing since under 42 USC Sec. 1983, no exhaustion of state remedies is required, to obtain an order requiring an evidentiary hearing on Landrith’s character and fitness to practice law in the State of New Jersey.
77. The plaintiff has filed this action against the defendants to also obtain temporary admission of Bret D. Landrith to represent the plaintiff in vindicating rights that are in imminent danger of being lost to the statutes of limitations while the plaintiff is unable to find licensed New Jersey counsel.
78. The plaintiff requires this injunctive relief because constructively and in practice, state attorney admission officials rely on a misinterpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to deny disbarred attorneys of an evidentiary hearing to determine character and fitness to practice law when the state disbarment of an attorney representing the rights of members of a protected class when extortion fails to prevent them from vindicating their client’s federally guaranteed civil rights is prima facie proof of their character and fitness to practice law.
79. The plaintiff has causes of action in a separate proceeding still being investigated against the following State of New Jersey medical professionals for the loss of plaintiff’s daughter: Dr Iaofinn, Dr Arlando Arpolito, Dr Fiore, Dr Frank Dyer, Dr Anna Burton Dr Mona Tantawi, Dr Joseph Aquaviva, Melissa Odessa MSW, Dr. Malani Bhattia , Sari Breuer MS, Melanie Long MSW, Dr Christina Stayer, Dr Linda Klee-Mueller, Dr Bari, Dr Gary Brown, Dr. Jaseem , Dr. LalMuhammad Pathan, Dr. Kaiser Pathan, Faye Wong MD Hackensack Pediatrics, Dr Luthra, Dr Shashi Jain, Dr Sarala C Mundassery, Dr. Gary Brown, Dr Melinda Carson, Anna Burton MD, Catherine Stayer, MD, Linda Klee-Mueller, LCSW, Phd, M. Hanif Ramay, MD, Karine Airapetian, MD, Anita Jothy MD, Srikanth Reddy, MD, Serge Dumay, MD, M. Javed, Iqbal, MD, Syed Arshad Husain MD, Syed Moin MD, Asif Siddiqui MD, Sajeda Pathan PA, Farhat Khan RN, Simon Parisier MD, Zubeida Arif, Ghulam Arif, Urooj Arif, Shahid Umer, Sarwat Umer. The Greater Behavioral Health Trenton, Hackensack Pediatrics, NY EYE and EAR Infirmary Cochlear Implant Center, and Schoolhouse Road Pediatrics.
IV. CAUSE OF ACTION
Claim For Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 Or, In The Alternative
Under The Fourteenth Amendment Of The US Constitution
The plaintiff FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN makes the following claim for relief against the defendants in their official capacity from ongoing violations of federal law by state officials answering to or following policies implemented by the defendants.
The plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding factual averments.
This court is “a competent state tribunal” to decide “the federal issues involved” as required under Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 at 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689 at 1697, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973).
Without the ability to obtain New Jersey licensed counsel or an attorney from a foreign state to serve pro hac vice, the plaintiff is constructively denied the opportunity to vindicate her federal interests. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
Ex Parte Young Doctrine Factors
The plaintiff seeks her relief solely in this state tribunal and without a concurrent federal proceeding.
The relief sought by the plaintiff is properly characterized as prospective.
The relief sought by the plaintiff does not seek divestiture of state lands or property interests, the elimination of regulatory authority, or otherwise implicate lawful “special sovereignty interests.”
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The relief sought by the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER and CHAIRMAN JOHN DOE #1 is for administrative, ministerial or executive function conduct within the judicial branch of New Jersey State government believed to be under the jurisdiction of the statute after the 1996 amendment.
The relief sought by the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER is in the alternative for policies created and implemented in his earlier office of New Jersey Attorney General as the state’s chief law enforcement officer.
Alternatively, the plaintiff seeks relief against CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER and CHAIRMAN JOHN DOE #1 under the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution for ongoing violations of the plaintiff’s federally guaranteed rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The defendants are subject to jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Farmer v. Ramsay, 41 F.Supp.2d 587 (D. Md. 1999) the court found that while a state may not be sued directly for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials. See id. at 591.
The plaintiff’s alternative relief sought under the Fourteenth Amendment is collateral injunctive relief against a judicial branch officials determined to be proper under Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) and not effected by the 1996 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON ENTITLEMENT TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The plaintiff is entitled to the prospective injunctive relief sought for the following reasons:
Without a licensed attorney who is free from the fear of bad faith professional discipline retribution by state officials, there is no practical or realistic expectation that the plaintiff will have a fair chance to vindicate her rights. State of New Jersey appointed counsel have been inadequate in their representation of the plaintiff and no provision exists for their appointment to private civil rights prosecutions on behalf of the plaintiff on her colorable 42 USC Sec. 1983 claims in state or federal court:
“The decision to deny the assistance of an appointed attorney to a layman unschooled in the law in an area as complicated as the civil rights field is truly too important to be deferred until a resolution on the merits can be had. Such an individual likely has little hope of successfully prosecuting his case to a final resolution of the merits.”
Slaughter v. City Of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587 at ¶¶ 3-7 (8th Cir. 1984).
(1) irreparable harm is likely if the relief is denied:
The plaintiff is being prevented from visitation with her biological daughter Nabeela Pathan and in the last three months has suffered ex parte restraining orders increased against the plaintiff to prevent her from even viewing her daughter from afar even though the plaintiff had not violated any restraining orders.
a. Irreparable harm through loss of familial relationship
The plaintiff having suffered what the defendant CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER knows to have been an inadequate and ineffective legal representation as an indigent respondent in a parental rights termination action under the badges of racial, ethnic and religious based discriminatory animus is now losing parenting time that adequate counsel could obtain for her through the vindication of her rights against the New Jersey licensed healthcare professionals, proving the frauds employed to procure the unlawful adoption.
The plaintiff is being similarly prevented from a relationship with her mother Sabera Pathan who resided with the plaintiff until the plaintiff became victim of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) civil rights conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of her daughter and prevent the plaintiff from working, from being able to support herself, and from being free from confinement.
The loss of parenting time and the opportunity for the plaintiff to lawfully see that her daughter Nabeela Pathan is well, along with the loss of opportunity to see or visit her elderly mother Sabera Pathan are the types of harm “that cannot be redressed adequately by monetary damages.”
b. Irreparable harm through inability to obtain counsel for redress of rights
The injuries alleged by the plaintiff causing her no alternative but to pursue the present injunctive relief include a threat to First Amendment interests.
The plaintiff is being prevented from effectively seeking compensation and remediation from the New Jersey victim’s crime compensation tribunal for lack of attorney representation to exercise fully her First Amendment right to seek redress.
The plaintiff is being prevented from enjoying Liberty, from exercise of voting rights, and other fundamental constitutional rights due to confinements in violation of the State of New Jersey’s Mental health laws.
The plaintiff has been injured and is under imminent danger of recurring violations of her gender specific and religious interest in privacy violating her First Amendment and Eighth Amendment rights while held unlawfully in New Jersey mental health facilities involuntarily and without counsel is unable to seek redress or to prevent reoccurrences of this consequence of reporting to the police the crimes against the plaintiff as instructed by the State of New Jersey Victim’s Rights Commission.
The plaintiff has been injured and is under imminent danger of recurring violations of her Ninth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendment rights that kept her from utilizing a School of Medicine scholarship to become a Physician at Seton Hall and twice kept her from voting while held unlawfully in New Jersey mental health facilities involuntarily and without counsel is unable to seek redress or to prevent reoccurrences.
In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) the Supreme Court emphasized that "the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Id. at 373 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
c. Irreparable harm through violations of federal criminal statutes
Irreparable injury is “presumed and equitable requirements are satisfied per se when a violation of federal law is shown since, in enacting the statute, Congress declared that violations of the statute are contrary to the public interest and therefore cause irreparable harm” Hueblein, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n. 539 F. Supp. 123, 128 ( D. Conn. 1982). In United States v. Hayes International Corporation, 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir.1969) the court stated "irreparable injury should be presumed from the very fact that the statute has been violated." Id.; accord Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir.1981); U.V. Industries, Inc. v. Posner, 466 F.Supp. 1251, 1255-56 (D.Maine 1979); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 65.04(1) n. 7b.
The plaintiff as an American citizen that is Muslim and of Indian/Pakistani/Afghan descent cannot be discriminated upon based on her religious headdress, or her national origin while seeking enforcement of child support orders in a state court.
The 1964 Federal Civil Rights Law, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2), permits federal prosecution of anyone who "willingly injures, intimidates or interferes with another person, or attempts to do so, by force because of the other person's race, color, religion or national origin"  because of the victim's attempt to engage in one of six types of federally protected activities including “participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility or activity provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof”.
Federal courts have also held that when a law protecting important civil rights has been violated, irreparable injury should be presumed. United States v. Haves Int'l Corooration, 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1969) (violation of statute prohibiting race discrimination in employment automatically constitutes irreparable injury).
(2) the applicable underlying law is well settled;
The plaintiff as a private party suing state officers for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief from an ongoing violations of the Constitution or federal laws, is not considered to be making a claim against the state itself and the Eleventh Amendment does not apply. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); see also Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1205.
The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Character, an agency of the New Jersey Supreme Court, is not a named defendant in the present suit.
The defendant CHAIRMAN JOHN DOE #1 as a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Character is not subject to judicial immunity.
Members of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Character cannot lawfully participate in the 18 USC § 241 and 18 USC § 242 felonies of some State of Kansas officials by denying a hearing with a full and fair opportunity to present evidence or by denying Bret D. Landrith’s admission on the basis of his representation of an African American or American Indian in asserting their federal antidiscrimination statutory rights under 42 USC §1981 and 42 USC §1982 for James L. Bolden and the Indian Child Welfare Act 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et. seq. for David M. Price.
Model Rule 8.4(b) like the State of New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b) prohibits "conduct". Neither a conviction nor criminal charges are necessary for there to be a violation of Rule 8.4(b) by State of New Jersey Judicial branch officials through their participation in some State of Kansas officials’ violations of 18 USC § 241 and 18 USC § 242. See People v.Odom, 941 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1997); In re Hassenstab, 934 P.2d 1110 (Or.1997).
The Kansas Supreme Court also expressly determined that Bret D. Landrith was to be disbarred for the exercise of US Supreme Court recognized Freedom of Speech rights related to litigation that are also recognized in the State of New Jersey and the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals as protected speech an attorney could not lawfully be disbarred for.
Subsequent to the disbarment, State of Kansas officials have initiated other state proceedings including interfering with Landrith’s ability to live in and obtain employment in the states of Missouri, Nebraska and Florida in bad faith and to harass Landrith and his former clients that is prohibited under Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965).
The plaintiff FAREEDA JABEEN PATHAN identifying federally recognizable injuries is entitled to the assistance of privately retained counsel under the Sixth Amendment needed to facilitate "a concrete opportunity to vindicate his [her] constitutional rights." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1217, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974).
(3) the material facts are not substantially disputed and there exists a
reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits;
The plaintiff would ultimately prevail on obtaining Landrith’s admission to the State of New Jersey bar and therefore the US District Court for the District of New Jersey bar if the injunction against the defendants is granted, preventing them from denying Bret D. Landrith an evidentiary hearing on his character and fitness for the bar.
A. Preventing Landrith from practicing law in New Jersey participates
in discrimination prohibited under 42 USC §1981
The disbarment of Bret D. Landrith was by State of Kansas officials expressly for the conduct of advocacy on behalf of the civil rights of James L. Bolden and David M. Price in courts where they were determined to have colorable claims of race based discrimination under federal civil rights statutes.
Bret D. Landrith was not provided the privileges and immunities of an American citizen specifically provided advocates under 42 USC §1981 despite having raised the defense in the disbarment proceedings.
Bret D. Landrith was suspended and disbarred in 2005 for bringing the racial discrimination Civil Rights claims of James L. Bolden, Jr., an African American to federal court and for the pro bono representation of Bolden’s witness David M. Price in an appeal of a parental rights termination case where the Kansas SRS deprived the natural father of access to interstate compact against child trafficking documents used to place the American Indian child in an adoption out of state prior to the termination of parental rights.
Bret D. Landrith was expressly disbarred by the State of Kansas Supreme Court as written on the face of the disbarment order for following clearly established US Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals precedents in federal court, including treating the voluntary, unreserved entry of appearance by the City of Topeka as effective service on the sole liable party in an official capacity lawsuit under Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) ("[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. ... It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity."); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984).
Bret D. Landrith was also disbarred for raising the Indian Child Welfare Act which prohibited the taking and placement of the child without notice to the natural father.
The official transcripts repeatedly show Bret D. Landrith was denied the opportunity to present any evidence related to Landrith’s representation of David M. Price while Price was still legally the father with parental rights having made a timely pro se appeal suspending the termination of parental rights under Kansas law.
The basis the disciplinary tribunal later used for its recommendation of disbarment was that Bret D. Landrith did not have sufficient cause to support David M. Price by representing him in an appeal Price initiated while representing himself pro se in post judgment proceedings in trial court.
Bret D. Landrith’s appeal of Bolden’s case to the Tenth Circuit US Court of Appeals was interfered with by State of Kansas officials and by Kansas District Court Clerk’s personnel.
The conduct first caused the Tenth Circuit to delay the briefing schedule, then to cancel the oral argument because the State of Kansas suspended Bret D. Landrith.
Bret D. Landrith was denied hearings and reciprocally disbarred by the US District Court for the District of Kansas and the US District Court for the District of the Western District of Missouri because of Landrith’s disbarment by the State of Kansas.
The Kansas Supreme Court also expressly determined that Bret D. Landrith was to be disbarred for the exercise of US Supreme Court recognized Freedom of Speech rights related to litigation that were held to a different standard of substituted State of Kansas precedent conflicting with the standard recognized in the State of New Jersey and the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals as protected from state attorney discipline prosecution under NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 at 417-445 (1963).
B. Plaintiff ‘s Relief is Required Under Selling v. Radford
The plaintiff is unable to obtain Bret D. Landrith’s services as an attorney in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the normal and likely mandatory venue for vindicating the plaintiff’s federally guaranteed rights, without obtaining his admission in the State of New Jersey.
Admission to practice law before a state's courts and admission to practice before the federal courts are separate, independent privileges. "The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context, lawyers are included. " Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
Thus, for example, "disbarment by federal courts does not automatically flow from disbarment from state courts." Id. at 282; accord In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968). This is true even when admission to a federal court is predicated upon admission to the bar of the state court of last resort. See Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 49 (1916); see also Theard, 354 U.S. at 281 ("While a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a state court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court by the same route."). Once federal admission is secured, a change in circumstances underlying state admission -- such as a shift in domicile -- is "wholly negligible " on the right to practice before a federal court. Selling, 243 U.S. at 49.
The federal interest in the supremacy of the enforcement of 42 § USC 1981 rights through 42 § USC 1983 outweighs the interests of the defendant officials.
State of Kansas Attorney Discipline official Stanton Hazlett noticed Landrith that he would be formally prosecuted over the allegations in Kansas Discipline Complaint DA889, the day Landrith called an African American Army National Guard soldier named Mark Hunt to testify on deprivations of rights by city officials against the City of Topeka in a Topeka federal courtroom before the Hon. Judge Julie Robinson.
While Landrith is a member of the majority race, his advocacy on behalf of James L. Bolden and David M. Price was protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Equal Protection Clause precludes selective enforcement of the law based on race or ethnicity. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In its recent decision in Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 22230113 (10th Cir. September 29, 2003), the Tenth Circuit noted “Racially selective law enforcement violates this nation's constitutional values at the most fundamental level; indeed, unequal application of criminal law to white and black persons was one of the central evils addressed by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The State of Kansas Attorney Discipline Office, documented in Landrith’s proffer of evidence to the Kansas Supreme Court for relief from judgment, as having committed the frauds resulting in Landrith’s disbarment did not contest or otherwise respond to the motion for relief from judgment, deeming these averments of fact and the frauds admitted under the Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure for a pleading requiring a responsive pleading or answer.
Denial of Landrith’s admission to the State of New Jersey bar and therefore the US District for the District of New Jersey Court would violate the United States Supreme Court cases Drew v. Tidwell Case no. 01-6900 , and Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46:
“The Supreme Court has identified three circumstances in which a federal court should not impose reciprocal disbarment on the basis of state court disbarment: (1) absence of due process in the state procedure, (2) substantial infirmity in the proof of lack of private and professional character, or (3) "some other grave reason"
sufficient to indicate that reciprocal disbarment was inconsistent with "principles of right and justice." Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 50-51, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585 (1917); see In re Edelstein, 214 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir.2000).”
Drew v. Tidwell, Case no. 01-6900 at ¶9 (USSC 2002).
C. Facial Violation Of Fourteenth Amendment And State Of New Jersey Law
On its face, the disbarment order of the State of Kansas: a. unlawfully encroaches Landrith’s Freedom of Speech and rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by justifying Landrith’s disbarment for seeking relief in federal court for his African American client and later from the state’s disciplinary prosecution; b. unlawfully encroaches Landrith’s Freedom of Association by justifying the disbarment of Landrith for the political speech of his American Indian client unrelated to the respondent’s representation; c.unlawfully encroaches Landrith’s Freedom of Speech by justifying disbarment for factual reporting of events in a closed court of the parental rights termination action, after the action and appeal had concluded. Landrith accurately reported these events and proffered evidence during the closed court of his disciplinary proceeding; and d. impermissibly denies Full Due Process required under the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of the respondent’s liberty interest in First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protected conduct in advocacy on behalf of members of a protected class; e. erroneously adopts the pretext ( unrefuted as required by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)) that the City of Topeka’s uncontested entry of appearance in Bolden’s case could not have been a basis for competently establishing jurisdiction over the defendant contrary to the law of this district court and every federal circuit that an action against a city officer acting in his official capacity is an action against the city.
(1) absence of due process in the state procedure
The State of Kansas Attorney Discipline Tribunal members Randall D. Grisell, Sally Harris, and Michael Schmitt fraudulently signed the report and recommendation for disbarment created by assistant Kansas Attorney Ethics Prosecutor Gayle B. Larkin that falsely and misleadingly stated that Landrith failed to cite to the record in David M. Price‘s appeal brief.
Bret D. Landrith‘s Adoption Appeal opening brief alone made sixty seven citations to the record to support David M. Price’s contentions in appeal. See Landrith Adoption Opening Brief.
Randall D. Grisell, Sally Harris and Michael Schmitt fraudulently signed the report and recommendation created by Gayle B. Larkin and are guilty of the assertions that the tribunal‘s report falsely charged Landrith for untruthfulness in failing to support with a basis in fact and that the Kansas Supreme Court unlawfully disbarred Landrith over.
Randall D. Grisell, Sally Harris, and Michael Schmitt signed the materially false report that had the foreseeable effect of injuring Landrith in his profession and caused it to be sent to the Kansas Supreme Court.
During the appeal pre-hearing motion process, Landrith observed that none of the adoption and child custody statutes governing the Shawnee County District Court (“SCDC”) and Kansas Social and Rehabilitation Services (“SRS”) had been complied with.
Bret D. Landrith observed that Interstate Compact (“ICPC‖”) adoption records had been visibly altered to fraudulently represent the adopting parents as residing in Kansas when they lived in Colorado.
The defects were documented in the evidentiary SCDC record on appeal at Pg. 55-157, 210-214, 213 and cited appropriately in Landrith‘s appeal brief.
Hon. Judge Pierron, despite filing the prejudicial first ethics complaint against Landrith and serving as a director of one of the state’s largest adoption contractor corporations which was stated on the Kansas Supreme Court Web Site at the URL http://www.kscourts.org/ctapp/gjp_coaj.htm strongly admonished Landrith for raising concerns about the legitimacy of the adoption.
“Judge Pierron has served as President of the Kansas Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse and on the board of directors of the Kansas Children's Service League.”
Kansas Court of Appeals Home Page at time of disbarment hearing.
The appellate opinion inaccurately stated that Landrith sought only SRS records the father was not entitled to despite numerous appellate motions for many kinds of court records Landrith and his client David M. Price had been denied access to.
Despite this new issue giving the respondent an appeal by right under K.S.A. 60-2101(b), the Kansas Supreme Court denied review.
On July 8th, 2005, the City of Topeka‘s first African American Judge, Municipal Court Judge Deborah Purce suffered the instigation of an investigation for termination immediately after she had ruled in favor of David M. Price, Landrith‘s client and chief witness for James Bolden.
Hon. Judge Deborah Purce stated that the City of Topeka was retaliating against her for acting ethically:
"People have told me that Ebberts was under pressure from the police department because of my number of 'not guilty' verdicts," Purce said. "It would not be legal or ethical for me to be fired because I weighed evidence in favor of the accused more than Ebberts and police would have liked."Purce also outlined the events of July 8. Armed security guards were called to escort her out of the courthouse.
Above from Ex-judge sees race as issue‖ Topeka Capital Journal July 17, 2005
(2) substantial infirmity in the proof
of lack of private and professional character
Landrith was disbarred for relying on the City of Topeka’s unqualified entry of appearance in Bolden v. City of Topeka. The Supreme Court has held that a suit brought against an individual in his official capacity is really "only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Id. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099.
During the hearing in Rosemary, the wife of David M. Price’s adoption case, the Adoption Attorney Austin K. Vincent revealed on the record that Baby C’s adoption had been completed the third week in April, before Rosemary Price filed her petition for adoption.
The hospital notes show that David M. Price, never had access to the Shawnee County, Kansas District Court (“SCDC”) files to the non sham adoption proceeding that resulted in Baby C’s adoption through Austin K. Vincent and that David M. Price was entitled to under Nunn v. Morrison, 608 P.2d 1359, 227 Kan. 730 (Kan., 1980) determining a nondiscretionary duty to make available SRS records used to terminate parental rights.
The petition for the real Baby C adoption case was created by the Adoption Attorney Austin K. Vincent for the SCDC after the baby’s birth on March 9th.
On April 26th, the husband of the birth mother and Austin K. Vincent received the results of the DNA test they had ordered and knew conclusively that David M. Price was the natural father.
On April 26th, the birth mother, her husband and Austin K. Vincent created and began a plan to procure the adoption through extrinsic fraud on the SCDC.
On May 4th in the absence of the natural father David Martin Price, the birth mother, the husband of the birth mother and Austin K. Vincent who had a duty in the ex parte hearing to truthfully disclose all the known information to the State of Kansas court instead committed fraud by omission and Baby C was trafficked to Stratton, Colorado where the adoptive parents lived, even though they had fraudulently written “Stratton, Kansas” on the ICPC to evade the Kansas SRS procedures and the Colorado family services procedures to prevent child trafficking.
The sham petition used on May 4th by the birth mother, the husband of the birth mother and Austin K. Vincent to deceive the State of Kansas and deprive David Martin Price of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the adoption was allowed to expire without being renewed under the 180 day rule as Austin K. Vincent was required to do to maintain its validity.
The State of Kansas Supreme Court order disbars’ Landrith for seeking the documents in preparation of appeal that revealed Austin K. Vincent’s fraud of omission and the disbarment hearing transcript reveals that Landrith is mocked for believing there is such a thing as fraud by omission or that Austin K. Vincent had a duty to give the knowledge to the court of the natural father David Martin Price’s identity.
The disbarment tribunal also refused to hear evidence from David M. Price on the deception created by Austin K. Vincent so that David Martin Price would only get notice on May 12th for a June 22nd hearing which did not reveal the subject of the hearing and was not even informed which SCDC courtroom to attend a hearing to challenge the adoption (the infamous secret “00” Division of the SCDC ).
Austin K. Vincent had participated in a contemporary adoption appeal to preserve the taking of an infant through fraud by a Kansas Adoption attorney. In the Matter of Adoption of AMM, 949 P2d 1158 , 24 Kan. App. 2d 605 (Kan. Appeal 1997). The same modus operandi by the Kansas Adoption attorney enterprise was used to defeat the ICPC mechanism of the Kansas SRS to prevent trafficking of infants across state lines. The prospective adoptive parents in AMM, In the Matter of fraudulently represented their residence in Kansas when actuality the couple resided in Missouri.
The disbarment tribunal also refused to hear evidence from David M. Price’s appointed attorney Bruce D. Woolpert, Legal Advisor to the Kansas Army National Guard Adjutant General on why Baby C was not returned to Kansas, why Baby C ‘s existence and knowledge of the birth mother’s pregnancy had been kept from David M. Price and that the child in need of care requirement of Kansas Statutes to do an involuntary adoption had not been met.
The ethics tribunal refused to let Frank Kirtdoll an African American who had lost property to the city and attempted to have Magistrate James P. O’Hara recused for bias in a federal case testify. Frank Kirtdoll had made an affidavit in James Bolden’s case as a witness to the assistant city attorney Sherri Price’s threat to criminally prosecute Fred Sanders a minority Topeka business man for land use violations if he testified against the City. Racial Discrimination requires Clear and Convincing evidence, however Kansas Attorney Discipline Administrator Stanton Hazlett and the disciplinary tribunal repeatedly prevented Landrith from presenting this evidence.
Stanton Hazlett witheld the affidavits of African Americans discriminated against and retaliated against by the City of Topeka for raising concerns about the misuse of federal housing funds and for asserting rights in Shawnee District court in order to obtain fraudulent probable cause in an ex parte hearing in order to prosecute Landrith for representing two members of protected classes.
The Kirtdoll affidavit stated Sherri Price came on to Fred Sanders property with two police cars and a code compliance officer to perform an inspection knowing Fred Sanders attorney was out of town. This is of course the threat of criminal prosecution that is a violation of Kansas ethics in a contemporary Kansas Bar Association Journal article. The tribunal also refused to let Fred Sanders testify who was prevented from taking office as elected president of the Monroe Neighborhood Improvement Association where the Brown vs. Board of Education historic site is located for almost a year because he questioned what had happened to federal funds the city claimed had been spent in the neighborhood. The city also obtained a list of his property and retaliated against him by citing violations.
When Landrith answered the charges against him and attempted to put on evidence he was prevented from presenting supporting evidence required for his defense and specifically and repeatedly prevented by the panel from presenting evidence about the parental rights termination which became the post hearing basis for the disciplinary panel to recommend disbarment.
Kansas Attorney Discipline Administrator Stanton Hazlett and his attorney Steve Phillips made false representations of fact to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Landrith v. Hazlett, et al , Case No. 04-3364 by filing a motion entitled "Motion for Summary Disposition due to Mootness" on February 3, 2005, to secure a moot ruling against Landrith’s attempt to enjoin this prosecution. The motion argued that after the conclusion of the hearing, the disciplinary panel was unlikely to recommend Landrith for disciplinary action, therefore the federal case should be dismissed as moot. However the panel had ruled that Landrith was to be recommended for discipline, something Stanton Hazlett witnessed and his agent Steve Phillips was responsible for knowing.
The action was not at that time moot but the delay in the briefing scheduled caused by Stanton Hazlett and Steve Phillips’ extrinsic fraud on the Tenth Circuit prevented the court from having the opportunity to protect Landrith’s constitutional rights before the Kansas Supreme Court heard Landrith’s case (the rule that a federal court could lose jurisdiction from a faster acting state court has now been reversed). Landrith had the clear right to enjoin the prosecution of Hazlett’s enforcement under Leclerc v. Webb, No. 03-30752 (Fed. 5th Cir. 7/29/2005) (Fed. 5th Cir., 2005) and Dubuc v. Michigan Board of Law Examiners (6th Cir., 2003) The clear and repeated error of Kansas state officals is that Landrith is wrongly deemed to have violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (“KRPC”) for factually describing Stanton Hazlett and Steve Phillips’ fraud. Stanton Hazlett and Steve Phillips violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1) by knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal.
(3) "grave reason(s)” denying Landrith admission is inconsistent
with "principles of right and justice”
James Bolden’s federal filing merited hearing by a jury on civil rights claims and an appeal of race based and housing discrimination was scheduled for oral argument in the Tenth Circuit. When the Supreme Court of Kansas took away the plaintiff James L. Bolden’s right to have Landrith represent him in U.S. District Court for Kansas because Landrith is somehow committing a wrong under State of Kansas law for bringing 42 USC 1983 Civil Rights claims to a federal court, even before there was a trial on the merits or a substantive ruling in Bolden’s Tenth Circuit appeal, the State of Kansas was in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and the plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment rights, in addition to having prejudiced James Bolden and David Price’s state and federal actions.
(4) the balance of the hardship to the parties favors the issuance of the requested relief.
“the relative hardships to the parties in granting or denying relief.”
The plaintiff seeks the prospective injunctive relief to enable her to vindicate the laws of the State of New Jersey and of the United States.
The defendants CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER and CHAIRMAN JOHN DOE #1 have an affirmative duty under 42 USC Sec. 1986. Section 1986 imposes a "Good Samaritan" duty to protect upon police, bystanders, or others who have knowledge of impending execution of a racist conspiracy as defined by sec 1985 of the Act and have the ability to prevent the conspirators from carrying out their objectives. Section 1986 provides:
“Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured. . . for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case.”
Thus, knowledge of a sec. 1985 conspiracy, power to protect its victims, and neglect or refusal to protect results in liability under sec 1986. Section 1986 reaches more broadly than sec. 1985, its predicate, by inculpating bystander defendants who are not themselves conspirators under sec 1985. It is unique among American civil rights statutes in creating liability when a defendant has neither personally committed a discriminatory act, engaged in a conspiracy to do so, nor acted with discriminatory intent. A negligent failure to protect by an actor with knowledge of a sec. 1985 conspiracy and power to protect its victims is actionable. See Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1298 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that negligence is sufficient to maintain sec 1986 claim).
The statute creates a legal duty. In effect, it "deputizes" local actors in a position to intervene in prohibited conspiracies and renders them liable to victims of conspiratorial violence, thus focusing on those in the best position to stop the violence. As a result, sec. 1986 extends the reach of liability beyond the immediate circle of conspirators and thus buttresses sec. 1985, which attaches liability only to those who affirmatively enter into the conspiracy. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1985.
Prayer For Relief Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and or the Fourteenth Amendment
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment of immediate injunctive relief requiring the defendants to have an evidentiary hearing to determine the character and fitness of Bret D. Landrith, an attorney willing to represent the plaintiff in vindicating her federally guaranteed civil rights. The plaintiff also demands that the defendants temporarily admit Bret D. Landrith to the State of New Jersey Bar so that he can represent the plaintiff in matters under imminent danger of expiring due to statutes of limitations. The plaintiff furthermore seeks any and all appropriate relief in addition or alternative to the injunctive relief requested.
S/ Fareeda Jabeen Pathan
Fareeda Jabeen Pathan
Plaintiff Pro Se
List of attorneys the plaintiff contacted who declined to represent the plaintiff and failed to refer her to other State of New Jersey licensed attorneys.
Verification of complaint.
Lawyers that declined to represent the plaintiff:
Thomas Conole Esq.
Ian Arcus, Esq
Abby Nash, Esq
Barbara King, Esq
Jaya O Connor, Esq.
Nosheen Khawaja, RpH Esq.
Kathleen Policastro, Esq
Robert Pompliano, Esq
Ralphael Glinbizzi, Esq Assistant Deputy Public Defender
Jane Blank, DAG
Craig Robin, Law Guardian
Michelle Blake-Smith, Esq
Joseph Preziosi, Esq
Beth Ann Hahn, Esq
Beatrix Shear, Esq
Craig Robins, Esq
Jane Blank, Esq
Rochelle Rozier, Esq
Lorraine Augostini, Esq
Linda Biancardi, Esq
Sadie L. Davis, Esq Director of Operation
T. Gary Mitchell, Esq Director of Litigation
Janice T. Anderson, Esq Managing Attorney, Northern Office
Yvonne Smith Segars, Esq N J Public Defender
Marsetta Lee Esq Director of Victims Crime Compensation Office
Joseph S. Preziosi, Assistant Deputy Public Defender
Sami Catovic, Esq
Alan D. Bowman, Esq
Debra Bowman, Esq
Bassem Ramadan, Esq
Hassan Ibn Abdellah, Esq
Amy Vasquez, Esq
Peter N. Fiorentino, Esq
Rebecca K. Spar, Esq
Amy Sara Cores, Esq
Howard Miller, Esq
Rasha Foda Esq
Alison Williams, Esq
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTORNEY LIST
I, Fareeda Jabeen Pathan, declare as follows:
1. I have personal knowledge of myself and my activities, including those set out in the foregoing Complaint, and if called upon to testify I would competently testify as to the matters stated herein.
2. I verify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the factual statements in this Complaint concerning myself and my activities are true and correct.
S/ Fareeda Jabeen Pathan_ Date 12-20-2010
Fareeda Jabeen Pathan
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me a notary public, this ______ day of _______________, 20____.
________________________________________ My Commission Expires: ___________________
ATTACHMENT 2 VERIFICATION
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was amended in 1996 to provide judicial officers with immunity from injunctive relief.
 The US Department of Justice Civil Rights Division states: “Section 241 of Title 18 is the civil rights conspiracy statute. Section 241 makes it unlawful for two or more persons to agree together to injure, threaten, or intimidate a person in any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the Unites States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same). Unlike most conspiracy statutes, Section 241 does not require that one of the conspirators commit an overt act prior to the conspiracy becoming a crime.” http://www.justice.gov/crt/crim/241fin.php
 The US Department of Justice Civil Rights Division states: “Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under "color of law" include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within the their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official
duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials. It is not necessary that the crime be motivated by animus toward the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin of the victim.” http://www.justice.gov/crt/crim/242fin.php
 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision reinvigorated 42 USC Sec. 1981 as a cause of action against government discrimination and real estate takings in Bolden v. City of Topeka. 441 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2006). Dicta mentions approvingly my disbarment. The decision has been favorably cited by the Sixth Circuit in Coles v. Granville Case No. 05-3342 (6th Cir. May 22, 2006).
 The Kansas Supreme Court later adopted the plaintiff’s argument that the Indian Child Welfare Act applied to American Indians living off the reservation in its decision on In The Matter Of A.J.S., Kansas Supreme Court Case No. 99,130 (2009).