mcginn in english

McGinns Position towards Saul Kripke  

Introduction

In the following text it should be discussed Collin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning and Saul Kripke´s Wittgenstein. 

On Rules and Languages. McGinn should be critizised with his critic towards Kripke. For explaining both positions Wittgensteins Private Language Argument should be represented and as an exampel considered: Michael Esfelds Kripke 20 years rule-following after Kripkes Wittgenstein and Klaus Puhls argumentation of rule-following. Esfelds Essay shows us how broad the discussion of Kripke has gone ahead. I want to discuss Kripke really short because  Kripke is well quoted and discussed and with a new representation there it can´t be added anything new. For critizising McGinn the essay from Hans Sluga “Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism” should be considered and how he shows us that there are sceptical elements in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Sluga describes very good the influence from Mauthner to Ludwig Wittgenstein and he finds an equalized position. The question for sceptical elements should be discussed for starting here with McGinn and for destructing him there,

because this is the main point he critizises Kripke. Here I think that Hans Slugas argues with historical arguments of the philosophical tradition and he shows us the possibility of a sceptical position in correlation with Wittgenstein.

1. Wittgensteins Private Language Argument

1.1  The Private Language Argument

As it is known there is a lot of written about Wittgensteins Private Language Argument. Also a correlation between the private language argument and rule-following is described. 

Stewart Candlish takes in parts the debate about the private language argument in three phases: the orthodox phase which is represented  by Robert Fogelin, in a group of fame Oxford-Philosophers and into a new group around Saul Kripke.[1]

As a central point it is always stated Sentence 202 that there is a difference between following a rule and believing of following a rule:

"Therefore 'following a rule' is a practice. And believing one is following a rule is

not following a rule. And for that reason one cannot follow a rule 'privately',

because otherwise believing one was following a rule would be the same as

following a rule."

Candlish goes on with his argumentation, that this could be considered in correlation with pain.

“ It can be felt directly what pain is; you have to give senses a name and suddenly the rules for the later using of the name is ready. That this impression is a consequence of a imagination, Wittgenstein tries to do make this clear like the insight that the identity of pain comes from the common praxis of the remark, the reaction and of the use of language.”[2]

Also the feeling “E” is a part of the discussion about private language and is not an argument for  private speaking. A person can´t give the sign “E” a private meaning. Candlish puts the discussion through the sign “E” in the part of the scepticism of memory.

It´s also important to know what Wittgenstein understands under a possible private language – this is barricaded by the definition that these are words only the speaker has the correlation with private feelings - 

§ 243:

“[...] The words of this language should have a correlation to that what only the speaker could know; only his direct and private feelings. Another person can´t understand this language.”

A language spoken by Robinson Crusoe e.g., an invented language, all other possibilities are excludes by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

1.2  The rule following

1.2.1        Klaus Puhl

Wittgenstein uses a lot of remarks on rule-following and Klaus Puhl wrotes a remarkable essay about this.

 “Rule-following”. After introducing remarks Puhl says, that Wittgenstein does not give a definition of the concept of rule-following[3], he also does not show us the nature of the rule-following, he only shows us a loose correlation of remarks. Puhl shows us ex negativum the biggest mistakes like explicity, determination and completeness.

Explicity:

With explicity of a rule is meant that a speaker of a language knows a rule when he uses a language and this in an explicitly way. And this is not the case. Every speaker of a language can speak a language without explicite knowledge of the grammar rules. Alone the behaviour has to be rule-following.

Determination:

With determination is meant that a rule someone handles with  has to be determinated in advance.

Wittgenstein shows us the possibility, that while playing a game the rules might be invented. “Make up the rules as you go along”. We can imagine a play with a ball where you invent the rules while playing.

Completeness:

With completeness is meant that all aspects of rule-following behaviour has to be determinated through rules.

PI 84 and PI 83 argue against the principle of completeness. It´s not everything restricted through rules. There is no rule by a tennis-match how high a ball should be thrown. Even this rule is nowhere exemplificated, there is a rule “Throw the ball as high as possible!”

In §85 a rule is compared with a signpost. He shows the way, but it depends on you if you want to use a shortcut or if you want to got the way on your fourth. You can´t exclude all the different possibilities using the way. This is a good metapher, the signpost leaves no doubt open and he leaves open everything at the same time.

Puhl explains, that the use is important for the meaning of the term of rule-following and his normativity is significant, not the following of directly named rules. After a discussion of Kripke Puhl subsummizes, that Wittgensteins rule-follower is very different from the egozentric subject of the tractatus, he is an active and social human beeing.

For the discussion about Saul Kripke Michael Esfeld is a good example.

1.2.2        Michael Esfeld

In the essay “rule-following 20 years after Kripkes Wittgenstein”[4] Esfeld states, that the problem of rule-following moves in the center of the Philosophy of language. His essay wants to say, what the problem is. He goes in distance to an exegese of Kripke and doesn´t want to answer the question, if Kripke interprets Wittgesntein in a correct way.

Summarizing with rule-following in the meaning of Esfeld is meant:

“If a person has a term at one´s disposal, than the person has the ability to use this term in indefinite new situations. If a person has the term tree at one´s disposal, than he or she knows in indefinite new situations whenever the person is confronted with this, when it´s right to say “this is a tree” and when it´s not right, to say this. You can express this so: If a person uses a term, the person is following a rule and the rule says, what is correct and what is incorrect in using the relevant term.”[5]

Is a person using a term, Esfeld is going on, the person is following a rule and the rule says, what is correct and what is incorrect. The problem of rule-following is how we handle with terms of certain rules of meaning. This problem can be considered under two aspects, the infinity-aspect and the normativity-aspect.

The infinity-aspect says, that there are endless possibilities to formulate something, but all possibilities agree with the correct possibility.

“Every of this possibilities agrees with the rule, instantiating the ending, under the interpretation what the rule is.”[6]

The normativity-aspect asks, what determines, what´s the correct way to use a term in a new situation.

“What determines, what´s the right way to use a term in a new situation that the affected person follows a rule in that sense that she can distinguish between correct and incorrect rule-following?”[7]

For both aspects Esfeld offers 3 solutions. The direct solution, the sceptical solution and the pragmatical solution.

The direct solution means, that there are conditions of truth for sentences they ascribe persons convictions with a certain meaning that there are semantical facts independent  from the use of the term. A part of this are biological ideas, represented also by McGinn.

Esfeld argues against the direct solution that the meaning of our convictions are finer than their relationship to the world. It´s also stated that biological functions are no norms.

“If a special habit helps to survive and to reproduct a special organism, it can´t be concluded the norm that it is correct for the organism to have the behaviour in that manner. Even if biological functions are in a certain way normativ from the standpoint of evolution, the question is still requested, how a thinking beeing could find a difference between correct and incorrect rule-following.”[8]

The sceptical solution contains sceptical elements. While the direct solution suggests conditions of truth, the sceptical solution says, that there are only conditions of maintaining.

“That a person has convictions with a certain meaning is exactly than claimable, if a person takes part in a social and a speaking praxis, treated from other persons, that the person has convictions with the concernd type."[9]

The sceptical solution doesn´t allow the conclusion from conditions of claiming to conditions of truth, because for a society there isn´t such a criterion. Through the use it is said what the correct use is.

The pragmatical solution is something between those both and accepts in contrast to the sceptical solution conditions of truth.

The three solutions are better understandable in combination with the infinity and

the normativity aspect:

- the direct solution recurs directly onto the infinity-aspect. The infinite

possibilities are so limited that the certainity of meaning of our convictions can be

reconstructed.

- the sceptial solution denies this. Normativity recurs exclusively to accordance

between individuum and society.

- a pragmatically solution starts with the normativity-aspect. Central is the aspect

of sanctions. Confirmation or sanctions control the right use.

2.      Wittgenstein as a skeptian?

2.1  Skepticism

Skepticism comes from the critic of the achievment of human cognition. Considering it in a historical way there is Sextus Empiricus as the most important representativ of the antic scepsis. Descartes, a philosopher of the earliest modern time, well known for his doubts is e.g. no skeptician, because he wants to overcome the scepsis. In the actual discussion is especially Gettier with his Gettier-problems well-known.

2.2  Wittgenstein as a Pyrrhonian Skepticist

An important essay about scepticism, Pyrrhonian Scepticism, is written by Hans Sluga, where he asks, whether Wittgenstein was a skeptician and how was his relationship towards Mauthner.

Skepticism, subsummed Sluga at the beginning of his essay, shows the limits and the possibilities of human knowledge. To speak with Robert Fogelin there are two ways of theoretical skepticism. One is skeptical about philosophical theorizing, the other shows his interest towards philosophical parts like logic, ethic and metaphysic. He also remembers philosophers using restrictiv arguments and he describes those as pyrrhonian skepticists. In that direction he considers Ludwig Wittgenstein either, because he writes in a skeptical tone of voice. Wittgenstein shows us that metaphysical sentences are nonsense. Also the discussion about rule-following and the private language is characterized as skeptical.

„But he also writes much of the time in a strikingly sceptical tone of voice. His tractatus proposes, for instance, to show us, that metaphysical claims are strictly senseless. And what are we to say to his “sceptical” arguments against the possibility of an essentially private language? Do these not amount to a philosophical skepticism concerning necessity and private experience.”[10]

As further indices for skeptical thoughts the tractatus should be considered, because Wittgensteins says, philosophical problems come from missunderstandings of the logic of language. In that way you can read the Philosophical Investigations, § 128, that thesis of the philosophy shouldn´t be discussed, because all do agree with them. So far Sluga´s presentation of Fogelin.

Wittgenstein as a Pyrrhonian skeptician is caused on Fritz Mauthner and the lecture of the book Contributions to a critique of language. In this book Mauthner describes his engagement towards the Pyrrhonian Skeptizism.

Mauthner was influenced by Schopenhauer and Mach and he thought, that also Schopenhauer was a Pyrrhonian Skeptician. Schopenhauers pessimism was a skepticism, which is above the philosophy. Mach was reading Schopenhauer and he was Mauthners Professor in Prague and he has an enormous influence on Mauthner. Mach had the experience, that Mauthner had the same goals like him, to free the science from metaphysical elements.

If you read the tractatus, Wittgenstein starts, that all Philosophy should be a critic of language, but not in the sense of Mauthner. Sluga explains, that only people who have no practice in interpretation see an opponent of Wittgenstein. Someone who is reading carefully, knows that Wittgenstein thinks in advance the rounde of the people who influenced him: Frege, Russel, Moore, Hertz – Philosophers he praises and philosophers he is also critizising. Hans Sluga shows us some examples. So you can´t generalise this critic on Mauthner – Mauthners shadow hangs over Wittgensteins formulations. E.g. the sentences 4.002 or 5.5563. Mach took metaphers from Sextus Empiricus, the most important exponent of the Pyrrhonian Skepsis and those sentences where taken from Mach by Mauthner and Wittgenstein took them again from Mauthner.

„If I want to rise up in the critique of language, which is the most important business of thinking mankind, I must destroy language step by step behind me, and within me, I must break the rungs of the ladder as I step on them.” (1.1)

Sluga sees differences between Mauthner and Wittgenstein, but he holds on, that one argument speaks for the skeptian thesis, that Philosophy is a critic of language. Further arguments wheather Wittgenstein and Mauthner are close, might be found if Mauthner is read in correlation to the Philosophical investigations. You can find similar opinions toward language by Wittgenstein and Mauthner. For Mauthner language is little a representation and more a way of communication. In that way language exists as a social reality. Also formulations of Mauthner, that a rule is nothing but a term of our use of language are convictions of Wittgenstein from the Philosophical Investigation.

Sluga claims, considering the relationship between Mauthner and Wittgenstein critically, Mauthner is more a pyrrhonian skeptician while Wittgenstein only took elements of this skepsis.

At the end of his essay Sluga discusses the question, not the Wittgenstein of the tractatus, as Fogelin claims, but the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations could be considered as pyrrhonian skeptician. The Wittgenstein of the tractatus has, like Fogelin thinks, cartesian elements. Cora Diamond also sees two Wittgensteins, but for her the first Wittgenstein is a pyrrhonian Wittgenstein. Sluga by himself sees skeptical elements at the whole Wittgenstein – to part him in a pyrrhonian skeptician or not has didactical and restrictiv elements:

„We are forced to conclud at this point that there are possibly as many distinct kinds of skepticism as there are creative skeptical thinkers, and that the attempt to tabulate the forms of skeptical thoughts in advance and to divide them neatly into philosophical and Pyrrhonian can have only limited and didactic function.”[11]

1. Saul Kripkes Position

Saul Kripke classifies §201 as a central motiv of the Philosophical Investigations. “Our paradox was this: a rule cannot determine any course of action because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule” This can be considered as an important part of the philosophical skeptizism.

The problem should be brought out with a mathematical example, even the skeptical problem is considerable  by every reasonable use of language. The example is well known, well discussed and presented – here the problem again in a few sentences.

Kripke shows us an excentric skeptician, who confuses the use of language of addition and the immediatly explained quaddition – or considering it skeptical. Normally you say 68 plus 57 are 125, but Kripke or the skeptician defines the addition in another way and up to 57 is the answer 5.

Addition: 68 + 57 = 125

Quadition: 68 * 57 = 54 as the definition declaims: x * y = 5, x, y > 57

The use of language, as the skeptician follows, is now so, that with the new definition I interpret my earlier use of language wrong. He might use LSD or beeing fury, what causes to missunderstand the previous use.

You should understand this in that way, that you have the imagination, that the quaddition is what you mean, because LSD or the fury has changed previous use of language.

There are also further examples of previous and actual use of language, e.g. “Green”. If I imagine “green”, I have something in my mind, how I use this word. But maybe I ment with “Green” in the past really “Glau”.

The sceptician described here by Kripke is troough and through skeptical. Instructions who force or justifie “5” or “125” as answers are dubious. He presents a theory, which changes the use of language. The term “plus” or “gruen” or “Tisch” used in the past was in reality “quus” (or “glau” or “Tishul”). Earlier ways of using the language should be dubious, to solve the problem. Also behaviouristical restrictions are not accepted by the skeptician. It´s also not a Question of theorie of recognition, because the recognition is not enough for the decision if someone means “glau” or “blau”.

In my opinion is this a contribition for the sketicism of meaning from Kripkes side.

Kripke finds further skeptical Arguments from Wittgenstein at the issue of reading. So it´s a difference if you read or if you just believe reading and he also recurs also on the sentence 202 of the Philosophical Investigations:

“In general there is no special moment when something happens; after the decision of the teacher the scholar can “read”, if he has passed an according reading-exam. Maybe there is a special moment where the scholar has the feeling: “I´m reading now!” But the appearance  of such an experience is neither an necessary nor a sufficient condition for the decision of the teacher, that the scholar can read.”[12]

Find something near it in Paragraph 156 of the Philosophical Investigations:

“Now compare a beginner with this reader. The beginner reads the words by laboriously spelling them out. – Some words, however, he guesses from the context, or perhaps he already partly knows the passage by heart. Then his teacher says that he is not really reading the words (and certain cases that he is only pretending to read them.)”[13]

1. Mc Ginns critic on Kripke

If you read McGinn you remember on the one side Kripke, because Kripke is quoted by McGinn page after page. On the other side the good reader recognizes, that also Michael Esfeld is close to the text in neutral way, because Esfeld states, that he isn´t interested if Kripke depict Wittgenstein right or wrong. The critic of McGinn on Kripke is, that what he is writing has no correlation with Ludwig Wittegnstein. Wittgenstein has also no skeptical position and a further argument of McGinn is that Kripke finds, that with sentence 202 the argumentation of Wittgenstein is complete, while the following sentences say a lot about the private language.

So McGinn states, that Kripke shows us a problem which has not as much correlation towards Wittgenstein as Kripke thinks.

„For what Kripke has done is to produce an impressive and challenging argument which bears little affinity with Wittgenstein´s own problems and claims: in an important sense Kripke and the real Wittgenstein are not even dealing with the same issues. (they have a different “problematic”).”[14]

McGinn follows, that there is not only the sentence 202, there is also a sentence 201 and in sentence 201 is a misunderstanding described. With this misunderstanding McGinn wants to show us, that Kripke is ad absurdum wrong.

First Wittgenstein makes clear, that the paradox arises from a misunderstanding and second there is special relation between rule-following and interpretation.

„First, Wittgenstein makes clear immediatly that the stated paradox arises from a „misunderstanding“, i.e. a false presupposition; so he cannot really be endorsing the paradox, as Hume embraces his own sceptical claims about causation. Second, when we ask what the misunderstanding is we are told that it is the mistake of assuming that grasping a rule is placing an interpretation upon a sign, i.e. associating it with another sign – an assumption which Wittgenstein thinks we are by no means compelled to make.”[15]

I think that McGinn is wrong here and he can´t really destruct Kripke. Wittgenstein says in ohter words in 201 what he brings to an point in sentence 202. Following a rule and interpreting is described by Wittgenstein in a antimetaphysical position as “replaceing”. This comes to a point in sentence 202, that believing to follow a rule is not the same as following a rule.

Further McGinn thinks, that Kripkes error is considerable at the example of “reading”. Kripke thinks, that the skeptical paradoxon is also found in the diskussion about reading. If you consider the text, you can read that Wittgenstein  only describes what the reader is doing, but he doesn´t shows us a paradoxon. McGinn confirms his position at only one part of the philosophical investigation.

„Kripke´s misinterpretation comes out clearly in his remarks about Wittgenstein´s treatment of “reading”. Wittgenstein to be propounding his paradox for reading – reading is not an individualistic fact but is to be understood in terms of social assertibility conditions. But when we consult the text we find that what Wittgenstein is opposing is a particular family of views about the sort of fact reading is – that it consists in an inner process: conscious, queer, or physical – and advising us to look to what the reader does: (...)”[16]

I would ask McGinn whether whether he is taking it too easy with the text and if Kripke might be the better reader of the Philosophical Investigations. McGinn stays at the position, that the paradox is not the central theme of the Philosophical Investigations.

McGinn follows his position in that way, that he thinks, that Wittgenstein is an epistemological skeptician. I showed above, that Wittgenstein might be a skeptician:

„It would also be wrong to interpret Wittgenstein as an epistemological sceptic. As I emphasised in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein´s denial that our use of words is founded on reasons is not intended sceptically: the traditional sceptic makes an inappropriate and impossible demand on our epistemic concepts, and the right response to him is to question the need for what he says there isn´t.”[17]

McGinns Position is at least that Wittgensteins argumentation is not complete with sentence 202, here should be more work of argumentation.There he shows himself as skeptician in opposition towards the private language argument or as a friend of a private language.

„The divergence between Kripke´s interpretation and mine shows up sharply in our different views of the way 202 relates to the later sections dealing (explicitly) with private language (243f)“[18]

as it follows:

“202 sets the stage for that argument without actually completing it; more argumentative work has to be done befor the possibility of a private language can bei excluded.”[19]

For me there are three standpoints against McGinn. First he quotes Kripke page after page and shows us then his own opinion, but his book is full of the text of Kripke. He repeats the opposite nearby as his text. Second there are positions considering Wittegnstein as a skeptician and my last argument against McGinn is that he debates a private language and he shows us with this that he is far away from Wittgenstein and not Kripke.

End

Like it is said at the end in this work there is critizised Collin McGinn. So the approach of McGinn is not very genious. Kripke is described detailed for challenge him with a few arguments. Kripke would discuss too less with Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein won´t develope a skeptical argument. In addition it won´t be possible to confirm Wittgensteins argumentation at sentence 202, you have to consider the other sentences of the Philosophical Investigations either. I tried to call in question this argumentation. I demonstrated the private language argument, the rule following and Kripke once again. I demonstrated Wittgenstein in correlation with Mauthners skeptical position and I attacked with this McGinns position, who won´t understand Kripkes genious position. At least Wittgenstein is fame for his argumentation that there is no private language. If you claim the opposite you need a similar genious background like Kripke, but this is not shown by McGinn.

Written and translated by Bettina Mueller 2009

copyright by Bettina Mueller 2009

Literatur:

Boghossian, Paul A. In: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 83-92

Cade Hetherington, Stephen Kripke and McGinn On Wittgensteinian Rule-Following

Candlish, Stewart, Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargumentation, S. 144, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Klassiker auslegen, Eike v. Savigny, Berlin 1998

Esfeld, Michael: Regelfolgen 20 Jahre nach Kripkes Wittgenstein, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57,  2003

Kripke, Saul, Wittgenstein. Über Regeln und Privatsprache, Frankfurt 2006

McGinn, Colin, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1, London 1984

Puhl, Klaus, Regelfolgen in: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Klassiker auslegen, Eike v. Savigny, Berlin 1998

Sluga, Hans, Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism in: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Oxford Press 2004

Wittgenstein, Ludwig Werkausgabe Bd 1, S. 319 Frankfurt 1984

[1] Candlish, Stewart, Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargumentation, S. 144, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Klassiker auslegen, Eike v. Savigny, Berlin 1998

[2] Candlish, Stewart, S. 146

[3] Puhl, Klaus, Regelfolgen in: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Klassiker auslegen, Eike v. Savigny, Berlin 1998

[4] Esfeld, Michael: Regelfolgen 20 Jahre nach Kripkes Wittgenstein, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57,  2003 S. 128 – 138

[5] Esfeld, Michael: Regelfolgen 20 Jahre nach Kripkes Wittgenstein, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57,  2003, S. 128f

[6] Esfeld, Michael: Regelfolgen 20 Jahre nach Kripkes Wittgenstein, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57,  2003, S. 128 ff

[7] Esfeld, Michael: Regelfolgen 20 Jahre nach Kripkes Wittgenstein, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57,  2003, S. 128 ff

[8] Esfeld, Michael: Regelfolgen 20 Jahre nach Kripkes Wittgenstein, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57,  2003, S. 128 ff

[9] Esfeld, Michael: Regelfolgen 20 Jahre nach Kripkes Wittgenstein, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 57,  2003, S. 128 ff

[10] Sluga, Hans, Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism in: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Oxford Press 2004, S. 100

[11] Sluga, Hans, Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism in: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Oxford Press 2004, S. 115

[12] Kripke, Saul, Wittgenstein. Über Regeln und Privatsprache, Frankfurt 2006, S. 62/63

[13] Wittgenstein, Ludwig Werkausgabe Bd 1, S. 319 Frankfurt 1984

[14] McGinn, Colin, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1, London 1984, S. 60

[15] McGinn, Colin, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1, London 1984, S. 68

[16] McGinn, Colin, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1, London 1984, S. 69

[17] McGinn, Colin, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1, London 1984, S. 72

[18] McGinn, Colin, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1, London 1984, S. 91

[19] McGinn, Colin, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Aristotelian Society Series Volume 1, London 1984, S. 92