Research
Working papers
Finalist at ITAX PhD Student Award 2018
Abstract: I study how individuals intertemporally adjust their labor supply during a year in which labor income was tax-free (a tax holiday). In a difference-in-difference setting, exploiting a progressive tax scheme, I estimate an intensive margin elasticity of 0.06. There is no evidence of an extensive margin response. It is possible that individuals face stronger frictions in adjusting their labor supply during the tax holiday than in the long run, Therefore, I exploit an additional tax reform, combined with the tax holiday, to show that the data is consistent with a tax holiday elasticity of 0.05 and a structural intertemporal elasticity of 0.4.
(with Per Engström and Katarina Nordblom)
Abstract: A fundamental tenet of economics is that agents respond to incentives. When filing their tax returns, Swedish taxpayers get information about whether they can expect a tax refund or having taxes due and about whether they are below or above a salient tax kink. This information may affect behavior depending on taxpayer motives. The former would induce loss averse taxpayers to claim deductions to a higher degree if having taxes due than if expecting a refund, while the latter would make the rational taxpayer more likely to claim deductions when facing the higher marginal tax rate. Access to register data on the universe of Swedish taxpayers for eight years allows for a clear-cut analysis using an RKD framework. We find strong causal effects of taxes due on the probability of claiming deductions, while the responses to the standard monetary incentives are insignificant. We find similar results for both inexperienced (young) and experienced (old) taxpayers. Hence, for both types of taxpayers, loss aversion is much more decisive than neoclassical incentives.
Published articles
(with Per Engström, Eskil Forsell and Johannes Hagen), International Tax and Public Finance, 2019
Abstract: Using a randomized field experiment in the Swedish pension system, we investigate whether receiving an information letter affects the take-up rate of the housing allowance for pensioners. We also investigate whether the framing of the information letter affects take-up. The results show that simple information letters had a dramatic effect on the application rate and subsequent take-up rate: the baseline application rate in the targeted control population was only 1.4 percent while the corresponding rates in the different treatment groups were between 9.9 and 12.1 percent. The letter that addressed common misconceptions about the benefit caused significantly higher submission and acceptance rates. The letters had a substantial economic effect on the applicants. We estimate that the applicants, induced by the treatment, increased their monthly incomes by around 10 percent.
(with Alex Voorhoeve and Brian Wallace), Economics and Philosophy, 2019
Abstract: When people must either save a greater number of people from a smaller harm or a smaller number from a greater harm, do their choices reflect a reasonable moral outlook? We pursue this question with the help of an experiment. In our experiment, two-fifths of subjects employ a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm prevented, this heuristic mandates saving the greater number. In our experiment, this leads to choices that are inconsistent with all standard theories of justice. We argue that this demonstrates the untrustworthiness of distributive judgments in cases that elicit similarity-based choice.
(with Alex Voorhoeve, Ken Binmore and Lisa Stewart), Theory and Decision, 2016
Abstract: We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers.