Publications

You can download my full CV here.  Here are my favorites. 

• The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism (Oxford University Press, 2024).  

• "From Doxastic Blame to Doxastic Shame," Ergo (forthcoming).  

• "Understanding and Testimony," in J. Lackey and A. McGlynn (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

• "Testimony, Understanding, and Art Criticism," in A. King (ed.), Philosophy and Art: New Essays at the Intersection (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

• "Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism?" (with Krista Lawlor), in B. Roeber, M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, third edition (Blackwell, 2024), pp. 305-28.   

• "Desire and Goodness," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2022), pp. 160-80. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12812

• "Desire that Amounts to Knowledge," Philosophical Quarterly 71(1) (2021), pp. 56-73. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa022

• "Fitting Inconsistency and Reasonable Irresolution" (with Simon D. Feldman),  in D.E. Gatzia and B. Brogaard (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds (Routledge, 2021), pp. 131-46.  

• "Critical Injustice," American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2) (2020), pp. 129-44.  https://www.jstor.org/stable/48570843 

• "The Guise of the Good and the Problem of Partiality," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49(6) (2019), pp. 851-72. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1433794

• "Intellectual Pride," in J.A. Carter and E.C. Gordon (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Pride (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), pp. 79-98.

• "Towards Social Accounts of Testimonial Asymmetries," Noûs 51(1) (2017), pp. 49-73.  https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12098 

• "The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1) (2016), pp. 131-51.  https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1049625 

• A Critical Introduction to Skepticism (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).

  • An erratum for the book.

  • Reviewed: Teaching Philosophy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

• A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief (Oxford University Press, 2013).

  • Reviewed: Dialogue, Mind, Philosophical Review

• "What's Bad about Bad Faith?" (with Simon D. Feldman), European Journal of Philosophy 21(1) (2013), pp. 50-73.  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00434.x 

• "Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility," Episteme 9(3) (2012), pp. 205-23.  https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.11 

• "The Myth of Factive Verbs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80(3) (2010), pp. 497-522.  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00338.x 

• "Knowledge and Conversation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(3) (2009), pp. 591-620.  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00257.x 

• “How to Defend Response Moralism,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 49(3) (2009), pp. 241-55.  https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp020