Contact Information:

Email:   ahumu [-at-] yahoo.com 


Currently, I'm a senior lecturer at Holon Institute of Technology (HIT) in Israel.

Previously, I was a post-doc fellow at the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL), Caltech. 

Research Interests: Theoretical and Experimental study of algorithms and pricing in strategic environments, especially game-theoretical problems arising in the design of resource allocation scenarios such as auctions with multiple goods and cloud computing.

Keywords: Electronic Commerce, Cloud Computing, Online Advertising, Incentives, Fairness, Algorithmic Game Theory, Scheduling, Pricing, Optimization, Approximation Algorithms, Performance Evaluation,  Simulations, Auctions, Budgets

More information: CV | Research Statement

Links:  dblp | google.scholar


Academic Service:

Conference Program Committees: EC-11, EC-14, EC-15, WINE-15


Community Service:

2016-17-18


Journal Papers:

Selling Mechanisms for a Financially Constrained Buyer

Juan Carlos Carbajal and Ahuva Mu'alem

Games and Economic Behavior(GEB). vol 124, pp 386-405, 2020.

 

Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira.

Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 110, pp 174-193, 2018.

 

Fair by Design: Multidimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms,

Ahuva Mu'alem

Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 88, pp 29-46, 2014.


Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts' Theorem, (slides)

Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.

Social Choice and Welfare, vol 32, pp 407-423, 2009.


Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions. (ps), (slides), (poster). Full version: pdf.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan.

Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), vol 64, pp 612-631, 2008.


Weak Monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation.

S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen. Some supporting material.

Econometrica, vol. 74(4), pp. 1109-1132, July 2006.


On the Definition of "On-line" in Job Scheduling Problems.

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.

SIGACT News 36(1), pp. 122-131, March 2005.


Utilization, Predictability, Workloads, and User Runtime Estimates in Scheduling the IBM SP2 with Backfilling (ps).

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.

IEEE Trans. Parallel & Distributed Syst. 12(6), pp. 529-543, Jun 2001.



Conference Papers:

Mind the Revenue Gap: On the Performance of Approximation Mechanisms under Budget Constraint, 

Ahuva Mu'alem  and Juan Carlos Carbajal.

To appear in 17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2024) 

See also: Working paper


Ginseng: Market-Driven Memory Allocation, 

Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda, Eyal Posener, Muli Ben-Yehuda, Assaf Schuster, and Ahuva Mu'alem.

In VEE-14


Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets, 

Ahuva Mu'alem.

In SAGT-14


The Effects of Untruthful Bids on User Utilities and Stability in Computing Markets (pdf).

Sergei Shudler, Lior Amar, Amnon Barak, and Ahuva Mu'alem.

In CCGRID-10


Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders.

David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem and Mahyar Salek.

A slightly more detailed older version can be found here

In WINE-09


On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms.

Ahuva Mu'alem.

In ADT-09


On the Importance of Migration for Fairness in Online Grid Markets.

Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser.

A short version appeared in AAMAS-08

In GRID-08


The Power of Preemption in Economic Online Markets.

Lior Amar, Ahuva Mu'alem and Jochen Stoesser. In GECON-08, LNCS 5206


Mechanism Design Over Discrete Domains.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In EC-08. (slides).

Also presented at the third world congress of the game theory society, GAMES-08


Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapira. In Soda-07


On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially Informed Environments,

(slides). Ahuva Mu'alem. In EC-05


Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions.

Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. ("monotonicity" slides) ("full" slides). In FOCS-03


Bicriteria Scheduling for Parallel Jobs. (slides).

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem. In MISTA-03


Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions. (slides), (poster). Full version: pdf.

Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan. In AAAI-02


Utilization and predictability in scheduling the IBM SP2 with backfilling.

Dror G. Feitelson and Ahuva Mu'alem.

In 12th Intl. Parallel Processing Symp., pp. 542-546, Apr 1998


Working and Unpublished Paper(s):

A Note on Testing Truthfulness, 2005.

Ahuva Mu'alem.


PhD  Thesis:

Incentives and Computation: Combinatorial Auctions and Networks (pdf). 


Recent Teaching: