Mechanism Design and Social Choice: Auctions in Context
The past few decades have witnessed a remarkable expansion of auctions activities. From the sales of mobile phone licenses and industrial goods, to the privatization of state-owned assets, auction mechanisms have been employed to enhance revenue and efficiency in otherwise imperfectly competitive markets.
In this course the students will have the opportunity to enrich and sharpen their knowledge of various widely-applied auction policies. Depending on the time and progress, the course will cover the theory and applications surrounding the three following major topics:
1. Private value auctions
2. Auctions with interdependent valuations
3. Multiunit auctions
After each topic there will be a problem-based review session. We will use “Auction Theory” by Vijay Krishna as the required textbook. The grade for this course will be solely determined by a written final exam.
The course material, including a weekly course plan can be found at ecampus.