Adrien Henri Vigier
Email: adrien dot vigier at nottingham dot ac dot uk
Office: Room B48, School of Economics, University of Nottingham
One part of my current work lies at the intersection of Mechanism Design and Information Design, and the other part in Finance. In the past, my research touched upon Network Security, Social Learning, and (a long time ago) Particle Physics.
Recent publications:
Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information, with J. Bizzotto and J. Rudiger;
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021
Summary: A principal has a given amount of time to persuade an agent to do what she would like her to do. How does she go about doing this?
Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry, with J. Bizzotto;
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021
Summary: When is it best to compensate rating agencies upfront, that is, irrespective of the ratings assigned, and when is a contingent payment scheme optimal?
Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets?, with J. Rudiger;
American Economic Review, 2020
Summary: Suppose that, in a dealer market, market makers and speculators can all acquire information at the same cost. Who then acquires information?
Testing, Disclosure and Approval, with J. Bizzotto and J. Rudiger;
Journal of Economic Theory, 2020
Summary: Certifiers base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire firsthand, by way of tests or otherwise. How do these sources of information impact one another?
Working papers:
School-Based Statistical Discrimination, with J. Bizzotto
Abstract: We study statistical discrimination based on the school which an individual attended. Employers face uncertainty regarding an individual's productive value. Knowing which school an individual went to is useful for two reasons: firstly, average student ability may differ across schools; secondly, different schools may provide different incentives to exert effort. We examine the optimal way of grouping students in the face of school-based statistical discrimination. We argue that an optimal school system exhibits coarse stratification with respect to ability, and more lenient grading at the top-tier schools than at the bottom-tier schools. Our paper contributes to the ongoing policy debate on school tracking.
The Limits of Commitment, with J. Bizzotto, and T. Hinnosaar
Abstract: We study partial commitment in leader-follower games. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by the payoffs she obtains under the full and no-commitment benchmarks. We apply our results to study new design problems.
Communication via Third Parties, with J. Bizzotto and E. Perez-Richet
Abstract: A principal designs an information structure and chooses transfers to an agent that are contingent on the action of a receiver. The principal faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, designing an information structure maximizing non-monetary payoffs, and on the other hand, minimizing the information rent that must be conceded to the agent in order to implement the information structure which the principal designed. We examine how this trade-off shapes communication. Our model can be applied to study the relationship between, e.g.: political organizations and the public relations companies that campaign on their behalf, firms and the companies marketing their products, consultancies and the analysts they employ.
Work in progress:
Information Acquisition in OTC Markets, with J. Rudiger
Competing for Talent, with Y. Ishii and A. Oery
Low Resolution Economics, with J. Bizzotto and T. Hinnosaar