Adrien Henri Vigier
Email: adrien dot vigier at nottingham dot ac dot uk
Office: Room B48, School of Economics, University of Nottingham
One part of my current work lies at the intersection of Mechanism Design and Information Design, and the other part in Finance. In the past, my research touched upon Network Security, Social Learning, and (a long time ago) Particle Physics.
Working papers:
Market Segmentation, Information Sale, and Information Foreclosure, with S. Terstiege and E. Tarantino
Abstract: We study the sale of consumer data allowing firms to engage in discriminatory pricing. When information is sold by an independent data intermediary, the resulting consumer surplus is as if all firms were fully informed. We then consider the case in which the seller of information also competes in the goods market and show that the seller of information may choose not to sell full information to its rivals; this strategic behavior ends up lowering consumer surplus. Lastly, we show that the acquisition of a firm by an independent data intermediary always reduces consumer surplus.
Market Segmentation and Product Steering, with S. Terstiege
Abstract: A monopolistic seller possesses an inventory containing distinct products, each consumer wishes to buy a single product, and the seller can steer consumers' choices. We fully characterize the producer-consumer surplus pairs induced by market segmentation as product variety becomes large. We uncover a trade-off between consumer surplus and social welfare, prove the redundancy of price discrimination, and analyze the welfare implications of privacy. We apply our results to study market segmentation arising from the sale of consumer data by data intermediaries.
The Limits of Limited Commitment, with J. Bizzotto and T. Hinnosaar
Abstract: We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determine her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. However, under more general commitment structures the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her minimum Cournot payoff. We apply our results to study information design problems in leader-follower games where a mediator communicates information about the leader's action to the follower.
Communication via Third Parties, with J. Bizzotto and E. Perez-Richet
Abstract: A principal designs an information structure and chooses transfers to an agent that are contingent on the action of a receiver. The principal faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, designing an information structure maximizing non-monetary payoffs, and on the other hand, minimizing the information rent that must be conceded to the agent in order to implement the information structure which the principal designed. We examine how this trade-off shapes communication. Our model can be applied to study the relationship between, e.g.: political organizations and the public relations companies that campaign on their behalf, firms and the companies marketing their products, consultancies and the analysts they employ.
Work in progress:
Information Acquisition in OTC Markets, with J. Rudiger
Competing for Talent, with Y. Ishii and A. Oery
Low Resolution Economics, with J. Bizzotto and T. Hinnosaar