Adrien Henri Vigier

Email: adrien dot vigier at nottingham dot ac dot uk

Office: Room B48, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

One part of my current work lies at the intersection of Mechanism Design and Information Design, and the other part in Finance. In the past, my research touched upon Network Security, Social Learning, and (a long time ago) Particle Physics.

Recent publications:

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021

Summary: A principal has a given amount of time to persuade an agent to do what she would like her to do. How does she go about doing this?

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021

Summary: When is it best to compensate rating agencies upfront, that is, irrespective of the ratings assigned, and when is a contingent payment scheme optimal?

American Economic Review, 2020

Summary: Suppose that, in a dealer market, market makers and speculators can all acquire information at the same cost. Who then acquires information?

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020

Summary: Certifiers base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire firsthand, by way of tests or otherwise. How do these sources of information impact one another?

Working papers:

School-Based Statistical Discrimination, with J. Bizzotto

Abstract: We study statistical discrimination based on the school which an individual attended. Employers face uncertainty regarding an individual's productive value. Knowing which school an individual went to is useful for two reasons: firstly, average student ability may differ across schools; secondly, different schools may provide different incentives to exert effort. We examine the optimal way of grouping students in the face of school-based statistical discrimination. We argue that an optimal school system exhibits coarse stratification with respect to ability, and more lenient grading at the top-tier schools than at the bottom-tier schools. Our paper contributes to the ongoing policy debate on school tracking.

The Limits of Commitment, with J. Bizzotto, and T. Hinnosaar

Abstract: We study partial commitment in leader-follower games. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by the payoffs she obtains under the full and no-commitment benchmarks. We apply our results to study new design problems.

Communication via Third Parties, with J. Bizzotto and E. Perez-Richet

Abstract: A principal designs an information structure and chooses transfers to an agent that are contingent on the action of a receiver. The principal faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, designing an information structure maximizing non-monetary payoffs, and on the other hand, minimizing the information rent that must be conceded to the agent in order to implement the information structure which the principal designed. We examine how this trade-off shapes communication. Our model can be applied to study the relationship between, e.g.: political organizations and the public relations companies that campaign on their behalf, firms and the companies marketing their products, consultancies and the analysts they employ.

Work in progress:

Information Acquisition in OTC Markets, with J. Rudiger

Competing for Talent, with Y. Ishii and A. Oery

Low Resolution Economics, with J. Bizzotto and T. Hinnosaar