Invisible Journeys: North Korean Refugees and the Politics of Non-Refoulement

Invisible Journeys: North Korean Refugees and the Politics of Non-Refoulement

Sungjin Lim

25-2 Yonsei PSCORE

North Korea’s tightly closed borders and repressive regime have prompted tens of thousands of its citizens to undertake perilous escapes over the past few decades. More than 34,000 North Koreans – the majority of them women – have fled to South Korea since the two Koreas were divided. These “invisible journeys” are often conducted in secret, through dangerous terrain and foreign territories, as escapees evade capture. For those who manage to flee the Hermit Kingdom, a new battle begins: securing refuge in a world of complex politics, where the principle of non-refoulement is meant to shield them from being sent back into harm’s way. This article examines why North Koreans flee, the hazards they face in flight, and the legal and ethical dimensions of non-refoulement in the context of North Korean refugees.

From Famine to Freedom: Why North Koreans Flee

North Koreans leave their country for a mix of intertwined reasons. Many are driven by hunger and economic desperation – a legacy of the devastating famine in the 1990s – while others seek basic freedoms denied under Kim Jong Un’s authoritarian state. In North Korea, virtually all aspects of life are controlled by the regime; there is no freedom of speech, religion, movement, or access to outside information. Ordinary citizens face chronic food shortages, political oppression, and the constant threat of punishment for perceived disloyalty. Life can be especially harsh for those of “wrong” songbun (social caste), who are denied opportunities and often subjected to forced labor or internment in prison camps. Under these conditions, escaping to find food, safety, or liberty becomes, for some, the only hope.

Crucially, leaving North Korea without state permission is itself considered a serious crime. The regime views escapees as traitors. In 2010, North Korea’s Ministry of People’s Security even decreed that defection is an act of “treachery against the nation,” punishable by death. In practice, North Koreans caught or sent back after fleeing are at grave risk of imprisonment in brutal labor camps, torture, sexual violence, or execution. In other words, even if a person’s initial reasons for flight were economic, the very act of escape transforms their situation into a political one – they become marked as enemies of the state. As one legal analysis notes, “once North Korean citizens flee their homeland, the Kim regime assumes they are political opponents, and they thus face the prospect of politically motivated punishment, abuse, and even torture upon repatriation.” For this reason, North Korean defectors are broadly recognized as refugees sur place – people who may not have been formally recognized as refugees when they left, but who become refugees because returning would expose them to persecution.

Invisible Routes and Hidden Dangers

Geography dictates that most North Korean escapees cross first into China, which shares a lengthy border with the North. The crossing itself can be deadly: many defectors traverse the frigid Tumen or Yalu Rivers, or bribery is required to slip past border guards. Once in China, however, the journey is far from over. North Koreans have no legal status in China – Beijing considers them illegal migrants – so they must live in hiding. They move from safehouse to safehouse or live under assumed identities, constantly fearing detection. This underground existence can stretch on for years. According to research, many North Korean women end up trafficked in China, sold into forced marriages or prostitution rings in rural areas due to their vulnerable status. Children born to North Korean mothers in China receive no citizenship rights either, compounding the precariousness of these families’ lives.

For those who evade the immediate risk of being handed back to North Korea, life in hiding is extremely harsh. They are unable to seek legal employment, education, or medical care without risking exposure. Exploitative brokers often prey on these refugees, demanding high fees to smuggle them to a third country. From northeastern China, escapees may embark on a long clandestine trek through countries like Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, or Mongolia, seeking a way to reach safety (most aim for South Korea, which will accept North Koreans as legal citizens). Every step of the way, North Koreans face the danger of refoulement – being captured by authorities and forcibly returned to North Korea. If caught by Chinese police, they are placed in detention centers and, in many cases, eventually loaded onto trucks and trains back across the border. These journeys are “invisible” because they occur in the shadows: quietly coordinated by underground networks, unnoticed by the outside world, and often unacknowledged officially by the countries involved.

Non-Refoulement: A Legal Lifeline Under Threat

International law provides a critical safeguard intended to protect people like North Korean escapees: the principle of non-refoulement. Enshrined in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (Article 33) and its 1967 Protocol – as well as in the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture – non-refoulement forbids states from expelling or returning any person to a territory where they face a real risk of persecution, torture, or other serious harm. This principle is absolute when it comes to torture: “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’)… a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,” declares Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. Crucially, China is a state party to both the Refugee Convention (and Protocol) and the Torture Convention, which means it is legally obligated to uphold non-refoulement. Moreover, non-refoulement is widely regarded as a norm of customary international law binding on all states – some experts even consider it a jus cogens (peremptory) norm from which no derogation is permitted.

In theory, then, North Koreans who manage to escape their country should be protected from forcible return. Once beyond North Korea’s borders, these individuals meet the criteria of refugees: they have a well-founded fear of persecution “for reasons of… political opinion” (among other grounds) if returned. Even those who fled primarily due to hunger or economic distress are seen as political refugees in the eyes of international law, because Pyongyang criminalizes their departure and is likely to punish them severely on that basis. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea has documented that forcibly returned North Koreans are systematically subjected to abuses amounting to crimes against humanity – including torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and arbitrary imprisonment. Knowing this, the international community has repeatedly emphasized that no country should repatriate North Korean escapees. In September 2025, for example, the UN Human Rights Office urged all states to “respect the principle of non-refoulement [not returning someone to a place they will be mistreated] and… refrain from carrying out forcible repatriations in light of the real risk of serious human rights violations” faced by North Koreans sent back home.

Despite these clear legal standards, the protection of non-refoulement is under serious threat in practice. The “politics” of non-refoulement – particularly in the case of North Korean refugees – means that international law often collides with geopolitical calculations.

China’s Policy: Politics Over Principle

China is the critical player in this saga, as it hosts the largest number of North Korean escapees in transit. Yet Beijing has consistently placed politics and its bilateral alliance with Pyongyang above the plight of refugees on its soil. Officially, China refuses to recognize North Koreans as refugees at all – instead, it labels them “illegal” economic migrants or trespassers, claiming they cross the border for food or work. The Chinese government cites a 1986 border agreement with North Korea (and subsequent secret protocols) which commit to mutual repatriation of each other’s “illegal” entrants. In line with this, Chinese security forces for years have actively hunted down North Korean escapees, particularly in the northeastern provinces. Under President Xi Jinping, surveillance technology and police operations in border regions have intensified, creating a “fishing net” of CCTV cameras, informants, and regular inspections designed to catch North Koreans in hiding. Local authorities have reportedly been given quotas to round up undocumented North Koreans, reflecting a systematic campaign to stem defections via China.

The result is grim: mass forcible repatriations. After a lull during the COVID-19 pandemic (when North Korea sealed its frontiers entirely, temporarily halting deportations), China has resumed large-scale returns of North Korean escapees. In October 2023, for example, Chinese authorities forcibly deported hundreds of North Koreans – estimates suggest up to 600 men, women, and children – who had been detained in various Chinese facilities during the border closure. They were sent back across the border in a heavily guarded convoy of buses and vans, in what observers called the largest mass repatriation in years. Their fate, like that of so many returnees, is unknown: no contact has been possible since they “vanished” into North Korean custody. Rights groups warn these people likely face interrogation, torture, sexual violence (including forced abortions for pregnant women), long terms in labor camps, or even execution as “traitors.” North Korean authorities regard defectors with utter hostility – state media routinely brands those who flee as “human scum” and enemies of the regime.

China’s policy of repatriation persists despite international condemnation. At China’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council in early 2024, Beijing explicitly rejected recommendations from other states to stop forcible returns of North Koreans. Chinese officials maintain that they are “handling the issue according to domestic law,” emphasizing that the North Koreans entered China illegally for economic reasons. Behind this stance is China’s strategic calculus: it fears that acknowledging North Koreans as refugees would anger Pyongyang and potentially encourage larger refugee flows that could destabilize the border. Additionally, a collapse of the North Korean regime (which a mass exodus might precipitate) is viewed in Beijing as a worst-case scenario, potentially bringing a U.S.-aligned Korea to China’s doorstep. Thus, the politics of alliance and regional stability have led China to flout the principle of non-refoulement, despite being a treaty signatory. Human Rights Watch bluntly states that by sending people back “to a place where they know returnees will be severely persecuted,” Chinese authorities are violating international law and may be complicit in North Korea’s crimes. Indeed, the UN Commission of Inquiry warned that China’s cooperation in capturing and repatriating escapees could constitute complicity in crimes against humanity.

It’s worth noting that China does have other options short of granting asylum itself. The South Korean government (by law) welcomes North Korean defectors as citizens, offering resettlement assistance. The United Nations and several countries have urged Beijing to at least allow the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) access to North Korean migrants in China and permit them safe passage to third countries. So far, China has resisted such proposals. By choosing repatriation instead, China has drawn sharp criticism for subordinating humanitarian obligations to political expediency.

Ethical and Humanitarian Dilemmas

The forcible return of North Korean refugees raises profound ethical questions. At its core, non-refoulement is not only a legal rule but a moral imperative: it reflects a near-universal agreement that human beings should not be delivered into the hands of torturers or executioners. When countries breach this norm, the human cost is devastating. Testimonies from North Korean defectors who survived repatriation (or from former officials) describe nightmarish consequences: whole families imprisoned in kwanliso (political prison camps), newborn babies of repatriated women killed and fetuses forcibly aborted, and torture methods so cruel that many do not survive captivity. Knowing this likely fate, sending someone back against their will isn’t just a technical violation of law – it is an action fraught with moral culpability. This is why human rights organizations frequently characterize China’s deportations as an egregious offense. In one recent appeal, a group of UN human rights experts insisted that China’s actions “may amount to aiding and abetting crimes against humanity” by North Korea. The ethical principle of “do no harm” clearly demands that no state should willfully put refugees in the path of such atrocities.

Even countries that generally support refugee protection can find themselves wrestling with these dilemmas. South Korea, for instance, has a formal policy of accepting North Korean escapees. Yet in one controversial episode in 2019, the South Korean government forcibly repatriated two North Korean fishermen who had fled by sea – over allegations that they had murdered fellow crew members. Despite the men’s expressed desire to defect, South Korean authorities handed them back to the North, calling them “dangerous criminals” undeserving of protection. The decision provoked domestic and international outcry. Human rights groups argued that, regardless of their crimes, the men were almost certain to face torture or execution in North Korea, making the expulsion a violation of non-refoulement obligations. Indeed, “returning these two men to North Korea was illegal under international law because of the likelihood they’ll be tortured under North Korea’s extremely brutal legal system,” Human Rights Watch said at the time. In a striking turn, South Korea’s own courts later agreed: in 2025, a South Korean court found several officials guilty over the unlawful repatriation, noting it “provoked criticism from… human rights activists” and acknowledging it should not have occurred. This case underscores that the non-refoulement principle applies universally – even to those accused of serious crimes – because the ban on torture is absolute. International law does allow excluding certain serious criminals from formal refugee status, but it never permits sending a person to a country where they are likely to be tortured or killed. The ethical rationale is simple: no matter what someone has done, no state should be complicit in subjecting them to inhumane treatment.

The International Response and the Road Ahead

The plight of North Korean refugees and the breaches of non-refoulement have not gone unnoticed. The United Nations, through its agencies and special rapporteurs, has repeatedly urged action. As mentioned, UN officials have called on China to stop repatriations and allow humanitarian access. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has likewise pressed China to recognize that many North Koreans have a valid claim to international protection and to grant the UNHCR a role in assessing individuals’ asylum claims. A coalition of over 70 civil society and human rights groups sent an open letter to China’s President in late 2023, imploring Beijing to halt plans for mass deportations and warning that such actions violate fundamental international norms. Allies like the United States, European Union, and South Korea have also raised the issue in diplomatic discussions, though often Beijing rebuffs these as interference in its “internal affairs.”

South Korea faces its own challenges in handling the continuous – if greatly diminished – trickle of defectors who reach its territory. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea’s border crackdowns have caused defection numbers to plummet to record lows. Yet, Seoul still receives new arrivals (just under a hundred in the first half of 2025) and provides them resettlement support. There is also growing attention to the “second wave” of these invisible journeys: the children born to North Korean refugees in third countries (mainly China) who are now seeking to join their mothers in South Korea. As these cases show, the refugee saga doesn’t end even after reaching a haven – integration and long-term protection remain concerns.

Ultimately, the issue of North Korean refugees and non-refoulement sits at the intersection of human rights and geopolitics. On one hand, there is an absolute moral and legal imperative to protect the vulnerable from persecution; on the other, regimes like China and Russia (and occasionally South Korea, as seen) weigh security, diplomatic, and political factors that lead them to shirk this duty. The challenge for the international community is to reinforce the norm that some values are non-negotiable – that no political rationale can justify sending someone back to “certain death or torture,” as this violates the most basic standards of humanity. That means sustained pressure and engagement with governments that host North Korean escapees, as well as creative solutions (for example, quiet arrangements to allow refugees safe transit to countries willing to take them).

The journeys of North Korean refugees may be largely invisible to the world, but they test the very visible principles we claim to uphold. Non-refoulement, often called the cornerstone of refugee protection, is only as strong as each nation’s commitment to honor it. In the case of North Koreans, that commitment has wavered dangerously. Every time a refugee is forced back through barbed wire fences and into the arms of an unforgiving regime, the promise of “never again” is broken. Ensuring that these invisible journeys end in sanctuary rather than sorrow will require courage – the courage of escaping North Koreans, certainly, but also the courage of governments and institutions to put human dignity above politics. In the end, the way the world handles these refugees is a measure of our collective adherence to the fundamental ethics of human rights and the rule of law.

References:

• Ellery Saluck. (2024). China’s Violation of Refugee Rights: Repatriation of North Korean Refugees. Human Rights Brief, 27(1). (Abstract notes China’s refusal to recognize North Korean escapees as refugees and its breach of non-refoulement obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture)digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu.
  
  

• Human Rights Watch. (2019, November 12). South Korea Deports Two From North to Likely Abuse. (Condemns South Korea’s 2019 repatriation of two North Korean fishermen as illegal under international law due to risk of torture on return)hrw.orghrw.org.
  
  

• Human Rights Watch. (2025, October 15). China: No Letup in Forced Returns to North Korea. (Documents that since 2024, China has resumed large-scale deportations of North Koreans, violating the non-refoulement principle and placing returnees at risk of torture, sexual violence, forced labor and execution)hrw.orghrw.org.
  
  

• Migration Policy Institute – Noël Um and Eunsook Jang. (2025, July 8). Slipping through the Cracks in South Korea: The Uncertain Futures for the Children of North Korean Defectors. Migration Information Source. (Notes that over 34,000 North Koreans have fled to South Korea in recent decades, and describes the plight of women refugees in China and their children, who live in fear of repatriation)migrationpolicy.orgmigrationpolicy.org.
  
  

• Oxford Human Rights Hub – Corinne L. Peters & Andrew Wolman. (2025, May 28). Chinese Repatriation of North Korean Escapees: An International Law Analysis. (Explains that North Korean escapees qualify as refugees sur place and that China’s forced repatriations violate its obligations under the Refugee Convention and Torture Convention; notes non-refoulement is a jus cogens norm and China could instead allow escapees safe passage to South Korea)ohrh.law.ox.ac.ukohrh.law.ox.ac.uk.
  
  

• Reuters – Hyonhee Shin. (2023, December 7). Up to 600 North Korean defectors deported by China ‘vanish’ – rights group. (Reports on a mass October 2023 repatriation of North Koreans by China, after which the defectors’ whereabouts are unknown; warns they likely face torture, imprisonment, or worse, and notes China’s denial of their refugee status)reuters.comreuters.com.
  
  

• Reuters – Joyce Lee & Hyonhee Shin. (2025, Feb 19). South Korea court finds former officials guilty of forcible return of N. Koreans. (Details the South Korean court ruling that the 2019 deportation of North Korean fishermen was unlawful; recounts that the men had intended to defect and that rights groups labeled the repatriation a potential “crime against humanity” given North Korea’s human rights record)reuters.comreuters.com.
  
  

• United Nations Human Rights Council. (2014). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK. (Findings from the UN COI documenting that repatriated North Koreans are routinely subjected to torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and other crimes against humanity; the COI urged all states not to return escapees to such treatment and noted that China’s actions could make it complicit)hrw.org.