No outside help for Britain

Fighting the Second World War had been a very expensive business for Britain; the country had to negotiate with the United States for a loan. While these tricky discussions were continuing, extremist Zionists were committing terrorist acts in Palestine, and their supporters were drumming up anti-British feeling around the world, particularly in America. At home the British government had to contend with a war-weary populace who wanted an end to the killing of young soldiers in Palestine, and the national humiliation of Britain's widely publicised problems in that country. These were the international and domestic challenges Britain faced in trying to find a settlement for Palestine; given the difficulties, could any country or organisation have solved the problem?

Statement on Palestine to the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, February 1947. 

PALESTINE (GOVERNMENT POLICY)

HC Deb 25 February 1947 vol 433 cc1901-2007

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1947/feb/25/palestine-government-policy

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin)

' I think we might have been able to do more for the Jews, and have increased this rate at that time, if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate admission of 100,000. I do not desire to create any ill feeling with the United States; in fact, I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them, as with other countries, but I should have been happier if they had had regard to the fact that we were the Mandatory Power, and that we were carrying the responsibility....

I went next morning to the (American) Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement be not issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections. ...

I think we could establish a case that we have carried out what the Mandate originally intended, provided that the problem had not been accentuated by the Hitler regime. If we take the ratio of migration and development un-accentuated by the Hitler regime, I think that the original basis of the Mandate, as visualised in 1922, has, in fact, been carried out. What we have not been able to do is to meet, with this Mandate, the accentuated position created by the Hitler regime and the persecution in Germany. That is my view. I believe that throughout British Governments have done their best all the way through....

The Palestine Administration has had one of the most difficult tasks of any Administration in the world....They have had no support from the people, and they have been criticised by both sides. I believe that they have honestly tried to do their best, and that if there has been a failure in dealing with the problem of these displaced persons due to persecution of the Jews it has not been the Palestine Mandate, as administered on the original basis, which has been the cause of failure; it has been the failure of the moral consciousness of international organisations to grapple with this problem, as a whole which has left the problem as it is at the present time....'

Notes:

Thomas Dewey was Republican governor of New York State; Democratic President Truman anticipated that Dewey would be his main rival in the presedential elections of 1948. In October 1946, during the mid-term elections,  Truman made a public statement endorsing the partition of Palestine and called for 100,000 Jewish refugees to be allowed to enter Palestine, because he anticipated that Dewey was about to make a similar statement in support of these aims. This occurred during the London Conference convened by the British  which sought to negotiate a settlement for Palestine with the Arabs and the Zionists.

Extract from Palestine Mission. A Personal Record 1947 written by British Labour MP Richard Crossman, a member of the Anglo-American committee on Palestine, 1946.

'....the average American supported immigration to Palestine simply because he did not want more Jews in America.....By shouting for a Jewish state, Americans satisfy many motives. They are attacking the Empire and British protectionism, they are espousing a moral cause, for whose fulfilment they will take no responsibility, and most important of all, they are diverting attention from the fact that their own immigration laws are one of the causes of the problem'

The Anglo-American Committee of enquiry was created to examine the problem of Palestine and how this related to the large numbers of Jewish displaced persons (DPs) in Europe after the war. The committee visited DP camps in Europe, and Palestine. Their report of April 1946 recommended that 100,000 Jewish refugees be allowed into Palestine immediately.

Extracts from 'Palestine Postscript. A short record of the last days of the Mandate,' by Sir Henry Gurney.

'Hitherto the British had been presented to American eyes as the principle enemies of the Zionist cause. Now for the first time the United States public began to see that the quarrel in Palestine was not between the British and the Jews, but between the Jews and the Arabs. Many people began to recognize that the British had in fact never been anything but the stake-holders, concerned only to see justice done and to prevent both sides from gaining their ends by violence.' p.7

'In the event, right up to the 15th May, the United Nations were unable to do anything but talk. The Security Council allowed their calls for a cease-fire to be ignored by both sides and could take no action to enforce any of their resolutions, drafted and debated over weeks and months. The Commission contented themselves, so far as we could see, with calling for more and more reports and information without knowing how they would ever use them.' p.10

Notes:

Sir Henry Gurney was a British colonial administrator who served in various posts throughout the British Empire. In 1946, he was appointed Chief Secretary to Palestine, serving until the end of British rule there in 1948. Gurney wrote Palestine Postscript during the final months of the Mandate.

Copy in the archives of the former British Empire & Commonwealth Museum.

Extracts from the Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly, 10 April 1948

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION TO THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

10 April 1948

'After studying all the information available to it, the commission reached the inescapable conclusion that, in view of the situation which had developed in Palestine, it was necessary to refer to the Security Council the problem of providing that armed assistance which alone would enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities on the termination of the Mandate. For the purpose the Commission presented to the Security Council its first Special Report on the Problem of Security (S/676).

The Security Council did not provide armed assistance for the Commission, nor did it give to the Commission guidance or instructions, as envisaged in the resolution of the Assembly. The Security Council did approve two resolutions, one calling for steps to be taken to arrange a truce between the conflicting parties in Palestine, and the other requesting the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine. ...

The organized efforts of Arab elements to prevent the partition of Palestine; the determined efforts to Jews to ensure the establishment of the Jewish State as envisaged by the resolution; and the fact that the Mandatory Power, engaged in the liquidation of its administration and the evacuation of its troops, has found it impossible fully to contain the conflict, have led to virtual civil war in Palestine; to a steady deterioration in administration and security in the territory; and to the imminence of widespread chaos, starvation, strife and bloodshed on a scale hitherto unknown there....

The Commission has exerted every effort to direct attention to the perilous situation in Palestine; to emphasize the urgency of the time factor; and to give warning of the heavy responsibilities which would be incurred if the situation were allowed to deteriorate still further. In its reports to the Security Council the Commission had indicated the remedies which were necessary and the preparations which must be made urgently with a view to preventing a complete collapse of law and order on the date of the termination of the Mandate. ...

 The Commission has received no guidance or instructions from the Security Council, and no armed assistance has been made available to it....

The Commission, therefore, has the duty to report to the General Assembly that the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of co-operation from the Mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine, and the fact that the Security Council did not furnish the Commission with the necessary armed assistance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly’s resolution. '

https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/BCE2BD823185E523802564AA0056DAEA

Notes:

The Palestine Commission was created by the United Nations General Assembly to carry out the proposal for the partition of Palestine that the General Assembly voted for on November 29 1947. The Commission was composed of five representatives of small powers: Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, Philippines, Bolivia. It was created by the Assembly, but acted under the guidance of the Security Council. Its task was to aid the transition in Palestine from the mandatory regime to the new arrangements called for by the Assembly.