'Those are my principles, and if you don't like them... well, I have others.' Groucho Marx

 

'The British,....within the flexible limits of the mandate, veered and tacked with the wind' J C Hurewitz, 'The Struggle for Palestine,' New York 1950, p21.

 

'The White Paper of 1939 was an even greater act of expediency than the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Both were motivated by strategic concerns related to war efforts, either existing, as in 1917, or imminent, as in 1939.' Charles D Smith, 'Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict – A History with Documents,' New York 2007, p150.

 

Britain excelled in making lofty statements and pledges with regard to Palestine and the Middle East; to the Hashemite family, to the Zionists, and to the people who lived there. British politicians and diplomats were adept at keeping their promises vague and ill-defined, so that, as circumstances changed, these stated intentions could be 'clarified' and newly defined to maintain the best interests of the British government.

 

Britain was good at proclaiming noble sentiments, but the grubby reality was that their policies only responded to power, or the illusion of power. In 1917 British politicians thought that the Zionists represented a global power with international connections that could shape the outcome of the First World War, the Hashemites were useful in 1915, but their charm was waning by 1919, in 1930 the minority government couldn't even be sure of their control of parliament, and by 1939 Britain had to reckon with newly assertive Arab states in considering their Palestine policy. There were no principles involved in Britain's attaempts to govern Palestine; British actions were governed by expediency, which ultimately resulted in an ignominious end to their rule in Palestine and their place in the Middle East.