Research

​[1] Luca Vitale and Massimo Pulejo (Roma Tre University). "The Strategic Allocation of Religious Investments". 

Abstract:  Religious institutions are major providers of public goods, with investments that can affect public policy and political competition. But is religious spending driven by political considerations? To tackle this question, we build a novel index for individual religious values, and use it to gauge the religiosity of 85,358 mayoral candidates in 45,797 municipal elections, held in Italy between 1995 and 2021. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that the Catholic Church doubles its investments in municipalities governed by religious mayors. This boost in Church's investments is likely motivated by strategic complementarities with the spending decisions of mayors. Using data on more than 6 million procurement contracts, we show that religious mayors significantly increase municipal spending for religious goods and services, especially in the field of education. This shift in public goods provision significantly boosts citizens' attachment to religion, and it increases their propensity to enroll children in religious schools and to donate money to religious NGOs. These findings shed new light on the interactions between the state and religious institutions, and their downstream effects on citizens' attitudes and socioeconomic choices. 

​​[2] Luca Vitale. "The Geography of Public Goods: Vote Concentration and Distributive Politics in Italy".

 Abstract: Public goods are often distributed unevenly within the same administrative or electoral unit. What drives this spatial distribution of public resources? Building on theories of group-based distributive politics and bloc voting, I argue that polling stations where a politician receives a dominant share of the vote become attractive targets for public investment, but only when the elected politicians are aligned with the executive power. I test this theory in the context of local politics in Italian cities. Using data from 1,781 polling stations over 10 Italian cities and 11 years, the empirical panel analysis shows that higher vote concentration leads to greater public goods provision, but only when the elected councilor is politically aligned with the mayor, allowing them access to public resources. The effect is stronger for highly visible public goods, suggesting that councilors prioritize projects that enhance credit-claiming. These findings suggest that vote concentration, when paired with access to resources and localized vote observability, plays a crucial role in determining the geographical allocation of public investments.

​[3] Luca Vitale and Bryant Moy (NYU). "Does Segregation Produce Local Political Leaders? Evidence from White Ethnic Enclaves". 

Abstract: Why do some ethnic groups produce local political leaders while others do not? We argue that the spatial distribution of ethnic groups within cities -- particularly their concentration into ethnic enclaves -- shapes political candidate emergence. Ethnic enclaves facilitate leadership by reducing mobilization costs, enabling targeted public goods provision, and fostering dense social and economic networks. Using a novel approach that combines machine learning classification of candidates' ethnic ancestries with spatial measures of ethnic clustering, we analyze data from 638 U.S. cities over five decades. We find that greater geographic clustering significantly increases both the emergence and electoral success of co-ethnic candidates, especially in city council elections. This relationship is nonlinear, intensifying beyond a threshold of spatial concentration. Our findings demonstrate that spatial concentration, beyond simple population share, shapes pathways to local political leadership. 

​[4] Luca Vitale.  "Religiosity and Local Debt Repayment: Evidence from Italian Mayors".  Under Review

Abstract:  Does a politician’s religiosity influence their policymaking? While existing research has examined how partisanship, gender, and ethnicity shape political decisions, the role of religiosity remains understudied. This paper investigates how religious values influence debt repayment decisions among local politicians. I develop a novel index for individual religiosity, based on names matching local patron saints, and apply it to 62,908 mayoral candidates in 31,434 municipal elections in Italy. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that narrowly elected religious mayors are more likely to increase debt repayment, reflecting Catholic values that emphasize the negative connotation of debt, the moral obligation to repay it, and an inherent risk aversion. Further analysis shows that religious mayors strategically mitigate electoral costs by targeting budget cuts in less electorally costly areas, balancing their commitment to fiscal responsibility with electoral considerations. Overall, these findings establish that religiosity is a crucial parameter in politicians’ utility functions.

[1] Luca Vitale and Lorenzo Maria Casale (UZH). "Family Ties and Electoral Accountability". 

Abstract: Do family ties undermine electoral accountability? While previous studies on political accountability have examined the role of institutional factors, they often overlook the impact of social connections and familial networks in shaping politicians' behavior. We argue that politicians from large families benefit from more unconditional electoral support from their relatives, driven by loyalty and deeply ingrained social norms. As a result, their incentives to perform well are lower, as they can rely on a stable base of support regardless of their governance outcomes. Employing a TWFE and a Politician-Characteristic Regression Discontinuity (PCRD) design in 33,283 municipal elections held in Italy between 2000 and 2020, we find that mayors from larger families exhibit poorer economic performance. Using a novel dataset of mayors' CVs, we further show preliminary evidence of instances of a privatized management of public finances, with mayors from large families allocating more public funds to repair/beautify their streets of residence. Last, our analysis shows that large-family mayors are not electorally punished for their poor economic performance. Our study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the role that family networks have in shaping politicians' incentives and electoral accountability.

​[2] Luca Vitale. "The Strategic Interaction Between Dictators and The Church: Evidence from Fascism". [Awarded 5000$]