Research

[1] Luca Vitale.  "Religiosity and Local Debt Repayment: Evidence from Italian Mayors".  First View, Political Science Research and Methods

[Journal Version] [WP Version] [Replication Package]

[2] Luca Vitale and Massimo Pulejo (Roma Tre University). "The Strategic Allocation of Religious Investments".  Conditionally Accepted at the Economic Journal

[1] Luca Vitale and Bryant Moy (NYU). "Does Segregation Produce Local Political Leaders? Evidence from White Ethnic Enclaves".  R&R at the American Political Science Review

Abstract: Why do some ethnic groups produce local political leaders while others do not? We argue that the spatial distribution of ethnic groups within cities -- particularly their concentration into ethnic enclaves -- shapes political candidate emergence. Ethnic enclaves facilitate leadership by reducing mobilization costs, enabling targeted public goods provision, and fostering dense social and economic networks. Using a novel approach that combines machine learning classification of candidates' ethnic ancestries with spatial measures of ethnic clustering, we analyze data from 638 U.S. cities over five decades. We find that greater geographic clustering significantly increases both the emergence and electoral success of co-ethnic candidates, especially in city council elections. This relationship is nonlinear, intensifying beyond a threshold of spatial concentration. Our findings demonstrate that spatial concentration, beyond simple population share, shapes pathways to local political leadership. 

[2] Luca Vitale and Lorenzo Maria Casale (UZH). "How Family Undermines Accountability: Evidence from Italy".  

Abstract: The concept of electoral accountability is foundational to democratic systems. But can family ties undermine this core mechanism? While previous research has shown how factors like electoral competition, polarization, and access to information shape accountability, it has often overlooked the impact of social structures and politicians’ interpersonal and familial ties. Specifically, we argue that politicians embedded in large family networks benefit from unconditional electoral support from their relatives, reducing their incentive to perform well in office. Employing a two-way fixed-effects model and a regression discontinuity design in Italian municipal elections from 2000 to 2020, we find that having a mayor from a large family leads to poorer economic performance; nonetheless, despite this underperformance, such mayors do not face negative electoral consequences. These findings reveal how family ties can alter politicians’ incentives and undermine accountability even in developed democracies, suggesting that economic development alone might not dissolve rooted forms of electoral insulation.

​​[3] Luca Vitale. "The Geography of Public Goods: Vote Concentration and Distributive Politics in Italy".  

 Abstract: Public goods are often distributed unevenly within the same administrative unit. What drives this spatial distribution of public resources? Building on theories of group-based distributive politics and bloc voting, I argue that polling stations where a politician receives a dominant share of the vote become attractive targets for public investment, but only when the elected politicians are aligned with the executive power.  This dynamic reflects an attribution logic: a dominant vote share gives a politician unambiguous local "ownership" of a polling station, raising the probability that public investment there will be credited specifically to them, whereas in more competitive precincts credit is diffused among several plausible claimants and the incentive to invest weakens accordingly. I test this theory in the context of local politics in Italian cities. Exploiting novel data from 2,596 polling stations over 11 Italian cities, the analysis shows that higher vote concentration leads to greater public goods provision, but only when the elected councilor is politically aligned with the mayor, allowing them access to public resources. These findings suggest that vote concentration, when paired with access to resources, plays a crucial role in determining the geographical allocation of public investments.

[1] Lorenzo De Rosa (Yale) and Luca Vitale. "Youth Enfranchisement and Legislators' Incentives: Evidence from the Italian Senate Reform". 

[2] Amy Catalinac (NYU) and Luca Vitale. "Group-based Clientelism". 

​​[3] Luca Vitale. "Endogenous Social Capital: Politicians and the Formation of Ethnic Civil Society".