Research
Research
[1] Luca Vitale. "Religiosity and Local Debt Repayment: Evidence from Italian Mayors". Conditionally Accepted at Political Science Research and Methods
[1] Luca Vitale and Bryant Moy (NYU). "Does Segregation Produce Local Political Leaders? Evidence from White Ethnic Enclaves". R&R at the American Political Science Review
Abstract: Why do some ethnic groups produce local political leaders while others do not? We argue that the spatial distribution of ethnic groups within cities -- particularly their concentration into ethnic enclaves -- shapes political candidate emergence. Ethnic enclaves facilitate leadership by reducing mobilization costs, enabling targeted public goods provision, and fostering dense social and economic networks. Using a novel approach that combines machine learning classification of candidates' ethnic ancestries with spatial measures of ethnic clustering, we analyze data from 638 U.S. cities over five decades. We find that greater geographic clustering significantly increases both the emergence and electoral success of co-ethnic candidates, especially in city council elections. This relationship is nonlinear, intensifying beyond a threshold of spatial concentration. Our findings demonstrate that spatial concentration, beyond simple population share, shapes pathways to local political leadership.
[2] Luca Vitale and Massimo Pulejo (Roma Tre University). "The Strategic Allocation of Religious Investments".
Abstract: State and religious institutions are commonly considered competitors in the provision of goods and services, although their leaders are often ideologically aligned. We propose a simple model in which politicians can use public money to co-finance the investments of religious institutions. We formally show that, if religious politicians are more likely to co-finance religious investments, religious institutions should spend more in places governed by religious politicians. To test this argument, we build a novel index for individual religious values and use it to gauge the religiosity of 85,358 mayoral candidates in 45,797 Italian municipal elections. Regression discontinuity analyses show that the Catholic Church doubles its investments in municipalities governed by religious mayors. Consistent with the key assumption of our model, we also show that religious mayors significantly increase public spending for religious goods and services. This increase in the offer of religious goods significantly boosts citizens' attachment to religion, increasing their propensity to enroll children in religious schools and to donate money to religious charities. These findings shed new light on the interactions between the state and religious institutions and their effects on citizens' attitudes and choices.
[3] Luca Vitale and Lorenzo Maria Casale (UZH). "How Family Undermines Accountability: Evidence from Italy".
Abstract: The concept of electoral accountability is foundational to democratic systems. But can family ties undermine this core mechanism? While previous research has shown how factors like electoral competition, polarization, and access to information shape accountability, it has often overlooked the impact of politicians' connections and familial ties. We argue that politicians embedded in large family networks benefit from unconditional electoral support from their relatives, reducing their incentive to perform well in office. Employing a two-way fixed effects model and a regression discontinuity design in Italian municipal elections from 2000 to 2020, we find that mayors from larger families exhibit poorer economic performance. Crucially, our analysis further shows that large-family mayors are not electorally punished in the following elections for their poor performance. These findings reveal how family ties can alter politicians' incentives to perform and undermine accountability in democratic systems.
[4] Luca Vitale. "The Geography of Public Goods: Vote Concentration and Distributive Politics in Italy".
Abstract: Public goods are often distributed unevenly within the same administrative or electoral unit. What drives this spatial distribution of public resources? Building on theories of group-based distributive politics and bloc voting, I argue that polling stations where a politician receives a dominant share of the vote become attractive targets for public investment, but only when the elected politicians are aligned with the executive power. I test this theory in the context of local politics in Italian cities. Using data from 1,781 polling stations over 10 Italian cities and 11 years, the empirical panel analysis shows that higher vote concentration leads to greater public goods provision, but only when the elected councilor is politically aligned with the mayor, allowing them access to public resources. The effect is stronger for highly visible public goods, suggesting that councilors prioritize projects that enhance credit-claiming. These findings suggest that vote concentration, when paired with access to resources and localized vote observability, plays a crucial role in determining the geographical allocation of public investments.
[1] Lorenzo De Rosa (Yale) and Luca Vitale. "Youth Enfranchisement and Legislators' Incentives: Evidence from the Italian Senate Reform".
[2] Amy Catalinac (NYU) and Luca Vitale. "Group-based Clientelism".
[3] Luca Vitale. "Building the Base: Politicians and the Formation of Ethnic Civil Society".