Theodicy

A theodicy is only needed if the 'theo' is omnipotent so can prevent evil, is omniscienct so knows of all event soccuring, etc, and is omnibeneficial... and this is exactly the model of the creator presented in Genesis. So the problem of evil never arose in other models, it perhaps arose first in it spresent ful form due to the Biblical account?! [see https://www.comparativereligion.com/evil.html for a review of the issue of evil as seen in Hinduism, etc]]

So it is interesting to see that very acount as also resolving that problem!

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For post-Edenic existence not to be unfair, it isn't sufficient that the exit from Eden was a result of choice, one needs also the implications of "en od milvado" & "we are dream of God" idea (as implied in our being H's tzelem/ruach), ie the H' is subjecting himself to it all, not 'us', ie not a separate awareness being made to suffer, it is all just H!

How the creation & Eden accounts raise and resolve the problem of evil

Internet sources re Theodicy in ancient times, and now

Excerpt from source below: ["Problem of Evil": Wikipedia]:

Influential Roman writers such as Cicero and Seneca, drawing on earlier work by the Greek philosophers such as the Stoics, developed many arguments in defense of the righteousness of the gods, and many of the answers they provided were later absorbed into Christian theodicy.^{[citation needed]}

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Buddhism neither denies the existence of evil, nor does it attempt to reconcile evil in a way attempted by monotheistic religions ...... the problem of evil or of theodicy does not apply to it....Buddhism accepts that there is evil in the world, as well as Dukkha (suffering) that is caused by evil or because of natural causes (aging, disease, rebirth). The precepts and practices of Buddhism, such as Four Noble Truths and Noble Eightfold Path aim to empower a follower in gaining insights and liberation (nirvana) from the cycle of such suffering as well as rebirth.^[159][162]

Free Will

The possibility for free will that remains is libertarian agent causation, according to which agents as substances (thus not merely as having a role in events) can cause actions without being causally determined to do so.

Agent causation, or Agent causality, is an idea in philosophy which states that an agent can start new causal chains not determined by prior events. This is in contrast to causal determinism.^[1][2]

Defenders of this theory include Thomas Reid and Roderick Chisholm.

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https://philpapers.org/browse/agent-causation

Agent causal theories date back to Reid 1863. An important defence of theories of this sort was offered by Roderick Chisholm, in Chisholm 1976 (among other works). In the contemporary debate, the most important defender of agent causation is Timothy O'Connor; O'Connor 2000 is his most important work on the topic. Clarke 2003 contains an important sympathetic but ultimately skeptical discussion. Mele 2005 argues that agent-causation does not solve the problem of reduced control that it was introducing to address; Clarke 2005 replies. Markosian 1999 is a defence of compatibilist agent-causation.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incompatibilism

Those who reject free will and accept determinism are variously known as "hard determinists", hard incompatibilists, free will skeptics, illusionists, or impossibilists. They believe that there is no 'free will' and that any sense of the contrary is an illusion.^[8] Of course, hard determinists do not deny that one has desires, but say that these desires are causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. According to this philosophy, no wholly random, spontaneous, mysterious, or miraculous events occur. ... if our decisions were indeterministic events, free will would also be precluded. ...free will is the control in action required for the desert aspect of moral responsibility (Derk Pereboom: for empirical reasons it is unlikely that we are agent causes of this sort, and that as a result, it is likely that we lack free will )—for our deserving to be blamed or punished for immoral actions, and to be praised or rewarded for morally exemplary actions. .....if our decisions were indeterministic events, their occurrence would not be in the control of the agent in the way required for such attributions of desert