A former colony of Spain, by the early 20th century, Guatemala had evolved into a highly stratified society. A tiny minority of elite coffee growers, linked to the ruling regime, gained increasing control over land and labor. Almost completely dependent on the production and exportation of coffee, Guatemala was subject to the fluctuations of international markets. In fact, its economy nearly collapsed with the onset of the Great Depression. Economic instability led to social and political unrest and bankruptcies and unemployment began to spiral out of control. In 1931 Guatemala’s elite united and turned to the rule of a strongman, Jorge Ubico Castañeda, to restore stability and growth.

Ubico was given virtually unchecked powers, and upon assuming office he suspended constitutional guarantees and crushed all opposition, particularly from organized labor. He mandated rigid enforcement of the law and used forced labor for public infrastructure projects. Ubico staunchly defended private property and landowners’ legal rights to a guaranteed labor supply. He severely cut government spending and rooted out corruption to balance the national budget. 

Ubico was a staunch political and economic ally of the United States. During World War II, he declared war on Japan, Italy, and Germany, welcomed the stationing of American troops in Guatemala, and moved to dispossess German immigrants of their lands. Ubico was also a friend to American businesses in Guatemala, in particular maintaining amicable and preferential relations with the United Fruit Company.

By the mid-1940s, a small and upwardly mobile middle class was beginning to emerge thanks to the stable economy and economic growth. This middle class, inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and the war against fascism and dictatorship in Europe and the Pacific, increasingly demanded political change. Ubico’s announcement that he would remain in office until at least 1949 caused both the middle and upper classes to protest. On July 1, 1944, Ubico yielded to this pressure and surrendered power to a junta [council]. However, this junta lasted only 3 months.

In October 1944, a group of junior army officers led a coup d’etat, formed a new junta, and immediately scheduled presidential elections for December 1944. Almost alone in the field, Juan José Arévalo Bermejo won the election, receiving 85 percent of the vote.

Arévalo assumed the presidency in March 1945. The new president led the creation of a new constitution, which would protect basic rights, while allowing for moderate reform focusing on nationalism and “the dignity of man” as a part of what he called “spiritual socialism.” Two of the document’s articles had were alarming to Guatemala’s elite and to the United States. Articles 91 and 92 recognized the right to private property, but stated that the government could expropriate [take away] land at any time to fulfill the needs of society at large. Arévalo never invoked Articles 91 and 92, but Guatemala’s landed elite were alarmed and accused Arévalo of succumbing to Communist influence. Even after the he purged his government of right-wing and left-wing extremists in July 1945, the allegations continued. Opponents labeled him communist, fascist, and, “Communist-fascist.”

While initially approving of Arévalo, the US soon grew wary of his supposed communist sympathies. In 1947 he signed a labor protection law targeting the United Fruit Company and later legalized the communist party. Alarm grew when he gave his support to the Caribbean Legion, a group of reformist Latin Americans who plotted to overthrow dictatorships in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, but which had many communists as members. 

When elections finally came in 1950, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, one of the members of the revolutionary junta of 1944, ran almost unopposed on a platform that advocated agrarian reform. 

When he assumed office in early 1951, Arbenz inherited a country that had changed little during Arévalo’s tenure and remained an economic paradox. Compared with its Central American neighbors, Guatemala was a rich country with the region’s highest gross domestic product (GDP) and strongest exports as well as a more diversified economy. However, in spite of its impressive economic performance, the country suffered from a highly skewed distribution of resources. A mere 2 percent of the population controlled more than 72 percent of Guatemala’s arable land. Of all privately held land, less than 12 percent was being cultivated. In a country dedicated primarily to agriculture, this translated into sweeping poverty and malnutrition.

From the outset of his presidency, Arbenz attempted to tackle Guatemala’s socioeconomic ills through a major agrarian reform. Guatemalan Communists were quick to support the new president’s efforts and Arbenz welcomed their participation. He worked with them to create an agrarian reform law, which, when it was passed by the National Assembly and signed by Arbenz in June 1952, was called Decree 900. This law mandated the redistribution of uncultivated lands in excess of 223 acres. Compensation for expropriated lands was provided in the form of government bonds.

The landed elite vehemently opposed Decree 900 immediately began publishing anti-reform pamphlets complaining of communist infiltration of the government. The United Fruit Company immediately recognized that, given its massive land holdings, it would be deeply impacted by the reform and began lobbying the US government for support. Guatemalan peasants, on the other hand, responded exuberantly and occassionally resorted to land seizure and the occupation of large plantations.

As early as 1951—well before an agrarian reform law could be written, much less passed—the Central Intelligence Agency was already drawing up a contingency plan to oust Arbenz for his tolerance of communism. The social unrest that accompanied the passage and implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law convinced critics in Guatemala and the US that communism had gained a foothold in the Americas. Contingency plans became an active plot, called PBSUCCESS, which was approved by President Dwight Eisenhower and carried out in June 1954.

Carlos Castillo Armas took power at the head of a military junta, provoking the Guatemalan Civil War, which lasted from 1960 to 1996. Elections and coups brought numerous leaders into power and the military used this instability to gain more power. Battles were waged between the military and leftist guerrillas, supported most strongly by the impoverished indigenous population. Increasingly the military targeted anyone seen as sympathetic to the rebels, including Catholic priests and nuns and entire indigenous villages. 

Declassified documents have revealed that the US consistently supported the military through training, financial support, and weapons sales in spite of being  aware of its human rights abuses. In the late 1970s, US President Jimmy Carter attempted to pressure Guatemala to stop abuses and then barred government and commercial sales of military equipment to Guatemala. In spite of the embargo, financial support and military advising continued, while US allies provided military equipment. 

In 1982, evangelical pastor and General Efraín Ríos Montt led a coup and became president of Guatemala. US President Ronald Reagan, who was tough on leftists throughout the Americas and the world, met with Montt and asserted that he was committed to reforms and democracy. Reagan lifted the US embargo and within weeks, now declassified CIA cables were reporting increased military abuses. The early 1980s saw the most severe killings and human rights violations of the war.

In 1994, under new President Ramiro De Leon Carpio, peace talks between the government and rebels of the Guatemalan Revolutionary National Unity began and agreements were signed on several issues including human rights. In 1996, under new president Alvaro Arzu peace negotiations were finalized. Peace accords ending the 36-year internal conflict were signed in December of 1996. The conflict officially killed over 200,000 people with many more “disappeared.”

In 2013, a Guatemalan court found Ríos Montt guilty of crimes against humanity and genocide against the Maya Ixil people. Montt was appealing this conviction when he died in March of 2018.

Washington, July 9, 1952.

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Situation

Summary:

The growing Communist tendencies of the present Guatemalan Government have alienated the majority of Guatemalans to such an extent that a popular uprising to overthrow the government is to be expected as a normal reaction. Forces supporting the government are confined to the Communists and fellow-travelers and to those members of the Armed Forces and labor who have benefited materially under the present regime. The recent passage of the Agrarian Reform Act, which makes land available to all Guatemalans in the Communist pattern, is expected to win further adherents to the government although it is opposed to the landowning class whose influence will wane as the Act takes effect.

Armed action against the government has been planned and pending since early this year and is now imminent. Details of the plan for such action, which follows through to the establishment of a democratic government, are known to us. [name not declassified] considers that if proper support can be provided the plan is feasible and practical and has a good chance of succeeding if it is put in effect by 1 September 1952.

Col. Castillo Armas, now resident in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, is the leader of the movement which is supported by organized groups in Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico and Guatemala. Cordova Cerna, resident in Guatemala City, is Castillo’s man in Guatemala. Carlos Simons, resident in Guatemala City, is the leader of another large anti-government group in Guatemala which is planning armed action, but which is not as yet working in coordination with Castillo. Coordination is being effected. These three are of exceptional ability and character and are fast friends of the U.S.

Castillo’s movement has the moral support of President Somoza of Nicaragua and of President Galves of Honduras, and it is believed that material support from these two men would be forthcoming if they could be assured of U.S. approval.

Castillo’s plan envisages moving against the government with clandestine armed forces from the borders of Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras and from the sea on Puerto Barrios in conjunction with internal revolt. He can arm the group in Mexico through purchase of matériel in that country and his other forces have some arms available. However, he will require assistance with matériel from some sources outside the area. His requests for combat air support are not considered to be necessary, but his request for air transport support should be met. His requests for shipping support can be met through procurement in the area. Simons can procure arms locally for his part in the action. Considerable local financial support has already been obtained by both Castillo and Simons, but further support is indicated. Castillo’s additional financial needs are estimated at $175,000 and Simons’ at $50,000, to include purchase of arms available in the area.

Conclusions:

1. Armed action in Guatemala is imminent.

2. The success of any action undertaken without further outside support is questionable and may well result in the elimination of all effective anti-Communist opposition in Guatemala.

3. Support in the form of direction, arms and equipment, enlisting the aid of area chiefs of state, finances, and air transport and shipping support can guarantee a good chance of success.

Recommendations:

1. That two more men from WHD be sent to [place not declassified] to assist the men now there in advising on operations.

2. That support with arms and equipment be provided. (These to be returnable upon successful conclusion of the operation.)

3. That Somoza and Galvez be informed that any assistance they give to Castillo will not reflect to their discredit.

4. That financial support in the amount of $225,000 be provided. (This amount to be reimbursable upon the successful conclusion of the operation.)

That air transport and ocean shipping support be arranged by the other parties interested in the operation. 

Washington, May 12, 1975.

SUBJECT: CIA’s Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz

In August 1953, the Operations Coordinating Board directed CIAto assume responsibility for operations against the Arbenz regime. Appropriate authorization was issued to permit close and prompt cooperation with the Departments of Defense, State and other Government agencies in order to support the Agency in this task. The plan of operations called for cutting off military aid to Guatemala, increasing aid to its neighbors, exerting diplomatic and economic pressure against Arbenz and attempts to subvert and or defect Army and political leaders, broad scale psychological warfare and paramilitary actions. During the period August through December 1953 a CIA staff was assembled and operational plans were prepared.

Following are the specific operational mechanisms utilized by the Agency in the overall missions against the Arbenz government:

1. Paramilitary Operations. Approximately 85 members of the Castillo Armas group received training in Nicaragua… 

2. Air Operations. ...There were approximately 80 missions flown during the 14–29 June 1954 period, by various type aircraft such as C–47’s, F–47’s and Cessnas which were used to discharge cargo, distribute propaganda and for strafing and bombing missions.

3. Clandestine Communications. A clandestine radio broadcasting station was established in Nicaragua. The purpose of these broadcasts was to intimidate members of the Communist Party and public officials who were sympathetic to the Communist cause. The radio station, prior to D-day, broadcasted programs on why they were on the air; dramatized examples of Communist tyranny; the ideologies and aims of the Liberation Movement and what effect was intended vis-à-vis each individual who was listening; an aggressive program outlining the activities which would ultimately bring down the Communist threat, etc.

4. Q Program. The objective was spreading responsibility for the operation throughout as many Latin American countries as possible in order to lessen the impact of United States participation.

[...]

One of the propaganda ploys was to fabricate reports of Soviet arms deliveries to Guatemala by submarine, and then arranging to have a CIA planted cache of Soviet arms discovered and publicized. The mythical arms deliveries were superseded by the real thing when a ship carrying 2,000 tons of Czech weapons and ammunition arrived. This shipment created an international furor and provided clinching proof of what had been the main CIA propaganda theme, that Guatemala under Arbenz had become a Soviet satellite.